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I. INTRODUCTION
Non-bankruptcy restructurings, which encompass a variety of cor-
porate finance transactions, may prove to be the boom area of securities
law in the 1990s, as the issuance of debt securities was in the 1980s.' The
general purpose of restructuring transactions is to preserve the going
concern value of a financially troubled corporation2 by modifying its cap-
ital structure to reduce interest or dividend expense, or to eliminate or
modify covenants in the corporation's existing securities that restrict or
prohibit a restructuring, or that the corporation can no longer satisfy.3
A corporation can effect a restructuring in a number of ways. One
often-used technique involves the consensual exchange (Exchange Offer)
of new securities of the corporation (New Securities)4 for certain of its
then outstanding securities (Target Securities).'
In addition, a corporation contemplating an out-of-court restructur-
ing may choose to solicit security holders' consents to modify Target Se-
1. See, eg., Cleaning Up After the '80s, INST'L INvESTOR, May 1990, at 92; Corporate
Finance; Time to Pick Up the Pieces, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 1990, at 1; Curran, Hard Lessons
from the Debt Decade, FORTUNE, June 18, 1990, at 76; Light, Yesterday's Bad Deals Are To-
day's New Business, Bus. WK., Dec. 11, 1989, at 96; Osborne & Voorhees, Looking for
Trouble, AM. LAW., Apr. 1990, at 6; Peterson, The Bankruptcy Boom, L.A. Times, June 30,
1990, at D 1, col. 2; Perry, Leveraged Buyout Firms Take Aim at Restructuring, Reuters, June
27, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Business file); Wise, Workouts, Bankruptcy Work Replacing
Junk Bonds Practice, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1989, at 1.
2. This Article focuses on out-of-court restructurings of corporations, although the con-
cepts and laws often apply equally to other legal entities.
3. For example, a corporation may offer shares of its common stock to holders of its debt
securities to eliminate interest expense or to preferred stockholders to eliminate dividend re-
quirements. See, e.g., BALLY MANUFACTURING CORP., OFFERING CIRCULAR (May 30,
1990); FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF SANTA BARBARA, PROSPECTUS (Nov. 7, 1989)
(amended by three supplements, the last of which was dated Jan. 3, 1990) (common stock for
one series of preferred stock and two series of debt). Obviously, the reduction of interest ex-
pense and dividend obligations would be attractive to non-financially troubled corporations, as
well. Non-financially troubled corporations have, in fact, used some of the techniques de-
scribed in this Article to accomplish these goals. See, e.g., OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPO-
RATION, OFFERING CIRCULAR (Sept. 23, 1987) (offering common stock for senior notes);
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, OFFERING CIRCULAR (July 2, 1987) (offering com-
mon stock for preferred stock that was exchangeable into debt securities).
4. The term, "New Securities," for the purposes of this Article, shall include any security
that is issued or created pursuant to any form of restructuring, including any exchange for or
modification of existing securities.
5. The term, "Target Securities," for the purposes of this Article, shall include any out-
standing security that a corporation attempts to acquire (for cash or New Securities) or modify
pursuant to any form of restructuring.
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curities (Consent Solicitation),6 reclassify equity securities pursuant to an
amendment to the corporation's charter (Reclassification) 7 or repurchase
Target Securities for cash.' A financially troubled corporation may also
utilize a "pre-packaged" plan of bankruptcy (Prepackaged Bankruptcy)
to avoid protracted chapter 11 proceedings. 9 This Article, however, fo-
cuses on issues related to out-of-court restructurings generally as well as
certain issues unique to Exchange Offers that involve an exchange or a
series of exchanges of New Securities for Target Securities pursuant to
section 3(a)(9)10 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the Securities
Act)," and on some of the issues raised by Consent Solicitations,1 2 which
frequently accompany restructurings that include an exchange of
securities.
The issuance of New Securities in exchange for Target Securities
6. See infra notes 44, 303-81 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 401, 903 (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242
(1983 & Supp. 1990). Such an amendment can, for example, transform a share of preferred
stock into a share of common stock. The Reclassification thereby would eliminate that pre-
ferred stock and, subject to relevant state corporate statutes and case law, eliminate its associ-
ated preference, dividend and other rights. In addition, a Reclassification would enable a
corporation seeking to restructure its existing common stock or preferred stock into new stock
to eliminate the issue of "holdouts," because once the corporation receives the requisite stock-
holder vote to effect the amendments, all holders of the modified (l~e., reclassified) Target
Securities, even those holders who voted against the Reclassification, are bound by the vote.
For a discussion of the issue of holdouts generally, see infra notes 45-50 and accompanying
text. When considering a Reclassification, practitioners must analyze whether the applicable
corporate statute permits Reclassifications, and if it does, whether the stockholders who vote
against the Reclassification would be entitled to dissenters' rights of appraisal. See 3 MODEL
BusINEss CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.01 (1990) (listing 29 states that provide dissenters' rights of
appraisal when certain amendments to a charter are approved). See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW, § 802(b)(6) (McKinney 1986); 3 MODEL BusINESS CORP. ANN. ACT § 13.02(a)(4)
(1990). Delaware and California are among those states that do not provide for dissenters'
rights of appraisal in such circumstances.
8. This usually occurs through a corporation's cash self-tender offer for Target Securities,
see, e-g., ZAPATA CORP., OFFER TO PURCHASE (Nov. 5, 1990), or through its open-market
repurchase of its debt or equity securities. Rule lOb-18, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18 (1990), gov-
erns an issuer's open market purchases of its common stock by providing a safe harbor from
liability for manipulation under sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(2), 78j(b) (1988). See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the
Issuer and Others; Adoption of Safe Harbor, Exchange Act Release No. 19,244, [1982 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,276, at 85,477 (Nov. 17, 1982); Post-Crash Repur-
chases: Legal Regulatory Concerns, Manhattan Law., Dec. 8, 1987, at 34; Olson & Rosengren,
SEC Gives Issuer Repurchasers a Safe Harbor at Last, Legal Times, Feb. 21, 1983, at 32.
9. Prepackaged Bankruptcies are authorized by section 1126(b) of chapter 11 of the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1988). See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying
text for a brief discussion of Prepackaged Bankruptcies. See, eg., THE SOUTHLAND CORPO-
RATION, PROXY STATEMENT-PROSPECTUS (Oct. 5, 1990).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1988).
11. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
12. See infra notes 303-81 and accompanying text.
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requires registration of the offering of the New Securities with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (the SEC), 13 unless an exemption is avail-
able.14 Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act (Section 3(a)(9)) provides
such an exemption and is often relied upon in the context of out-of-court
restructurings. 5 This exemption, often called the "exchange exemp-
tion," applies when New Securities are exchanged, except in a case under
title 11 of the United States Code, 6 "by the issuer with its existing secur-
ity holders exclusively where no commission or other remuneration is
paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange."' 7
A restructuring conducted as an exchange of securities pursuant to
Section 3(a)(9) (Section 3(a)(9) Exchange)'" offers a distinct advantage
over alternative forms of restructurings-by avoiding the delay associ-
ated with the registration of securities with the SEC, a Section 3(a)(9)
Exchange can be commenced relatively quickly and relatively inexpen-
sively.19 A Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, however, also has one significant
disadvantage to the corporation-the corporation cannot retain paid
agents to solicit the participation of the holders of Target Securities in
13. For a discussion of the judicial interpretation of exchanges of securities as "sales"
under the Securities Act, see infra note 118 and accompanying text.
14. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e. This Article does not specifically address
the Securities Act registration process in any detail. For a general discussion of the registra-
tion process, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 110-219 (6th ed. 1987); I & II L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SECURITIES RGULATION 513-743
(3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1990).
15. Corporations also conduct exchanges that are exempt from the registration require-
ments of the Securities Act pursuant to exemptions for securities issued in (a) a settlement that
includes the issuance of New Securities and that is approved by a qualifying governmental
agency, provided by section 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (Section 3(a)(10) Settlement Ex-
change), and (b) a private placement of New Securities, provided by section 4(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (Section 4(2) Private Exchange).
16. Title 11 of the United States Code contains the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (1988).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9).
18. While this defined term, as well as this Article, focuses on outright exchanges of a New
Security for a Target Security, Section 3(a)(9) also can be relied on to exempt other forms of
out-of-court restructurings, such as Reclassifications, which are effected through a stockholder
vote rather than a voluntary exchange of securities. See Rule 145 & preliminary note 2, 17
C.F.R. § 230.145 & note 2 (1990) (providing that an "offer" or "sale" of a security occurs for
purposes of the Securities Act when stockholders are asked to vote or consent to a plan or
agreement that, in essence, requires an investment decision on their part, and expressly provid-
ing that Section 3(a)(9) is available to exempt certain Rule 145 transactions from the registra-
tion requirements of the Securities Act if the conditions of Section 3(a)(9) are satisfied);
Securities Act Release No. 5463, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) % 3058, at 3067-3 to -4 (Feb. 28,
1974) (Illustration C).
19. For a discussion of the importance of the time required to complete a restructuring in
selecting a restructuring technique, see infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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the proposed exchange.2° If a corporation believes that professional so-
licitation efforts are essential to the success of its restructuring, the cor-
poration must either conduct the exchange within the parameters of
another Securities Act exemption,21 or it must register the sale of New
Securities offered in the exchange by filing a registration statement with
the SEC (Registered Exchange).22
From a legal standpoint, Exchange Offers may involve a plethora of
regulations and issues, including the following:
* the elements of Section 3(a)(9), if applicable; 3
" if there is a concurrent Consent Solicitation, the proxy rules
set forth in Regulation 14A 24 and Regulation 14C 21 promul-
gated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(the Exchange Act);
26
* the tender offer and "going private" rules27 promulgated
under the Williams Act, as amended;
21
20. See infra notes 204-57 and accompanying text. Another disadvantage of the Section
3(a)(9) Exchange is that, as in all consensual exchanges, participation of holders of Target
Securities is voluntary, and as such cannot bind non-participating holders of Target Securities.
These non-participating holders are often called "holdouts." For a discussion of the issue of
holdouts, see infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. The issue of holdouts in consensual
restructurings may cause a corporation to use another form of restructuring that binds non-
consenting holders of Target Securities, such as Reclassifications, see supra note 7, and
Prepackaged Bankruptcies. See, Hylton, Business and the Law: Prepackaging a Bankruptcy,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1990, at D2, col. 1; Southland Uses New Weapon in Reorganization
Battle, Reuters, Oct. 24, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Current file); Helliker, Prepackaged
Bankruptcy Acts as a Weapon, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1990, at A10, col. 1. See infra notes 48-49
and accompanying text, briefly discussing Prepackaged Bankruptcies.
21. See supra note 15.
22. As noted above, this Article does not attempt to review the registration process under
the Securities Act, which is not that different for Exchange Offers than for any other type of
offering, and is described well by many other commentators. See, e.g., authors cited supra note
14. Instead, this Article focuses more on Exchange Offers conducted pursuant to Section
3(a)(9), a topic that has not been analyzed extensively from a practitioner's perspective. See
infra notes 118-302. For a brief discussion of some of the timing and other factors that govern
a Registered Exchange and the proper form for registering an Exchange Offer pursuant to the
Securities Act, see infra notes 37-38 & 287, respectively.
23. See infra notes 127-257 and accompanying text.
24. Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14b-2 (1990). For a discussion of the
proxy rules, see infra notes 448-57 and accompanying text.
25. Regulation 14C, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14c-1 to -7 (1990). The requirements of Regulation
14C approximate those of Regulation 14A; consequently, Regulation 14C generally will not be
referred to separately in the balance of this Article.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988).
27. The tender offer and going private rules that primarily apply to Section 3(a)(9) Ex-
changes include Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1990), Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4
(1990), and Regulation 14E, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 to -3 (1990). For a discussion of the tender
offer and "going private" rules, see infra notes 382-447 and accompanying text.
28. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15
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0 if the New Security is a qualifying debt security, the require-
ments of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, as amended (the
TIA)29 and the rules promulgated thereunder;
30
* the continuing concern about the proper timing of public dis-
closure about the restructuring and related issues from the con-
ception to consummation of the restructuring;
31
0 the laws governing fiduciary duties and contractual obliga-
tions owed to various classes of security holders;
3 2
" state blue sky and securities laws;
33
" the rules of securities exchanges;
34
" the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. (the NASD); 3' and
U.S.C. §§ 781 (i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988)). The Williams Act, which was named after its
sponsor, Senator A. Williams, enacted the portions of the Exchange Act that govern tender
offers, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-7bbbb (1988) as amended by Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-550 (Nov. 15, 1990).
30. 17 C.F.R. §§ 260.0-1 to .14a-1, 269.0-1 to 269.7 (1990); see infra notes 458-64 and
accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of these issues as they have been applied in Delaware courts generally
and in the context of "exit consents" particularly, see infra notes 313-59 and accompanying
text.
33. Practitioners must determine whether the New Securities to be issued in a Section
3(a)(9) Exchange and the corporation conducting the exchange (because of its potential status
as a "dealer") must be registered in each of the states in which holders of Target Securities
reside. Approximately forty-four states presently provide a transaction exemption substan-
tially similar to Section 3(a)(9). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7309(b)(11) (1974). Cali-
fornia does not provide for this exemption (along with Iowa, North Dakota, Utah and
Vermont). One viable alternative is the "listed securities" exemption. See, e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25102 (West 1977).
Approximately forty-three states presently exclude issuers from the statutory definition of
broker-dealer. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25004 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 7302(a)(3) (1974). But see ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1801 (9)(b) (1987) (including issu-
ers in definition of dealers); FLA. STAT. AN. § 517.021(6)(a)(2) (West 1988); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 8-1101(3) (1987) (includes non-resident issuers within definition); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 359-e(1)(a) (McKinney 1984); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 10-04-02(2) (1985); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1707.01(E) (Anderson 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202a (Supp. 1990).
Practitioners are advised to start "blue-sky surveys" early in the process of planning any re-
structuring, especially in connection with the usually quick-paced Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, to
investigate the available exemptions and ascertain the required filings. See infra note 414 and
accompanying text for a brief discussion of limited exceptions to the tender offer rules for state
blue sky problems.
34. See infra note 452 and accompanying text.
35. The NASD exerts jurisdiction over non-underwritten restructurings, including Section
3(a)(9) Exchanges. The NASD reviews both the level of compensation of a NASD member
retained to advise a corporation conducting a non-underwritten restructuring, see NASD Inter-
pretations of the Board of Governors Relating to Section 1 of Article III of the Rules of Fair
Practice, NASD Manual (CCH) 12151.02, at 2023-37 (May 1989) [hereinafter Interpretations,
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* tax and debtor/creditor considerations.36
Ultimately, the process of selecting and executing a particular Exchange
Offer requires extensive cross-disciplinary legal analyses and guidance.
This Article provides issuers, financial advisors and their counsel
with a practical guide to the legal and logistical considerations generated
by Exchange Offers, particularly Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges and Consent
Solicitations. First, this Article summarizes some important considera-
tions in conducting Exchange Offers. It then describes the important as-
pects of the Section 3(a)(9) exemption, with particular focus on each of
the elements of Section 3(a)(9) from a practitioner's perspective, includ-
ing a checklist for complying with the element that can be most trouble-
some: the "no paid solicitation" requirement. The nest section of this
Article describes several logistical and legal aspects of Consent Solicita-
tions, especially those that arise when Consent Solicitations are con-
ducted in conjunction with Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges. This Article then
presents an overview of additional statutes, rules and regulations that
often apply to Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges and Consent Solicitations, such
as the tender offer, "going private" and proxy rules of the Exchange Act,
and the TIA. Finally, this Article concludes by presenting a summary of
the advantages and disadvantages of Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges and Con-
sent Solicitations.
II. CERTAIN PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Several significant factors impact how and whether a corporation
should attempt an out-of-court restructuring by means of an Exchange
Offer. Though many of the issues raised in this section are discussed
more thoroughly elsewhere, it is important to set them out initially to
provide a framework for this Article.
A. Time
The passage of time is almost always an enemy of the financially
troubled corporation. As time passes, suppliers may tighten credit and
customers may question orders, both of which further damage a corpora-
tion's cash flow. Employees may question the security of their positions,
NASD Manual], and whether such a NASD member is participating in the public distribution
of its own or its affiliates securities, see Schedule E to the By-Laws, NASD Manual (CCH) T
1881, at 1611-18 (July 1990). As a result, absent an exemption, a NASD member must file
many of the same documents with the NASD as it would file in an underwritten offering to
determine whether its fees are fair and reasonable, and whether its participation in the transac-
tion creates a "conflict of interest."
36. See infra notes 78-117 and accompanying text.
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possibly depriving the corporation of valuable human resources. Rating
agencies may downgrade existing securities. All of these factors can di-
rectly or indirectly decrease a corporation's access to capital and thereby
exacerbate its difficulties. Consequently, the more quickly a corporation
can successfully restructure, the better its future prospects tend to be.
Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges generally can be commenced more quickly
than most other types of out-of-court restructurings, in some cases within
a few weeks.37 Consequently, time pressures by themselves might dictate
the use of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange.3"
B. Development of Incentives for Existing Security Holders to
Participate in an Exchange Offer and the Issue of "Holdouts"
Corporations have long sought to create both positive and negative
incentives for existing investors to participate in Exchange Offers. The
positive incentives have included inserting terms in the New Securities
that are intended to make them trade at a premium over the current
market price of the Target Securities, such as a higher interest or divi-
37. The offering documents for most other forms of restructurings, for example, any Reg-
istered Exchange, or any Reclassification or Consent Solicitation subject to the proxy rules,
must be reviewed by the SEC prior to formal commencement. Furthermore, a qualified gov-
ernmental agency must approve any Section 3(a)(10) Settlement Exchange prior to the issu-
ance of any New Securities thereunder. Only a Section 4(2) Private Exchange potentially can
be commenced in the same time-frame as a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange. A Section 3(a)(9) Ex-
change may be subject to SEC review if it is a tender offer or if it constitutes a "going private
transaction" and, in either case, the Target Security is an "equity security" under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1988), see infra notes 382-447 and
accompanying text, or if the New Securities are debt securities that must be qualified under the
TIA, see infra notes 459-64 and accompanying text. SEC filings in such instances, however,
are made, and SEC review begins, concurrently with the commencement of the Section 3(a)(9)
Exchange. The only situation in which the commencement of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange
might be delayed because of Federal securities laws is when a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange is
conducted in connection with a Consent Solicitation or proxy solicitation that is subject to the
proxy rules. See infra notes 448-57 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 33 & 35,
discussing the few state blue sky laws that do not provide for an exemption similar to Section
3(a)(9) and the issue of NASD clearance, respectively. For a summary of the filing and disclo-
sure requirements that the structure of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange could trigger, see infra
notes 288-302.
38. For example, if a corporation determines it must register an exchange, it can expect
that the time (and associated cost) required for the registration process likely would be consid-
erably greater than that required for a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange. The primary timing consid-
erations in planning a Registered Exchange include (i) the amount of time the SEC requires to
review and provide initial comments on a registration statement (generally four to six weeks)
and (ii) the amount of time required for the corporation to complete the comment-response
phase of the registration process (generally one to two weeks).
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dend rate than the Target Securities,39 a shorter maturity,4° a ranking
senior to the Target Securities (with the New Securities possibly being
secured),4' protective covenants not included in the Target Securities, or
other attributes that might benefit the New Securities relative to the Tar-
get Securities.
A common negative incentive is the possibility of bankruptcy if the
Exchange Offer is not completed.42 Additionally, nonexchanging holders
often run the risk that if the exchange succeeds, their Target Securities
will be contractually subordinated to the New Securities. a To create
another negative incentive, some corporations have sought to amend or
eliminate certain covenants in Target Securities that remain outstanding
after the Exchange Offer through a Consent Solicitation of the holders of
the Target Securities (including those participating in the Exchange Of-
fer) that is conducted concurrently with the Exchange Offer."
From the corporation's perspective, a continuing issue that can in-
hibit the success of an Exchange Offer is the issue of "holdouts," i.e.,
holders of Target Securities who do not participate in the exchange.
Some holders of Target Securities choose to hold out in hopes of negoti-
ating a better deal. Others may simply believe retaining their Target Se-
curities is better than owning the New Securities.4" In other cases,
39. See, ag., NEw WORLD ENTERTAINMENT, LTD., SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO OFFERING
CIRCULAR (Aug. 2, 1988) (offering new 12-7/8% senior subordinated notes due 1995 for ex-
isting 11% subordinated notes due 1995 and 12-1/4% subordinated debentures due 1998).
40. See, eg., INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP., OFFERING CIRCULAR (June 15, 1990)
(offering senior subordinated debentures due in 2001 for existing subordinated debentures due
in 2005); ENRON CORP., OFFERING CIRCULAR (Dec. 2, 1987) (offering senior notes due in
1998 for existing subordinated debentures due in 2008). -
41. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP., supra, note 40; ENRON CORP., supra
note 40; NEW WORLD ENTERTAINMENT, LTD., supra note 39. Corporations have also uti-
lized Section 3(a)(9) to offer new debt securities for existing common stock in an effort to
decrease long-term debt and increase book value per share amounts, thereby offering holders of
such common stock the opportunity to receive an interest-bearing security and a more senior
ranking security. See, eg., THE PENN CENTRAL CORPORATION, OFFERING CIRCULAR (NOV.
13, 1987); ZENITH NATIONAL INSURANCE CORP., OFFERING CIRCULAR (Nov. 4, 1987).
42. See, e-g., Interco Readies "Prepak" Chap. 11; Interco Ina, FOOTWEAR NEWS, May 21,
1990, at 23. For a discussion of the disadvantages and advantages of Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion proceedings, see infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
43. See generally Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 246-
50 (1987) (discussing techniques that provide incentives for holders of target securities to par-
ticipate in debt restructurings).
44. See, e.g., OAK INDUSTRIES, INC., OFFERING CIRCULAR AND CONSENT SOLICITATION
(Feb. 14, 1986); SAVIN CORPORATION, PROSPECTUS AND CONSENT SOLICITATION (Feb. 12,
1988). This device is often called an "exit consent" solicitation. See Roe, supra note 43, at
248. For a description and discussion of exit consents, see infra notes 303-12 and accompany-
ing text.
45. As one commentator speculated, holders of Target Securities who "refuse to partici-
pate in the workout will benefit, because the [corporation] more easily can pay residual credi-
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entities-often called "debt raiders" or "vulture capitalists"-buy strate-
gic layers of a corporation's securities at distressed prices with the hope
of taking control of the corporation or at least the negotiation process. 46
Corporations employ a variety of techniques, including the incen-
tives and disincentives discussed above, to discourage holdouts. Another
important technique frequently used to reduce the number of holdouts is
to include a high minimum acceptance condition in the Exchange Offer,
such as requiring the tender of at least a specified percentage (often
eighty percent or higher) of the aggregate outstanding principal amount
or number of shares of the Target Securities.47
tors [eg., the holdouts] in full after (and if) the recapitalization succeeds. The holdouts would
benefit disproportionately, at the expense of those who... renegotiate their credits." Roe,
supra note 43, at 233 & n.3 (calling the holdout's benefit of an increased chance at full pay-off,
the "buoying-up effect").
In a basic exchange offer, bondholders that do not exchange will be enriched at the
expense of those that do: The exchange will leave the company able to pay the di-
minished fixed debt to the holdout bondholders in full. Indeed, the exchanging bond-
holders might be made worse off, since they help assure payment to the holdouts.
Id. at 236. In addition, some holders of Target Securities may not want to assume the risk of a
potentially reduced claim in bankruptcy if, notwithstanding the restructuring, the corporation
goes bankrupt. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
46. See All Eyes on Distressed Companies; Takeovers of Distressed Companies on the Rise,
CORP. FIN. WEEK., Sept. 17, 1990, at 1; Baker, The Debt Raiders, GLOBAL FIN., Dec. 1990, at
27 ("For some [debt raiders] the aim is to acquire a company, while others hope to parlay their
positions into sizeable equity stakes. Still others are more like arbitragers than debt raiders,
and they're buying defaulted debt on the hope that a-company will produce a settlement with
bondholders that will lead to big cash profits."); Farrell, The 'Vulture Capitalists'Are Circling,
Bus. WEEK, Sept. 5, 1988, at 84; Gillen, Debt Raiders Put New Spin on Takeovers After Wreck-
age of Junk-Financed Buyouts, BOND BUYER, Aug. 24, 1990, at 3; Richter, Debt Raiders' See
Bull Market in Bankruptcies L.A. Times, Oct. 21, 1990, at DI, col. 5; Dutt, 'Vulture Investors'
Prey On Miseries of Indebted Firms, Newsday, Sept. 16, 1990, at 53 (city ed.); "Debt raiders"
(the term generally used for entities that attempt to acquire control of a financially distressed
corporation by purchasing that corporation's debt) and "vulture capitalists" (the term gener-
ally used for entities that invest in the debt securities of financially distressed corporations to
sell at, or negotiate with the corporation to obtain, a significantly higher price, but not with a
view to acquire control of the corporation) are often backed by investment funds or partner-
ships that have been launched during the last few years to invest in distressed and/or bankrupt
corporations. Baker, supra, at 27 & 32 (more than $3 billion committed by pension funds and
other major institutions "to new restructuring funds that, among other things, purchase debt
of workout companies," including $780 million raised by Goldman Sachs & Co. for its Water
Street Recovery fund, and $1 billion raised by Zell/Chilmark Fund "to acquire financially
troubled companies"); 1990 in Review; Restructurings & Bankruptcies, CORP. FIN. WEEK,
Dec. 24, 1990, at 2 (more than $2.7 billion raised in 1990 by funds to invest in securities of
troubled corporations). See articles cited infra note 58, which discusses acquisitions of corpo-
rations through the acquisition of its debt.
47. See, eg., INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP., OFFERING CIRCULAR (June 15, 1990)
(80% minimum tender condition); OAK INDUSTRIES INC., OFFERING CIRCULAR (Feb. 7,
1985) (70% minimum tender condition); SAVIN CORP., PROSPECTUS AND CONSENT SOLICI-
TATION (May 12, 1988) (90% minimum tender condition); WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH
CO., PROSPECTUS AND SOLICITATION (Sept. 21, 1987) (80% minimum tender condition). See
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If the particular circumstances permit, some other forms of restruc-
turing can eliminate holdouts. For example, Prepackaged Bankruptcies
are increasing in popularity48 largely because all holders of Target Secur-
ities are bound if the Prepackaged Bankruptcy is approved by more than
two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed
claims casting a vote.49 In addition, reclassifications will bind all stock-
holders of the Target Securities upon the receipt of the requisite stock-
holder vote.50
C. Composition of, and Negotiation with, Security Holders
and Their Committees
An important factor in the success, and therefore the advisability, of
an Exchange Offer is the composition of the holders of prospective Tar-
get Securities. Depending on the number of such holders, as well as the
complexity of the restructuring proposal, a corporation may determine
that a form of restructuring that permits the retention of paid solicitors
(e.g., Registered Exchanges) may be preferable to a Section 3(a)(9) Ex-
change;51 or, it may decide that it should merely hire an information
agent to help distribute offering materials or run tombstone advertise-
ments or both in order to inform holders of Target Securities about the
infra note 395, describing SEC interpretation governing the waiver of minimum tender
conditions.
48. See, eg., REPUBLIC HEALTH CORP., PROSPECTUS AND CONSENT SOLICITATION
(Nov. 13, 1989); THE SOUTHLAND CORP., PROXY STATEMENT-PROSPECTUS (Oct. 5, 1990).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1988). See Kaplan, Prepackaged Cl. 11 Plans: Popular But Lim-
ited Restructuring Tool, BANKR. STRATEGIST, Dec. 1990, at 6 (second of 2-part series);
Kaplan, Prepackaged Plans: Popular, Limited Tool, BANKR. STRATEGIST, Nov. 1990, at 1
(first of 2-part series); Hylton, supra note 20; Hellitzer, supra note 20.
50. See, e.g., BANKS OF MID-AMEmCA, PROSPECTUS-PROXY STATEMENT (Sept. 9, 1988)
(Reclassification with Registered Exchange); READING & BATES CORP., PROXY STATEMENT-
PROSPECTUS (July 28, 1989) (Reclassification with Registered Exchange); WESTERN UNION
CORP., PROXY STATEMENT-PROSPECTUS (July 31, 1990) (Reclassification with Registered Ex-
change and Consent Solicitation).
51. For example, if there are few holders with large holdings, the company may want to
consider conducting a Section 4(2) Private Exchange. See supra note 15. If there are many
holders of relatively small amounts of Target Securities, then a cash tender offer or Registered
Exchange accompanied by a well-organized paid solicitation campaign may be preferable. See,
e.g., tombstone advertisements of Southland Corp., Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1990, at C13, col. 1
(Registered Exchange in conjunction with a Prepackaged Bankruptcy); see also Brennan,
Western Union Urgently Searches For Debt Holders, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1990, at C18, col. 6
(describing difficulties a corporation can face in attempting to contact widely disbursed holders
of securities); tombstone advertisement of Western Union Corp., Wall St. J., July 31, 1990, at
C15, col. 4 (concurrent Registered Exchanges, Consent Solicitation, Reclassification and proxy
solicitation).
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transaction.52 The key to this decision is whether a corporation believes
that its regular employees can effectively solicit the proposed exchange.5 3
A corporation should also consider the mix of recent purchasers of
the Target Securities 54 and long-time holders of Target Securities, who
already may have incurred large losses. This mix may indicate the differ-
ent motives of the holders of the Target Securities and, thereby, how best
to structure the terms of the New Securities to be offered in the Exchange
Offer.55
Another important factor is the now common practice of certain
holders of Target Securities' organizing committees (committees) that
negotiate on behalf of holders of Target S-urities.56 Committees, often
represented by legal counsel and financial advisors,57 can form a unified
front, enhancing the likelihood of the consummation of the Exchange
Offer. On the other hand, the differing motives of committee members
and disagreements amongst committees of different security holders can
delay or even prevent the completion of the restructuring."
52. See, e-g., tombstone advertisement of Westwood One, Inc., Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1990,
at C16, col. 1 (Section 3(a)(9) Exchange).
53. For a discussion of the parameters of the permissable solicitation activities of employ-
ees of a corporation conducting a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, see infra notes 206-10 and accom-
panying text.
54. See supra note 46.
55. For example, the manager of a portfolio containing Target Securities may accept or
reject a restructuring proposal based on how it would affect his or her compensation. See
Weingarten, Consensual Non-Bankruptcy Restructuring of Public Debt Securities, 23 SEc. &
COMMODITIES REG. 159, 163 (1990). A portfolio manager whose compensation is based upon
the value of the portfolio may be reluctant to accept restricted equity securities in an exchange
if the value of restricted equity securities held in the portfolio must be marked to zero; a
portfolio manager whose compensation is based upon cash yield would be reluctant to accept
pay-in-kind or zero coupon securities. Id. Portfolio managers of federally insured savings and
loan associations, which may not hold "junk bond" investments after July 1, 1994, see 12
U.S.C. § 1831e(d) (1990)), may be unwilling to accept low-rated debt securities that do not
mature before that date. Weingarten, supra, at 163.
56. Weingarten, supra note 55, at 160.
57. "[It has become commonplace for the holders of [Target Securities] to retain their
own investment bankers and attorneys, whose fees and expenses are often paid by the troubled
company." Id
58. For example, a "vulture capitalist" or "debt raider," see supra note 46 and accompa-
nying text for a description, may have a different agenda from other investors, not uncom-
monly "to acquire securities of a troubled company for the purpose of acquiring control of the
company's common stock" upon consummation of a restructuring. Weingarten, supra note
56, at 160 & n.7. See Baker, supra note 46, at 38; Dutt, supra note 46, at 53 (describing
Japonica Partners' acquisition of Allegheney International, Inc. (operator of the Sunbeam and
Oster appliance businesses) after Japonica purchased majority or blocking positions in virtu-
ally all of Allegheney's eight creditor classes). See also Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims
and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1990) [hereinafter
Fortgang & Mayer I] (describing several transactions in which investors purchased public and
private debt securities, bank loan claims, trade claims and other claims of corporations that
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The formation of a committee also may make a Section 3(a)(9) Ex-
change more feasible in some circumstances due to two recent no-action
positions59 taken by the staff of the SEC (the Staff). Generally, a corpo-
ration's paid advisors, such as legal counsel and financial advisors, may
not have any substantive discussions with security holders without invali-
dating the use of Section 3(a)(9).6 1 Before the release of these two no-
action letters, it was unclear whether the Staff would permit discussions
between the corporation's outside advisors and advisors to holders of
Target Securities. Such discussions, however, are often essential, if only
to explain the often complex financial analyses involved in many restruc-
turings. These two no-action positions clarified the Staff's position on
this matter, indicating that the Staff, at least, would condone discussions
on the merits of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange between the advisors to the
corporation and the advisors to committees of security holders.6'
had filed a petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1174 (1988), to acquire control of corporations, and providing a comprehensive his-
torical analysis of the regulation of, and the reasons for, the post-petition trading of a corpora-
tion's debt securities and other claims); Fortgang & Mayer, Developments in Trading Claims
and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11 (1990) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinaf-
ter Fortgang and Mayer I] (updating and discussing developments that "occurred too late for
detailed examination" in Fortgang & Mayer I, supra, and including a thorough discussion of
Japonica's acquisition of Allegheney International.
59. See International Controls Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Aug. 6, 1990)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact fie); Seaman Furniture Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1989-
1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,360, at 79,335 (Oct. 10, 1989).
60. No-action letters issued by the Staff are cited throughout this Article as support for
various propositions. We note at the outset, however, that the Staff is not the final arbiter of
issues relating to securities law matters. The no-action letter process "is merely an informal
process by which private persons and their counsel may seek ... an indication of the staff's
enforcement attitude toward a particular transaction prior to its consummation." Securities
Act Release No. 5691, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,682 (1976); Exchange Act Release No. 13,017 (Nov.
29, 1976) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Secrel file). The SEC is not officially bound by a Staff no-
action position, nor are the Staff no-action positions dispositive of Federal securities law issues
raised in the letters. Securities Act Release No. 5691, supra; Exchange Act Release No.
13,107, supra. Despite this official position, however, the recipient of a no-action response can
be fairly certain that the SEC will abide by the Staff position if the facts are as presented in the
no-action request. See Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 Bus. LAW. 1019, 1042
(1987); Obtaining No-Action Letters and Interpretive Advice, CORP. COUNSEL, Jan.-Feb. 1989,
at 1, 2. While no-action letters do not insulate recipients from private litigation, courts are
likely to give some weight to the views of the Staff and "the collateral estoppel effect of a no-
action letter has had an impact on private litigation." Lemke, supra, at 1043; accord Obtaining
No-Action Letters and Interpretive Advice, supra, at 2.
61. For a discussion of the "no paid solicitation" requirement of Section 3(a)(9), see infra
notes 204-57 and accompanying text.
62. In Seaman Furniture Co., a seemingly important factor was that the Section 3(a)(9)
Exchange had not commenced when the proposed discussions were to take place. See Seaman
Furniture Co., supra note 59, at 79,339. The Staff extended its position, however, to post-
commencement discussions between the corporation's advisors and the committee's advisors in
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In any event, all participants in any restructuring, including a Sec-
tion 3(a)(9) Exchange, should realize at the outset that most restructur-
ings involve a process of negotiation. Most holders and committees
expect that the corporation's first offer will not be its best offer. The
ability of a corporation and its advisors to commence and conduct nego-
tiations, however, is often limited by regulations applicable to the pro-
posed restructuring. 63 Ultimately, in many troubled-company situations,
holders must be convinced that the offer on the table is the last offer, and
potentially the last hope for the corporation short of bankruptcy.
D. Fiduciary Duties Owed to Different Security Holders
Courts in Delaware clearly and repeatedly have concluded that, ex-
cept in "special circumstances," neither a corporation, its directors nor
its controlling stockholders owe a fiduciary duty to holders of convertible
or non-convertible debt securities" or, in certain instances, preferred
stock.65 The basic rationale for this conclusion is that rights of
debtholders and the preferential rights of preferred stockholders are de-
rived from contract law, while those of common equity holders are based
upon the trust relationship between the board of directors of a corpora-
tion and its common stockholders.66 Contracting parties generally are
International Controls Corp., supra note 59. See infra notes 245-54 and accompanying text
discussing these two no-action positions.
63. For example, negotiations in a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange can be conducted at any time,
but must be between holders of Target Securities and the corporation directly, or between the
company's advisors and the committee's advisors if they stay within the parameters set forth in
the Seaman Furniture Co. and International Controls Corp. no-action letters. See infra notes
245-54 and accompanying text. Alternatively, when the restructuring is a Registered Ex-
change, practitioners must be concerned with the limitations of the prospectus delivery re-
quirements imposed by section 5 of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988). In
addition, when the restructuring includes a Consent Solicitation subject to the proxy rules,
solicitation materials must be filed with the SEC prior to or upon the date such material is first
sent, given or used, as the case may be. See Rule 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1990).
64. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 786 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff'd, 549 A.2d 300
(Del. 1988). See cases cited supra notes 313-23.
65. See, ag., Rosan v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., No. 10,526, slip op. at 14-17 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 6, 1990) (citing Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, 509 A.2d 584, 593 (Del. Ch. 1986) (no
fiduciary duty is owed to preferred stockholders with respect to the "preferential rights" (and
"special limitations") of preferred stock that are specified in the company's charter)). See infra
notes 315-16 and accompanying text. For a discussion of fiduciary duties generally owed to
non-common stockholders, see infra notes 313-23 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the fiduciary duties owed by a corporation, its directors and its controlling stockholders to
holders of the corporation's debt securities and preferred stock in "special circumstances," see
infra notes 331-35 and accompanying text.
66. See Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 10-11 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 21, 1985). While it appears that the Delaware law on fiduciary duties owed to bond-
holders is generally followed outside of that state, see Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships:
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limited in seeking redress of alleged wrongs to the remedies provided or
implied within the four comers of the document.67 As a result, a corpo-
Legal Theory In A Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L. J. 92, 118-19 [hereinafter Bratton II];
Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wisc. L. REv. 667,
691-98 [hereinafter Bratton I], a modicum of case law (mostly federal district court decisions)
and commentary has developed for the proposition that such a fiduciary duty exists even ab-
sent a special circumstance. See cases cited infra notes 322-23; McDaniel, Bondholders and
Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 265-312 (1988) [hereinafter McDaniel II]; McDaniel, Bond-
holders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 442-50 (1986) [hereinafter McDaniel 1].
See also Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165,
1168-69 n.11 (Nov. 1990) (listing "[t]he universe of scholarly literature directly focused on
bondholders' rights in a non-bankruptcy context," and generally proposing "a comprehensive
set of principles that support the extension of [fiduciary] rights to bondholders").
67. See Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). See infra notes 324-30 &
339-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of Oak Industries. One Delaware court has
held, in fact, that a board of directors breached its fiduciary duty to common stockholders
when it favored one bidder for the company over another bidder in part because the favored
bidder agreed to support the trading price of outstanding debt securities. Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 178-79, 182 (Del. 1986). Cf. Committee on
Corporate Laws, Other Constituency Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253
(1990) (report of Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of the Ameri-
can Bar Association) (recommends against the adoption of a so-called "stakeholders" or
"other constituencies" provision in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act because such
provisions "create opportunities for misunderstanding and thus pose potential for mischief"
and "radically alter" "long-standing and tested concepts of relationships that should exist be-
tween corporations and their directors and shareholders," and advises that other constituency
statutes adopted in states such as in New York, Connecticut, Indiana and Pennylvania should
be interpreted narrowly and "in a manner consistent with existing common law," "unless the
enacting legislature clearly evidenced a different intent"); Salwen, SEC Chairman Considers
Holders' 'Bill of Rights,' Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1991, at C16, col. 4 (reporting that SEC Chair-
man Richard Breeden testified to the Senate Securities Subcommittee that he was angered by
state anti-takeover statutes, such as "other constituency" provisions, that allegedly enabled
management entrenchment, and that Chairman Breeden said that "he is considering a 'share-
holder bill of rights'" that would limit the impact of those state anti-takeover statutes). Stake-
holder provisions generally permit directors to consider constituencies other than stockholders
(such as creditors, employees and communities) in the discharge of their fiduciary duties. See,
eg., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-
313(e) (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-202(5) (Harrison 1990); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1715(a) (Pamphlet 1990). Although these statutes were generally adopted to provide direc-
tors of corporations that were subject of hostile takeovers with a broader basis to respond to
such takeover attempts, Committee on Corporate Laws, supra, at 2253, it is possible that these
statutes could be turned on their heads to infer a fiduciary duty running to the new classes of
constituents they recognize. Id. at 2263-71. Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b), GA.
CODE ANN. § 22-202(5) and PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(a) (which merely permit directors to
consider other constituencies) with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313 (which mandates that
directors consider other constituencies). At least three states expressly deny that its stakehold-
ers statute confers any new rights to the enumerated constituencies. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 717(b) ("nothing in this paragraph shall create any duties owed by any director to any per-
son or entity to consider or afford any particular weight to any of the foregoing or abrogate
any duty of the directors, either statutory or recognized by common law or court decisions");
GA. CODE ANN. § 22-202(5) (providing that it "shall not be deemed to provide to any constit-
uency any right to be considered"); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1717 (section 1715(a) does not
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ration should proceed with a restructuring plan on the basis of what is in
the best interests of the common stockholders, unless one of the special
circumstances arises.
Insolvency and bankruptcy are among the "special circumstances"
that can create a fiduciary duty in a contractual relationship.6" In these
circumstances, the class of beneficiaries to whom directors of a corpora-
tion owe fiduciary duties is enlarged, if not shifted, to include the corpo-
ration's creditors.6 9 This metamorphosis creates an enormous practical
problem for the directors of a troubled company and its advisors. If a
corporation is solvent,70 the directors' relationship with bondholders
and, in certain instances, preferred stockholders, is at arm's length and
commercial in nature. In a transaction between a corporation and its
bondholders, directors have a fiduciary duty to negotiate with bondhold-
ers to obtain the best possible result for the corporation and its common
stockholders.71 If, however, the corporation is insolvent, the directors
risk liability to creditors for failing to protect the best interests of credi-
tors.72 Therefore, if there is any doubt about the "solvency" of a corpo-
ration, directors of the troubled corporation are well advised to establish
a record that-demonstrates that they did their best to attempt to resolve
matters on a basis that is "fair" to all constituencies of security holders-
common stockholders, preferred stockholders and debtholders.
"impose upon the board of directors ... any legal or equitable duties, obligations or liabilities
or create any right or cause of action against, or basis for standing to sue, the board of direc-
tors"). But see Committee on Corporate Laws, supra, at 2264 (citation omitted) (noting appar-
ently contradictory New York legislative history).
In any event, the contractual remedy created by a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is theoretically available to holders of a company's debt. Only three cases
have discussed this implied covenant in the context of Consent Solicitations. See Oak Indus.,
508 A.2d at 880; Kass v. Eastern Air Lines, Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op. at 11-12 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 14, 1986); Pisik v. BCI Holdings Corp., No. 14593/87, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June
21, 1987). See also infra notes 336-50 and accompanying text discussing this implied
covenant.
68. See infra notes 331-35 and accompanying text.
69. See Milmoe, Troubled Directors: Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Troubled Companies
in the Merger and Acquisition Context, in INVESTING IN THE TROUBLED COMPANY 1990, at
167, 196-209 (Practising Law Institute Course Handbook Series No. 556, 1990) (discussing
standards for director conduct during mergers and acquisitions in the context of bankruptcy
and insolvency); Block & Hoff, Duties of Directors of Distressed Corporations, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8,
1990, at 5, col. 1.
70. See infra note 334 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 67.
72. For a brief discussion of the fiduciary duties of directors of insolvent corporations, see
infra notes 331-35 and accompanying text.
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E. Liabilities and Disclosure Obligations Under Securities Laws
There is always a tension between the obligation of a public corpora-
tion to disclose information to the public in certain situations and the
practical difficulty of trying to conduct business in a fishbowl. 73 The se-
curities laws recognize that, in many circumstances, a corporation may
lawfully choose to keep information confidential, particularly where pre-
mature disclosure would be harmful to the corporation and its
stockholders.74
This tension is particularly acute for a financially troubled corpora-
tion. For example, although an announcement that the corporation is
having preliminary discussions with its bank group regarding the restruc-
turing of its senior debt may be desirable from a full disclosure point of
view, it may also cause suppliers to withhold normal trade credit and
customers to delay ordinary course payments, all exacerbating a down-
ward spiral for the corporation. Even if such an announcement is
deemed to be unnecessary, the troublesome issue of selective disclosure
remains.75 This problem typically arises when a corporation conducts
discussions with one or more of its creditors in an attempt to determine
the feasibility of a restructuring before turning to its other creditors and
security holders generally. 76 Rumors and leaks about the corporation's
73. See generally W. WALTON & C. BRISSMAN, CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS HAND-
BOOK: A GUIDE FOR MANAGING UNSTRUCTURED DISCLOSURE IN TODAY'S CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENT (1990) (providing a framework for corporate disclosure outside of the express
filing and reporting requirements of the Federal securities laws).
74. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239-40 n.17 (1988); Backman v. Polar-
oid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1990); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir.
1987); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968).
75. Selective disclosure is the disclosure of material non-public information to certain per-
sons or entities, such as selected analysts, without publicly disclosing the information. See
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The duty imposed on a
company and its officers is an alternative one: they must disclose material inside information
either to no outsiders or to all outsiders equally."). In some situations, selective disclosure
may subject a corporation to liability for "tipping" or "aiding and abetting" insider trading.
See W. WALTON & C. BRISSMAN, supra note 73, § 4.01[4], at 4-8. Liability for "tipping,"
however, only arises if the insider discloses material non-public information in breach of a
fiduciary duty. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659-60 (1983). Liability for "aiding and abetting"
insider trading only arises when a party assists another in an act that the party rendering
assistance knows is a violation of Federal securities laws. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624
(8th Cir. 1985). See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 14, at 1139-44 (discuss-
ing "aiding and abetting" liability under Rule lOb-5); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities
Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Con-
tribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972).
76. The problem can arise, for example, when a corporation enters discussions with infor-
mal or formal committees of holders of its public debt securities, some of whom may not feel
inhibited about trading on the information they may receive while serving on such committees.
See Cohen & Salawen, SEC Starts Insider Trading Probe in Junk-Bond Market, Wall St. I.,
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financial position may creep into the market following such meetings,
possibly forcing the corporation to issue a press release disclosing its
troubled financial situation to the world.77
F. The Bankruptcy Alternative
Bankruptcy is often the only alternative (other than a Section
3(a)(10) Settlement Exchange) for a financially troubled corporation that
is not able to restructure successfully out of court. As such, it may pro-
vide the strongest incentive for security holders to participate in an out-
of-court restructuring, such as a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, or at least to
reach an agreement on a Prepackaged Bankruptcy.
While a reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code7"
offers its own unique advantages, it also presents significant disadvan-
tages to the ongoing operations of a financially troubled corporation and
to its security holders. The financially troubled corporation must bal-
ance the advantages and disadvantages of a chapter 11 reorganization
Apr. 10, 1991, at Cl, col. 3; Paltrow, SEC Probes Junk Bond Insider Trading, L.A. Times,
Apr. 11, 1991, at D4, col. 1; Schifrin, Sellers Beware, FORBES, Jan. 21, 1991, at 36, 37. Com-
mentators have noted that "committee members may be subject to sanctions for trading claims
under principles of bankruptcy law even if they are not violating securities laws." Fortgang &
Mayer II, supra note 58, at 27 (citing Fortgang & Mayer I, supra note 58, at 24-37). To
remove disincentives for such large holders from serving on creditors committees, Messrs.
Fortgang and Mayer suggest that there is a need for both a SEC ruling and a Rule of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure officially recognizing the use of "Chinese Walls" for chapter 11 committee
members. Fortgang & Mayer II, supra note 58, at 29-30 (stating that the "authors intend to
submit a draft of such a [bankruptcy] rule for consideration by the Task Force on Trading
Claims of the Chapter 11 Subcommittee of the Bankruptcy Committee of the American Bar
Association."). See also Corporate Reorg. Rel. No. 384, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,502 (Sept. 27, 1989) (considering proposing a rule recognizing "Chinese
Walls" for institutional investors who serve on creditors committees); Memorandum of the
SEC in Support of Motion of Fidelity Management & Research Co. (filed Jan. 28, 1991), In re
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 1-90-00130 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio filed Jan. 25, 1990) (SEC
urging the court to allow an entity to serve on a creditors' committee and, at the same time,
trade in a debtor's securities if that entity satisfied two requirements: (1) "it is engaged in the
trading of securities in its regular course of business," and (2) it implements an effective Chi-
nese Wall), decided by Order Permitting Securities Trading in Certain Circumstances, In re
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., Consolidated Case No. 1-90-00130 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 7,
1991) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, FDS file) (essentially adopting the SEC's conclusion in its mem-
orandum, and setting forth the "'Chinese Wall' procedures to be employed by Fidelity").
77. "A company has no duty to correct or verify rumors in the marketplace unless those
rumors can be attributed to the company." StateTeachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654
F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981); accord Elkind, 635 F.2d 156; Electronic Specialty Co. v. Interna-
tional Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and
the American Stock Exchange require listed companies to respond to rumors or unusual mar-
ket activity. AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE §§ 401(c)-(d), 402(a), (c)-(d)
(1988); NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 202.03-.04 (2d ed.
1990).
78. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
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against other restructuring alternatives in selecting the best course of
action.
A chapter 11 reorganization presents the following disadvantages:
* The corporation's business is disrupted. Business rela-
tions may be harmed because the corporation cannot pay pre-
petition creditors, and many vendors will not do business with
a debtor-in-possession.79
e The corporation operates in a "fish bowl"-it must meet
stringent financial reporting requirements;80 creditors' commit-
tees and the United States Trustee, an official in the United
States Department of Justice, review its business operations;
non-ordinary course transactions are subject to creditor review
and bankruptcy court approval;"1 executive compensation may
be subject to the United States Trustee's review and approval.
8 2
* The announcement of a chapter 11 filing may trigger the
filing of otherwise unmatured claims against the corporation.
83
These claims often represent enormous potential liability and
may seriously impede the reorganization process.
* The added time to complete the in-court restructuring,
often combined with the many levels of creditors, whose legal
and financial advisors may be paid by the corporation, can re-
sult in extremely high aggregate costs to the corporation.
e The corporation's management may lose control of the
corporation through the appointment of a trustee or an exam-
iner, 4 the conversion of the case to a chapter 7 liquidation" or
the adoption of a creditor's reorganization plan.
8 6
Conversely, a chapter 11 reorganization provides a corporation with
the following advantages:
79. In chapter 11 cases a trustee is typically not appointed. Instead, the debtor as "debtor-
in-possession" continues to operate its business and manage its affairs. With limited excep-
tions, the debtor-in-possession has all the rights and powers of a trustee in a case under chapter
11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107(a).
80. Local rules typically require the filing of monthly operating reports with the United
States Trustee and the court. See, eg., FED. R. BANKR. P. 2015(2) (requiring periodic reports
and summaries); U.S. BANKR. CT. C.D. CAL. GUIDELINE No. 3 (requiring bi-weekly "interim
reports" and monthly "operating statements").
81. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
82. See, e.g., U.S. BANKR. CT. C.D. CAL. BANKR. R. 141(1).
83. Such potential claims include tax claims, environmental claims, product liability
claims, unfunded pension liabilities and retiree health and medical claims.
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104.
85. See id. § 1112(b).
86. See id. § 1121(c).
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e Filing the bankruptcy petition automatically stays all
creditor collection efforts.1
7
* The debtor-in-possession or trustee may avoid and re-
cover certain transfers of the corporation's property.88
* The court may authorize the debtor-in-possession to ob-
tain funds for working capital by granting first priority security
interests in the corporation's property over the objection of
other creditors, including secured creditors.89
e The court may authorize the debtor-in-possession to
reject unfavorable unexpired leases and executory contracts, or
assign leases and contracts despite anti-assignment
provisions. 90
e Certain claims may receive specified favorable treat-
ment: interest stops accruing on most unsecured claims;91 if a
reorganization plan is confirmed, unpaid pre-petition taxes may
be paid over an extended time period;92 unliquidated claims
may be estimated;93 certain claims arising from rejected leases
or employment 'contracts may be subject to statutory
limitations. 94
e The reorgalgization plan may be confirmed over the ob-
jection of dissenting creditors, if certain "cram-down" stan-
dards are met, 95 aid once the plan is confirmed, all creditors
are bound by its terms. 96
G. Recent Developments in Bankruptcy and Tax Law
There are also varioiks bankruptcy and tax issues that must be con-
sidered when formulating\ an out-of-court restructuring that includes an
exchange of New Securities for Target Securities, such as a Section
3(a)(9) Exchange. This AAicle will not address these subjects in detail. 97
87. Id. § 362.
88. Id. § 547 (avoiding preferences); id. § 548 (avoiding fraudulent transfers); id. § 544
(giving debtor-in-possession or trustee rights ofjudicial lien creditor or good faith purchaser or
both).
89. Id. § 364.
90. Id. § 365(f).
91. Id. § 502(b)(2).
92. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(c).
93. Id. § 502(c).
94. Id. § 502(b)(6), (7).
95. Id. § 1129(b).
96. Id. § 1141.
97. See generally G. HENDERSON & S. GOLDRING, FAILING AND FAILED BUSINESSES
(CCH Tax Trans. Lib. 1990); Cieri, Heiman, Henze II, Jenks, Kirschner, Riley & Sullivan, An
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Nevertheless, the effects of a 1990 bankruptcy court decision and the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 merit a brief discussion because, in
the case of the bankruptcy decision, certain debt-for-debt exchanges may
be less attractive to holders of Target Securities and, in the case of the tax
changes, the effective cost of such exchanges may be higher for certain
corporations. Because these changes affect only certain debt-for-debt ex-
changes, it is crucial that practitioners understand these developments
not only to analyze their meaning and applicability, but also to determine
the extent of their impact.
1. The LTV decision (In re Chateaugay Corp.)
A recent United States Bankruptcy Court decision involved an ex-
change by The LTV Corporation of new debt securities for target debt
securities with an equal face amount shortly before the filing of LTV's
petition for chapter 11 reorganization.9" In response to a motion to disal-
low a portion of claims represented by the new debt securities on grounds
that the claims included "unmatured interest," 99 the court relied on a
combination of bankruptcy authority"°° and certain tax and accounting
authority 1 ' (the latter two of which it conceded were not conclusive) to
hold that the difference between the face amount of the New Securities
and the "value" of the Target Securities represented unmatured interest.
Introduction to Legal and Practical Considerations in the Restructuring of Troubled Leveraged
Buyouts, 45 Bus. LAW. 333 (1989) (discussing, among other things, fraudulent conveyance,
tax and bankruptcy issues confronted by companies that have become financially troubled
following leveraged buyouts); Haims & Schaumberger, Restructuring the Overleveraged Com-
pany, 48 TAX Nom 91 (1990); Zonana, Tax and Restructuring Troubled Corporations,
N.Y.L.J., 1990, at 5, col. 1 (part two of two-part series); id., Aug. 23, 1990, at 5, col. 1 (part
one of two-part series).
98. In re Chateaugay Corp., 109 Bankr. 51, 52 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), appealfiled, (S.D.N.Y.
1990). The exchanging holders of the Target Securities received common stock in addition to
the new debt securities.
99. Id. at 57-58; see Bankruptcy Code, § 502(b)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1988) (provid-
ing that a claim shall be disallowed to the extent that it includes "unmatured interest").
100. Chateaugay Corp., 109 Bankr. at 57-58. According to applicable legislative history,
"unmatured interest" includes any original issue discount (OID). S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 352-53 (1977). For a
quotation from the applicable legislative history, see infra note 108. In general, a debt security
is issued with OID to the extent its stated redemption price at maturity exceeds its issue price.
See I.R.C. § 1273(a) (1988).
101. The court cited section 1273(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, 26
U.S.C. § 1273(b) and ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD OPINION No. 21 (Am. Inst. of Certi-
fied Pub. Accountants 1971) to support the proposition that the calculation of the OlD is
based on the issue price of the security, and the issue price of a note or bond issued in exchange
for non-cash property is the market value of the property. Chateaugay Corp., 109 Bankr. at
55. But see infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text discussing the apparent inapplicability
of these authorities and the superior relevancy of alternative authorities.
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As a result, the court reduced the claims of the holders of the New Secur-
ities from the face amount of those debt securities to the fair market
value of the Target Securities at the time of exchange, plus matured in-
terest to the date of bankruptcy.10 2
The result reached in the LTV decision is inappropriate and ex-
tremely unfair."0 3 The decision disproportionately penalizes public
bondholders who exchange their existing debt securities for a new debt
instrument with an identical face amount in an effort to accommodate
the debtor's financial difficulties."° Meanwhile, other classes of creditors
who also may have restructured their credit to accommodate the finan-
cial difficulties of the corporation apparently have not had their bank-
ruptcy claims reduced to the fair market value of their extensions of
credit prior to a bankruptcy filing by the troubled corporation. 0 5 In-
deed, by so reducing the claims of public security holders who participate
in the out-of-court restructuring, the LTV decision provides other credi-
tors with a windfall by permitting them to receive a greater pro rata
102. Chateaugay Corp., 109 Bankr. at 58.
103. In an earlier decision involving the reorganization of Allegheny International, the
court considered the claim of a creditor who had received new debentures from the debtor in a
pre-bankruptcy exchange for outstanding preferred stock. In re Allegheny Int'l, 100 Bankr.
247 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). In that case, the court held that the claim of the holder of the
newly issued debentures would equal the issue price of those debentures (plus interest), for
example, the value of the existing preferred stock at the time of the exchange. Id. at 252-55.
The result in Allegheny Int'l does not seem unfair because a stockholder who exchanges his
outstanding stock for debt has elevated his status to that of creditor; consequently, it is not
unreasonable that his claim should be determined by the value of the stock that he surrendered
before he is permitted to share par passu with other creditors.
104. Presumably the existence of the public trading market for the Target Securities ena-
bled the court to determine a "fair market value" for the Target Securities that could be used
to determine the issue price of the New Securities. Although there is no such readily available
mechanism for determining the value of other types of obligations of the debtor (such as trade
claims and bank credit), we suppose the existence (or perhaps the possibility) of any exchange
of such obligations prior to bankruptcy filing by a debtor logically could be included in the
court's reasoning to cover any such obligations.
105. The comparative advantage afforded non-public debt creditors is particularly inequita-
ble in light of the similarities between issuances of debt securities and the syndication of non-
public credit and the increasing tradability of non-public debt creditor claims. See Fortgang &
Mayer I, supra note 58, at 4-9, 13-56 (describing why and how claims are treated and some of
the issues involved in the trading of claims). The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure has recognized the increasing tradability of non-public debt creditor claims
in its proposed amendment to Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e). The amended rule would allow trans-
fers of non-public claims without requiring approval from the bankruptcy court. See Proposed
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules-Preliminary Draft of the Comm. on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Aug. 1989), reprinted in Bankr.
L. Rep. (CCH) No. 265 Part II (Oct. 12, 1989); Fortgang & Mayer I, supra note 58, at 42-43
(discussing the proposed rule). As stated above, however, we suppose that the reasoning used
in the LTV decision could be applied to claims of other creditors who exchange their claims in
a restructuring. See supra note 104.
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bankruptcy distribution than they otherwise would receive.11 6
The purpose of excluding "unmatured interest," including original
issue discount, from claims in bankruptcy 0 7 is to prevent creditors from
claiming disguised, unearned interest.1"8 In other words, the rule pro-
tects the debtor and its other creditors from the assertion of claims for
amounts in excess of the benefit actually conveyed to the debtor. If a
debtor has, in reality, only borrowed $900, the claim should not be
$1,000. The LTV decision, however, ignores the statute's purpose. In-
stead of determining the value of the claim with reference to the amount
of the original creditors' investment in the debtor or the benefit received
by the debtor, the court picked an apparently arbitrary figure-the mar-
ket value of the surrendered security on the date of the exchange-a
value that has nothing to do with the value the debtor received from the
106. In extreme cases in which the New Securities that are debt constitute most of the
outstanding claims, the reduction of the claims of the holders of such New Securities may be so
great that the corporation will be able to pay those reduced claims in "full" and still make a
distribution to stockholders. Under at least the spirit of the "absolute priority" rule, codified
in section 1129(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1988), however,
shareholders should not receive any distribution until creditors are paid the full amount of
their investment in the debtor. The absolute priority rule provides that if a class of unsecured
creditors votes not to accept the debtor's reorganization plan, the plan cannot be confirmed
unless (i) each creditor in the dissenting class receives property under the plan with present
value equal to the amount of its claim, or (ii) no holder of a junior claim or interest will receive
any distribution under the plan. Id.
107. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
108. Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a claim for "unmatured inter-
est" as of the date of the bankruptcy petition is not allowable. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2). The
legislative history of section 502(b)(2) makes it clear that the term "unmatured interest" in-
cludes OID and suggests that OID should be determined by taking the difference between an
obligation's face amount and its original issue price, at least in the context of a note issued for
cash. It states:
Paragraph (2) [of section 502(b)] requires disallowance to the extent that the
claim is for unmatured interest as of the date of the petition. Whether interest is
matured or unmatured on the date of bankruptcy is to be determined without refer-
ence to any ipso facto or bankruptcy clause in the agreement creating the claim.
Interest disallowed under this paragraph includes post-petition interest that is not yet
due and payable, and any portion of prepaid interest that represents an original dis-
counting of the claim, that would not have been earned on the date of bankruptcy.
For example, a claim on a SLO00 note issued the day before bankruptcy would only be
allowed to the extent of the cash actually advanced. If the original discount was 10
percent so that the cash advanced was only $900, then notwithstanding the face
amount of the note, only $900 would be allowed. If$900 was advanced under the note
some time before bankruptcy, the interest component of the note would have to be
prorated and disallowed to the extent it was for interest after the commencement of the
case.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-65, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 5848-51 (emphasis added).
The problem, of course, is that neither the legislative history nor the Bankruptcy Code
addresses how "issue price" and OID are to be determined in the context of a debt instrument
issued by the debtor as part of a pre-bankruptcy exchange of securities.
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issuance of the target debt security. I0
Finally, while it may be argued that the LTV result is not so unfair
when applied to investors who purchase debt in the secondary market
often at a tremendous discount, and who may only expect to recover a
portion of the face value of the debt, this argument is flawed. Instead of
focusing on the benefit the debtor received from the initial investor as the
basis for the claim, the LTV decision focuses on investment potentially
made by a subsequent investor; consequently, the debtor and the other
creditors receive a windfall based solely on the trading activity of the
existing public securities, not on any tangible attribute of the debtor's
estate. Moreover, if the LTV decision were taken to its logical extreme
and applied to all claims that trade after they are incurred, the likelihood
of completing any restructuring, in or out of court, would be reduced.' 10
109. The LTV decision cited a provision of the Internal Revenue Code that was not applica-
ble at the time, and ignored the then applicable provision (since repealed), under which the
claims of the holder of a new debt security with a face value equal to the face value of the
target debt security would not be affected. Chateaugay Corp., 109 Bankr. at 55 (citing section
1273(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 1273(b) (1988)). The
court ignored, however, I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4) (1988), repealed by Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11325(a)(2), 1991 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, (104
Stat.) 1017,1177, which was in effect at the time of the LTV decision and which provided a
special rule for the calculation of the issue price of a debt instrument issued in exchange for
another debt instrument of the same issuer. Under that section, the issue price of such a debt
instrument could not be less than the "adjusted issue price" (i.e., the original issue price plus
accrued OID) of the old debt instrument surrendered in the exchange, regardless of what the
issue price otherwise would have been under section 1273(b). Id. Thus, section 1275(a)(4), in
effect, permitted the "carryforward" of the issue price of the surrendered debt instrument. For
a brief discussion of section 1275(a)(4) and its repeal, see infra note 112 and accompanying
text.
It also appears that the LTV decision cited inapplicable accounting authority, while ig-
noring applicable accounting authority that, if used for analogous support, generally would
allow a holder of New Securities to retain the same claim in bankruptcy as it would have had if
it had retained its Target Securities. Chateaugay Corp., 109 Bankr. at 55 (citing ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES BOARD OPINION No. 21 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1971)). APB
Opinion No. 21 does not explicitly deal with notes issued in exchange offers by troubled com-
panies. The applicable accounting authority, dealing explicitly with "troubled debt restructur-
ings," is FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 15, 1977 [hereinafter FAS 15]. Paragraph 16 of FAS 15 pro-
vides that in a restructuring involving only the modification of the terms of a payable, the
debtor shall not change the carrying amount of the payable unless the total future cash pay-
ments under the new terms will be less than the carrying amount. Such will never be the case
in a debt-for-debt exchange of securities when notes of equal face amount are exchanged, and
only interest rates and/or maturity dates are changed. Id para. 16.
110. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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2. New tax legislation regarding cancellation of indebtedness income
and original issue discount
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990111 attempted to resolve
years of confusion by making it clear that the issue price of a New Secur-
ity will determine both the original issue discount (OID) and cancellation
of indebtedness (COD) income in debt-for-debt exchanges of securi-
ties." 2 COD income will generally equal the excess of the adjusted issue
price of the Target Security over the issue price of the New Security.
If the New Securities in debt-for-debt exchanges are traded on an
"established securities market,"" 3 the issue price of the New Securities
will equal the market value of the New Securities. If the Target Securi-
ties are traded on an established securities market but the New Securities
are not, the issue price of the New Securities will equal the market value
of the Target Securities at the date of the exchange. If neither the Target
Securities nor the New Securities is traded on an established securities
market, then, if the stated interest on the New Securities equals or ex-
ceeds the applicable Federal rate (as would normally be the case), the
issue price of the New Securities will equal their face amount. 
11 4
The fair market value of a New Security issued in most debt-for-
debt exchanges, including those conducted pursuant to Section 3(a)(9), is
frequently less than its own face amount and the adjusted issue price of
the Target Securities being retired. Therefore, the changes to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code will increase the instances in which COD income will
111. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 1991 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 1017 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
112. See id. § 11325(a), 1991 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1176 (adding new
I.R.C. § 108(e)(l1)(A) and repealing I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4)); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 964, 101ST
CONG., 2D Sass. 98-101 (1990). Before the repeal of section 1275(a)(4), new OID could not be
created in most debt-for-debt exchanges because the issue price of the New Security could not
be less than the adjusted issue price of the Target Security. The extent to which section
1275(a)(4) governed the determination of the issue price of New Securities for purposes of
computing COD income was unclear. See Haims & Schaumberger, supra note 96, at 94-98;
Cohen, The Repeal of Section 1275(a)(4) (Dec. 3, 1990) (unpublished manuscript).
113. Under proposed Treasury regulations, an instrument is only considered to be traded
on an established securities market if it is "traded on an established securities market on or
within 10 trading days after the date it is issued." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-2(c)(1), 51 Fed.
Reg. 12,022 (1986). An "established securities market" includes a national securities ex-
change, an over-the-counter market, or an "interdealer quotation system" that "regularly dis-
seminates quotations of obligations by identified brokers or dealers." Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-
1(e)(4)(iv) (as amended in 1981).
114. See I.R.C. §§ 1273(b)(4), 1274 (1988); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-2(c), 51 Fed. Reg.
12,022 (1986). The issue price of a Target Security will be less than its face amount if the stated
interest is less than the applicable Federal rate, see id., and hence the amount of COD income
may be more.
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arise, thereby increasing the cost of such debt-for-debt exchanges to
many corporations.
As with the LTV decision, however, these tax changes do not elimi-
nate exchanges of securities, such as Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges, as viable
out-of-court restructuring techniques. Any COD income that a corpora-
tion recognizes from an exchange of securities can be reduced to the ex-
tent that the corporation is insolvent immediately before the exchange. 1 5
Furthermore, COD income can be further reduced by any net operating
loss carryforwards, which are likely to be available to financially troubled
companies.'16 In addition, these tax changes apply only to debt-for-debt
exchanges. As a result, equity-for-debt exchanges may become increas-
ingly popular. This trend may be accelerated by the LTV decision,117 as
well as the general liquidity advantages of eliminating interest expense
that are likely to be particularly important for financially troubled
corporations.
III. THE POLICY AND ELEMENTS OF SECTION 3(a)(9)
A. The Policy of Registration and the Section 3(a)(9) Exemption
When a corporation proposes to exchange-and thereby sell' 1s-
New Securities for Target Securities, it must comply with the registration
requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act, unless an exemption from
the registration requirements of section 5 is available for the transac-
tion.119 Section 5 makes the sale of securities unlawful unless a registra-
115. See Haims & Schaumberger, supra note 96.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
118. Case law has established clearly that the exchange of a new security for an existing
security constitutes a "sale" of the new security under the Securities Act. See United States v.
Wernes, 157 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 1946); United States v. Riedel, 126 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir.
1942); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 14, at 399; 2 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note
14, at 1085; see also McGuigan & Aiken, Amendment of Securities, 9 REv. SEC. REG. 935, 935
n.1 (1976) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1933), explaining that such an
exchange, and therefore such a sale, may be deemed to occur when an existing security is
significantly modified).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988). Section 5 provides that:
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlaw-
ful for any person, directly or indirectly (1) to make use of any means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell
such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise...
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails to offer to sell ... through the use or medium of any prospectus or
otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such secur-
ity ....
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tion statement "is in effect," and makes any offer to sell securities
unlawful unless (a) a registration statement "has been filed," and (b) all
prospectuses relating to such securities comply with applicable
regulations.
1 20
There are a number of exemptions to the provisions of sections 5
and 10 of the Securities Act. Section 5 of the Securities Act is premised
on the theory that issuers should provide potential investors with full and
fair disclosure of all information that could be material to their invest-
ment decision and sufficient time to digest this information before mak-
ing any decision about purchasing or selling the offered securities. 12 1 In
considering the Securities Act's policy of full disclosure, however, Con-
gress identified circumstances "where there is no practical need for its
application or where the public benefits are too remote." 122  Conse-
quently, Congress exempted certain transactions from the ambit of sec-
tion 5. Among the exempted transactions are exchanges that meet the
requirements of Section 3(a)(9).
1 23
Congress determined that the Section 3(a)(9) exemption was appro-
priate to permit corporations to effect certain voluntary readjustments of
their securities without the delay, expense and, in financial distress situa-
tions, embarrassment of registration. 124 Congress also determined that
prohibiting paid solicitations in Section 3(a)(9) transactions would guard
against the use of Section 3(a)(9) to evade the registration requirements
of the Securities Act, 125 as well as ensuring that "excessive promoters' or
120. 15 U.S.C. § 77e. Section 5 of the Securities Act, and the applicable exemptions there-
from, dictate the circumstances in which a prospectus is needed. See Securities Act of 1933,
§ 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1988) (generally exempted securities); id. § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (exempted
transactions); id. § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (registration and prospectus requirements). Section 10
of the Securities Act and Regulation C, adopted thereunder, dictate the content of a prospec-
tus. See Securities Act of 1933, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1988); Regulation C, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.400-.497 (1990).
121. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1933).
122. Id. at 5.
123. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9). For a discussion of the re-
quirements of Section 3(a)(9), see infra notes 127-257 and accompanying text. Corporations
also utilize the exemptions from section 5 available under sections 4(2) and 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Act to conduct exchanges without complying with the Securities Act's registration
requirements. See supra note 15.
124. See H.R. RPp. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933) (referring to former Securities
Act of 1933, § 4(3), 15 U.S.C. 77d(2) (1933) (reenacted as section 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(9))); Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securities Act of 1933, 4
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 98 (1937).
125. H.R. REP. No. 152, supra note 124, at 25 ("Inasmuch as any exchange that involves
the payment of a commission of any sort is not exempt, there is no danger of the provision
being used for purposes of [evading registration requirements of the Securities Act]." (referring
to former section 4(3) under the Securities Act (reenacted as section 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(9)))).
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sponsors' interests" are not concealed from investors.
1 26
B. The Elements of Section 3(a)(9)
As noted above, Section 3(a)(9) exempts the issuance of the follow-
ing securities from the registration requirements of section 5 of the Secur-
ities Act:
Except with respect to a security exchanged in a case under
title 11 of the United States Code [the Federal Bankruptcy
Code], any security exchanged by the issuer with its existing
security holders exclusively where no commission or other re-
muneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting
such exchange. 127
In the absence of published congressional or SEC guidelines, com-
mentators have long attempted to establish a set of required "elements"
for compliance with Section 3(a)(9). Although commentators have dif-
fered as to the number128 and content of these elements, the four "prereq-
uisites" set forth by Professor Hicks'29 encompass most discussions of
Section 3(a)(9). 130 Trying to force the issues encountered in practice or
the Staff's no-action positions on Section 3(a)(9) into thesefour elements,
however, invariably becomes cumbersome and redundant. Conse-
quently, for purposes of analyzing Section 3(a)(9), only the following
three questions need be asked to determine whether an exchange of secur-
ities can be conducted without registration under the Securities Act in
reliance on Section 3(a)(9):
126. Letter from Chief of Securities Division of Federal Trade Commission, quoted in I
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2165.25, at 2588 [hereinafter Letter from Chief of Securities Divi-
sion]; accord H.R. REP. No. 152, supra note 124, at 25.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1988).
128. Compare L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 276-77 (2d ed.
1988) (setting forth three elements) with Connell, Section 3(a)(9): Recapitalizations, in I SE-
CURITIES LAw TECHNIQUES 5-1 (A.A. Sommer, Jr. ed. 1990) (setting forth five elements).
129. 7 J. HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
§ 2.03[1] (1990). Professor Hicks short-titles his four prerequisites of Section 3(a)(9) as: (1)
"Identity of Issuer," (2) "Exclusively by Exchange," (3) "Exclusively with Security Holders,"
and (4) "Absence of Remuneration or Commissions." Id. §§ 2.04-.07.
130. See L. Loss, supra note 128, at 276-79 (the second of his three elements contains both
of Professor Hicks' second and third elements). Connell basically duplicates Professor Hicks'
four "prerequisites," and adds a fifth "condition" for use of Section 3(a)(9): "[T]he transaction
must not be part of a scheme to evade registration." Connell, supra note 128, at 5-1. Connell
also sets forth factors for determining whether a transaction is a bona fide exchange or part of
a plan to evade registration. Id. § 5.02[5], at 5-10 (citing Securities Act Release No. 646, 1
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2136, at 2583-15 (Feb. 3, 1936)). For a quotation of relevant
portion of Release No. 646, see infra note 150.
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* Is the exchange being made by an issuer for its own securities
(the "same issuer" requirement)?
* Are security holders parting with any consideration in the
transaction other than outstanding securities of such issuer (the
"exclusively by exchange" requirement)?
0 Will the issuer pay any commission or other remuneration,
directly or indirectly, for the solicitation of the exchange (the
"no paid solicitation" requirement)?
In addition to asking these three questions, practitioners must be
concerned about whether a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange might be integrated
into another offering of securities by the corporation, if any, that is being
conducted within roughly the same time frame as the Section 3(a)(9) Ex-
change and, if so, whether any of the three elements set forth above
would be violated in such offerings.13 1 Other commentators apply this
integration analysis to Section 3(a)(9) through an additional fourth ele-
ment of the exemption: whether the offering is made exclusively to the
issuer's existing security holders, commonly referred to as the "exclu-
sively with existing security holders" requirement. 132 The probable gene-
sis of this "fourth requirement" is Securities Act Release No. 2029
(Release 2029)133 and Professor Loss' analysis (likely based on this Re-
lease) that the word "exclusively" in Section 3(a)(9) performs a "double
duty," modifying both the phrase "existing security holders" and the
word "exchange." '134 Release 2029, however, really should stand for
131. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 14, at 440.
[Flor an exemption to be available, each transaction must satisfy all of the conditions
of a single exemption. Moreover, where there are a series of offerings, every pro-
posed unregistered offering may be linked with a prior or subsequent offering; if such
linkage occurs, two or more ostensibly discrete offerings may be deemed to comprise
a single transaction. The doctrine of integration entails the process of combining
multiple offerings into a single offering, and the effect of such combination may be to
destroy one or more of the exemptions.
Id.
132. See, e.g., 7 J. HIcK , supra note 129, § 2.06[2] (discussing the problem of integration
under the general heading of "Exclusively with Security Holders.").
133. Securities Act Release No. 2029, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2140-2141, at 2583-17
to 2584 (Aug. 8, 1939). The general counsel of the SEC opined that the Section 3(a)(9) exemp-
tion "is available only to securities constituting part of an issue which, as a whole, is exchanged
in conformity with the requirements of the section." Id. 2140, at 2584 (emphasis added) (the
"issue" referred to is the issuance of securities at a particular point or points in time, not the
entire class of such securities). This language seems to refer back to other "requirements," not
create an additional and wholly new requirement.
134. L. Loss, supra note 128, at 277-78; see also 7 J.HIcKs, supra note 127, § 2.05[l][a], at
2-77 (stating that the word "exclusively" in Section 3(a)(9) modifies both the phrase "existing
security holders" and the word "exchange"). Professor Loss does not cite Release 2029 in his
"double duty" analysis of the word "exclusively" in Section 3(a)(9). There is no legislative
history or case law expounding on the word "exclusively," although the SEC has promulgated
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nothing more than the proposition that the use of Section 3(a)(9) can be
invalidated by integration, 13' a fact that is also true for other exemptions
under the Securities Act.136 Moreover, the only SEC interpretations or
Staff no-action letters that can be roughly characterized as involving an
"exclusively with existing security holders" requirement involve basic in-
tegration analyses, 137 such as a concurrent public or private offering of
new securities for cash. 138 While these offerings, which (by virtue of the
integration of otherwise separate transactions) are deemed to include the
two rules under the Securities Act that address the "exclusively by exchange" requirement.
See Rules 149 & 150, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.149, 230.150 (1990). For a discussion of Rules 149 and
150, see infra notes 192-93 & 198-203 and accompanying text. Release 2029 uses the word
"exclusively" to apply integration analysis to Section 3(a)(9), see Securities Act Release No.
2029, supra note 133, at 2584, which theoretically can be combined with the "exclusively by
exchange" requirement to impose a double duty on the word "exclusively." This second duty,
however, is illusory; integration analysis has its own history apart from Section 3(a)(9), see R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 14, at 440 (quoted supra note 131 and discussed infra note
136), and undoubtedly would apply to Section 3(a)(9) even if the word "exclusively" was not
contained in it. See generally infra notes 136 & 261 (discussing integration in the context of
other Securities Act exemptions, particularly those provided by Regulation D and section
3(a)(1 1), neither of which contain the word "exclusively").
135. See Securities Act Release No. 2029, supra note 133, 2141, at 2584 (SEC General
Counsel opining that a concurrent Section 3(a)(9) Exchange of new debt securities for existing
debt securities and a section 4(1) (now section 4(2)) private placement of debt securities to new
investors for cash constituted "separate 'issues,' and may be offered and sold.., without being
registered under the Securities Act"). See supra note 134. For a more detailed discussion of
integration as applied to Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges generally, see infra notes 258-71 and ac-
companying text.
136. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 14, at 440 (noting that integration analysis
applies to, among other Securities Act exemptions, the private offering exemptions available
under Sections 4(2) and 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2), (6) (1988), and Rules 505 and 506, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.505, .506 (1990); the limited offering exemptions under Section 3(b), e.g., Regulation A,
17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.264 (1990), and Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1990); the interstate
exemption available under section 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1988), and Rule 147, 17
C.F.R. § 230.147 (1990); and exchange exemptions available under sections 3(a)(9) and
3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9), (10) (1988)).
137. The discussions of variants of the "exclusively with the existing security holders" re-
quirement by each of the other commentators mentioned in this discussion also primarily con-
cern integration analysis. See 7 J. HICKS, supra note 129, § 2.06, at 2-88 to 2-94; L. Loss,
supra note 128, at 278-81; 3 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 1211-28; Connell, supra
note 128, § 5.02[3], at 5-7 to 5-8. In fact, none of the no-action letters cited in those discus-
sions of an "exclusively with existing security holders" requirement would have violated only
that requirement had the other offerings been integrated with the Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges.
In each case, one or more of the three Section 3(a)(9) elements listed in this Article also would
have been violated.
138. See, eg., Four-Phase Sys., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Dec. 10, 1973) (LEXIS, Fed-
sec library, Noact file) (substantially simultaneous private placement pursuant to section 4(2)
and a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange not integrated); see also 7 J.HIcKS, supra note 129, § 2.06[2],
at 2-91 to 2-94 (discussing Four-Phase Systems in its primary analysis of the "exclusively with
existing security holders" requirement). These are also the facts addressed by the SEC Gen-
eral Counsel in Release 2029. See Securities Act Release No. 2029, supra note 133.
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sale of securities for cash, would violate an exclusively with existing se-
curity holders requirement, they also would violate, if integrated, the ex-
clusively by exchange requirement. 139 Even a concurrent third-party
exchange of securities, after integration with an issuer's exchange of its
New Securities for its Target Securities, would violate the same issuer
requirement in addition to an exclusively with existing security holders
requirement. 4° Consequently, after reviewing the many Section 3(a)(9)
no-action letters on this subject, it is apparent that all ostensibly "exclu-
sively with existing security holder" situations really involve an integra-
tion analysis of one or more of the three elements set forth above. 141 As
a result, an "exclusively with existing security holders" requirement
serves no analytic purpose. Ultimately, practitioners must feel comforta-
ble that, after an independent integration analysis, the three elements of
Section 3(a)(9) identified in this Article have been satisfied.142
1. The "same issuer" requirement
Historically, the same issuer requirement of Section 3(a)(9) 143 was
construed strictly to require that the issuer of the New Securities in an
exchange transaction (the Offeror) be the same entity that issued the Tar-
get Securities. 1" The Staff, however, has taken no-action positions in an
139. See infra notes 186-203 and accompanying text.
140. For a discussion of the same issuer requirement, see infra notes 143-85 and accompa-
nying text. What is interesting in this context is that an "exclusively with existing security
holders requirement" theoretically should have been applied equally to the many no-action
letters concerning the same issuer requirement. Instead, the letters focused solely on the same
issuer requirement. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Sept. 6, 1976)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (Staff denying no-action request "particularly because the
exchange contemplated is not an exchange of a security by the same issuer with its security
holder" (emphasis added)); Worldwide Energy Co., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Feb. 5,
1973) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (must be "same legal entity").
141. For a general discussion of integration analysis in the context of Section 3(a)(9), see
infra notes 258-71 and accompanying text.
142. Ultimately, however, even the three elements for Section 3(a)(9) set forth in this Arti-
cle should only be construed as a convenient way to analyze Section 3(a)(9). While most no-
action letters readily fall into one or more of these three categories, there is, as noted above, no
legislative history or public interpretation by the SEC, the Staff or any judicial body that simi-
larly breaks Section 3(a)(9) into any set number of "elements."
143. Section 3(a)(9) exempts "any security exchanged by the issuer with its existing security
holders." 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (emphasis added).
144. See Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825, [1957-1961
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,539 (Aug. 12, 1957); O'Neill Bondholders
Comm., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH)
79,947, at 84,438 (July 10, 1974); 7 J. HICKS, supra note 129, § 2.04[1], at 2-37. The same
issuer requirement is not satisfied, and therefore Section 3(a)(9) is unavailable, in connection
with the issuance of New Securities in a transaction in which the issuer's legal form is changed.
See, e.g., NEOKA Group 1987-I, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Jan. 19, 1990) (LEXIS, Fed-
sec library, Noact file) (Staff "unable" to issue no-action position because "there is no 'identity
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increasing variety of circumstances-typically involving Offerors that are
parent or successor corporations proposing Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges of
their New Securities for the Target Securities of subsidiaries or predeces-
sors, respectively. In the transactions that are the subject of these no-
action letters, before the issuance of the New Securities the Offerors
either became jointly and severally (i.e., primarily) liable for Target Se-
curities issued by another entity (the Other Issuer), 145 or became secon-
darily liable for the Target Securities of the Other Issuer by guaranteeing
such Target Securities.1"
In at least one instance, it is apparent that an Offeror assumed the
primary obligation for the securities of the Other Issuer for the sole pur-
pose of satisfying the same issuer requirement, and the Staff granted the
no-action request.147 In other cases, Offerors acquiring Other Issuers
through reverse triangular mergers guaranteed certain securities of such
Other Issuers and thereby satisfied the same issuer requirement in subse-
quent Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges of the Offeror's New Securities for such
guaranteed securities. 148 While this technique may prove to be a helpful
method of satisfying the same issuer requirement, practitioners should be
cognizant of Securities Act Release No. 646,149 in which the SEC Gen-
eral Counsel stated that he believed that Section 3(a)(9) was "applicable
only to exchanges which are bona fide, in the sense that they are not
effected merely as a step in a plan to evade the registration requirements
of the [Securities] Act."'1 50 One reason, independent from Section 3(a)(9)
of issuer' within the meaning of section 3(a)(9)" when a general partnership proposed to
amend its partnership agreement to become a limited partnership by issuing limited partner-
ship interests in exchange for general partnership interests); Kanawha Gauley Coal & Coke
Co., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Sept. 4, 1974) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (cited on
LEXIS as Kanawha Gaulty [sic] Coal & Coke Co.) (same issuer requirement not satisfied
when a corporation changes its legal form to a limited partnership); Recreation Ventures, SEC
No-Action Letter (avail. May 14, 1973) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same issuer re-
quirement not satisfied when a limited partnership changes its legal form to a corporation,
even though the partnership agreement provided for such change). Nor is the requirement
satisfied in merger or certain other reorganization transactions. See 7 J. HIcKs, supra note
129, § 2.04[3][b], at 2-46; see also Hendry County Bank, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. May
28, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (in formation of a one-bank holding company,
no-action request denied because of "two different issuers" despite common control and stock-
holders, and, according to the no-action request, "reason, logic and justification"); Worldwide
Energy Co., supra note 140 (must be "same legal entity").
145. See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 167-85 and accompanying text.
147. See SEC No-Action Letters cited infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
148. See SEC No-Action Letters cited infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
149. Securities Act Release No. 646, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2136, at 2583-15 (Feb. 3,
1936).
150. Id. The SEC General Counsel provided the following guidelines for determining
whether a bonafide exchange exists for purposes of Section 3(a)(9):
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or any reason attributable to a particular transaction, that a parent that is
a reporting company under the Exchange Act"' might assume primary
or secondary liability for a new wholly owned subsidiary's debt that has
independent operations is that such an assumption could relieve the sub-
sidiary from reporting obligations under the Exchange Act.
1 52
Offerors should note that the assumption of the primary obligation
of another corporation's securities or the guarantee of the securities of
another corporation may, in and of itself, constitute the issuance of a
security.153 The registration requirements of the Securities Act, however,
In determining whether a particular exchange had been effected merely as a step in a
plan to evade the registration requirements of the [Securities] Act .... a court would
take into account... [i] the length of time during which the securities received by the
issuer were outstanding prior to their surrender in exchange, [ii] the number of hold-
ers of the securities originally outstanding, [iii] the marketability of such securities,
and also [iv] the question whether the exchange is one which was dictated by finan-
cial considerations of the issuer and not primarily in order to enable one or a few
security holders to distribute their holdings to the public.
Id. As intimated by the second and fourth of these "guidelines," the main focus of the SEC
General Counsel in Release 646 was the issuance of the New Securities to a single investor or
small group of controlling stockholders immediately prior to the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange to
justify use of the Section 3(a)(9) exemption. Id. 55 2136-2137, at 2583-15 to -16. In the con-
text of issuing a guarantee or an assumption in connection with pre-existing public securities, it
is likely that those pre-existing securities would be held by numerous non-controlling parties.
Release 646 is much more broadly cited for the proposition that Section 3(a)(9) is a transaction
exemption and that the New Securities issued thereunder carry the same restrictions on post-
distribution trading as the Target Securities. See infra notes 272-84 and accompanying text,
for a discussion of these trading restrictions in the context of Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges.
151. A reporting company is an entity that is required to file periodic reports with the SEC
pursuant to sections 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1988).
152. The subsidiary might have reporting obligations under the Exchange Act, for example,
if it had registered securities with the SEC pursuant to sections 13 or 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m,
78o(d). The Staff has expressed the view, however, that where the issuer of a fully and uncon-
ditionally guaranteed security is wholly owned by the guarantor and such wholly owned sub-
sidiary has more than minimal independent operations, and the guarantor is itself a reporting
company under the Exchange Act, the issuer of the guaranteed security "would be condition-
ally exempted ... from the reporting obligations" of the Exchange Act pursuant to section
12(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(h) (1988), thereof. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 53, 48 Fed. Reg.
28,230, 28,231 & n.2 (June 13, 1983) [hereinafter SAB No. 53]; see also id. at 28,231 (the
parent-guarantor need not be a reporting company to terminate the reporting requirements of
a wholly owned subsidiary that has "essentially no independent operations" and the guarantee
of the Target Securities is "full and unconditional."). "In implementing SAB No. 53, the Staff
has routinely expressed no objection to the cessation of such reporting by such [wholly owned]
subsidiaries," subject to certain conditions. FHC-CompCare, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter
(avail. Oct. 12, 1989) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (citing HRI Group, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter (avail. Oct. 11, 1988) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Burroughs Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Dec. 22, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Sprague
Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. May 3, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)).
153. See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), (4), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l), (4) (1988) (definition of
"security" includes, among other things, a "guarantee"); see also Financial Corp. of Santa
Barbara, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. June 22, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)
(treating a parent's "joint and several obligation" of a subsidiary's debt as a separate security);
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apply to "offers to sell" and "sales of" securities. 154 No-action requests
uniformly argue with success that no sale of the assumption or guarantee
has occurred when a parent or successor corporation gratuitously takes
on liability of another entity's securities; accordingly, there is no registra-
tion requirement.15 5
a. primary obligors
The Staff repeatedly has taken no-action positions when an Offeror
had assumed joint and several liability for the Target Securities of the
Other Issuer and intended to conduct a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange of the
Offeror's New Securities for such Target Securities, whether the Offeror
became a primary obligor at the initial issuance of the Target Securi-
ties156 or at a later date. Offerors have become the primary obligor at a
Union Planters Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 29, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file) (Staff noted that "payment of [certain notes] will be guaranteed by [Union Planters
Corp.], and that such guarantee may be deemed a security required to be registered under the
1933 Act, absent an exemption").
154. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988). The terms "sale" and "sell" are
defined in section 2(3) of the Securities Act. Id. § 77b(3).
155. See, eg., W.R. Grace & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. July 25, 1988) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file); Perpetual Say. Bank, Perpetual Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(avail. Feb. 29, 1988) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Midlantic Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter (avail. Apr. 27, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Pacesetter Fin. Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 21, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). Counsel often
support this argument by pointing out that no sale occurs when the debt holders have no right
of consent to the assumption and related changes to the debt. See Time-Warner, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter (avail. Jan. 9, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (Time-Warner vol-
untarily guaranteed Warner Communication's existing debt); FHC-CompCare, Inc., supra
note 152 (new parent of acquired corporation guarantees acquired corporation's debt); Com-
ing Glass Works, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep
(CCH) 1 78,707, at 78,013 (Feb. 26, 1988) (Staff noting that the initial issuer "is not required
to solicit the consent or vote of the Holders of the Debentures with respect to the... assump-
tion of payment obligations under the Debentures"); McKesson Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(avail. Aug. 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Newell Co., SEC No-Action Letter
(avail. July 22, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (Staff noting that "the holders of the
Debentures do not have any right to vote upon the ... assumption of liability"); Inexco Oil
Co., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Mar. 17, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Motor-
ola, Inc., SEC No-Aption Letter (avail. Mar. 5, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); see
also United Technologies Corp. & Sheller-Globe Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Feb. 6,
1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (counsel did not make the argument related to this
point, but Staff took particular note of counsel's representation that original issuer was "not
required to solicit the consent or vote of the" debt holders). Cf Recreation Ventures, supra
note 144 (Staff expressly does "not agree that a 'sale' under Section 2(3) is not involved" in a
proposed transaction in which the consent of investors was required). Counsel have also ar-
gued that the assumption is occurring for no value. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works, supra;
Newell Co., supra; see also Securities Act of 1933 § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (defining alterna-
tive uses of "sale" or "sell" to require some sort of disposition or attempted disposition of a
security "for value").
156. See, e.g., Financial Corp. of Santa Barbara, supra note 153 (parent holding company
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later date through a subsequent assumption of the obligations of the
Other Issuer arising from (1) the merger of the Other Issuer into the
Offeror itself' 57 or into a subsidiary of the Offeror, 15s or (2) the merger of
a subsidiary of the Offeror into the Other Issuer.'59 The assumption of
joint and several liability may also arise from other reorganizations, such
as the dissolution of a subsidiary1"° or the formation of a holding
company. 161
In each of these situations in which the Staff issued no-action letters,
the Offeror had assumed the obligations to pay the principal, premium, if
any, and interest on the Other Issuer's existing securities. The assump-
tion may have been of joint liability with the Other Issuer, 162 and it may
have been on a subordinated basis consistent with the Other Issuer's
obligation.1
63
It appears that an Offeror's assumption or guarantee' 64 of payment
liability of the Other Issuer's debt is a method of meeting the same issuer
requirement when it would not otherwise be met. In response to an ini-
tial request by Pacwest Bancorp. (Pacwest), the Staff refused to take a
assumed joint and several liability for the convertible debentures of its wholly owned subsidi-
ary when they were issued and relied on Section 3(a)(9) to exchange parent's common stock
for subsidiary's debentures upon conversion).
157. See, eg., Heritage Bancorp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Feb. 14, 1973) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file) (surviving corporation assumed all liability and obligation on con-
vertible notes of a previously unaffiliated corporation that it acquired and relied on Section
3(a)(9) to exchange its common stock for the acquired corporation's notes upon conversion).
158. See, e.g., Pacwest Bancorp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 13, 1979) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file) [hereinafter Pacwest II] (parent company assumed joint and several
payment obligation for the convertible debentures of a previously unaffiliated corporation it
acquired as an operating subsidiary and relied on Section 3(a)(9) to exchange the parent's
common stock for the subsidiary's debentures upon conversion).
159. See, e.g., McKesson, Inc., supra note 155; Newell Co., supra note 155; Motorola, Inc.,
supra note 155; DPF, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Feb. 12, 1979) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file); Pacesetter Fin. Corp., supra note 155.
160. See, e.g., Pan Am World Airways, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. June 30, 1975)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (parent company assumed obligations on convertible de-
bentures of a wholly owned foreign subsidiary when the subsidiary was dissolved and relied on
Section 3(a)(9) to exchange the parent's common stock for the subsidiary's debentures upon
conversion).
161. See, e.g., Perpetual Say. Bank, Perpetual Fin. Corp., supra note 155 (newly formed
holding company assumed obligations on the convertible debentures of an operating company
and relied on Section 3(a)(9) to exchange the holding company's common stock for the operat-
ing company's debentures upon conversion).
162. See, e.g., McKesson Corp., supra note 155 (assumption of joint liability with Other
Issuer); Newell Co., supra note 155 (assumption of joint liability with Other Issuer); WECO
Dev. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Feb. 23, 1973) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)
(assumption of "primary liability" of Other Issuer).
163. See, e.g., Pacwest II, supra note 158.
164. See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
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no-action position when Pacwest stated that it would only assume the
obligation of issuing its common stock upon the conversion of existing
convertible debentures of a corporation it had acquired and that Pacwest
intended to rely on Section 3(a)(9) to avoid registering the shares of its
common stock that would be issuable upon conversion.' 6  When
Pacwest subsequently represented that it would assume the obligations to
pay principal, premium, if any, and interest on the subsidiary's deben-
tures, the Staff agreed to the requested no-action position.
1 66
b. guarantors
A guarantee and the underlying security that is guaranteed are sepa-
rate securities.' 67 Consequently, a guarantor and an issuer of existing
guaranteed securities both will satisfy the same issuer requirement if they
jointly offer to exchange new guaranteed securities for the existing guar-
anteed securities.' 68 The requirement is also satisfied if a guarantor offers
New Securities other than a guarantee for the existing guarantee (consid-
ered the Target Security of the guarantor), and the issuer of the underly-
ing securities offers New Securities that carry no guarantee for the
existing underlying securities (considered the Target Security of the
Other Issuer).
169
Where the guarantor is the sole Offeror of New Securities, however,
the Staff's position has evolved from its denial of the no-action request of
National Can Corporation in 1973,17° to equating guarantees with as-
165. Pacwest Bancorp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCHI) 82,376, at 82,617-20 (Sept. 24, 1979) [hereinafter Pacwest I].
166. Pacwest II, supra note 158; see also 7 J. HICKS, supra note 129, § 2.04[4][b][iii], at 2-59
(discussing the Pacwest no-action letters).
167. See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), (4), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l), (4).
168. In this scenario, the guarantor, such as a parent corporation, would offer a new guar-
antee in exchange for the existing guarantee, and the issuer of the underlying security, such as
a subsidiary corporation, would offer a new underlying security for the existing underlying
security. 7 J. HicKs, supra note 129, § 2.04[5][a], at 2-61 (citing Grolier, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter (avail. Dec. 2, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)). Although Grolier involved
the factual scenario described by Hicks, the no-action request relating to the joint exchange of
existing guaranteed securities for new guaranteed securities was based on section 4(2) rather
than section 3(a)(9).
169. See ECL Indus. & Norlin Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Dec. 16, 1985)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (no-action position granted when a parent's new warrants
and its subsidiary's new debentures were offered in exchange for existing subsidiary debentures
that were guaranteed by the parent).
170. National Can Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Oct. 29, 1973) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file). National Can proposed to exchange its common stock for its subsidiary's
convertible debentures that it had guaranteed. The Staff refused to take a no-action position,
stating that "[a]lthough the guarantee of [the subsidiary's] Bonds by National may in itself be
deemed to be a security of National under Section 2(1) of the Act, the Bonds themselves are
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sumptions of joint and several liability in 1989.171 Starting in 1982, the
"[S]taff decided to bury its analysis and conclusion in National Can Corp.
in favor of a construction of the exemption that is grounded on the eco-
nomic reality of the issuer of the guaranteed securities at the time of their
issuance."' 172 In response to requests based on this "economic reality"
standard, the Staff granted no-action letters where a parent company had
guaranteed, upon initial issuance, the securities of a subsidiary issuer that
the parent had formed for a special or limited purpose.1 73 Nonetheless,
prior to 1989, the Staff avoided (and a few joint and several obligation
no-action request letters 74 distinguished) situations in which the Offeror
had guaranteed Target Securities of another issuer with independent op-
erations, and the Offeror proposed a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange of its New
Securities for those Target Securities. In response to the 1989 no-action
requests of Daisy Systems Corporation 7 ' and FHC-CompCare, Inc.,
176
not thereby considered a security of National under [Section 3(a)(9)] solely by reason of guar-
antee." Id.
171. See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
172. 7 J. HicKs, supra note 129, § 2.04[5][b], at 2-64 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
173. See, e.g., American Motors Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. July 8, 1982)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (no-action position taken after American Motors, which
had formed a finance subsidiary solely for the purpose of offering to foreign nationals outside
of the United States debt securities guaranteed by American Motors and convertible into
American Motors stock, argued that, for the purposes of exchanging its stock for the subsidi-
ary's securities upon conversion in reliance on Section 3(a)(9), it should be considered the
issuer of the subsidiary's securities because "the economic merits of the [subsidiary's] Bonds to
an investor lie solely in the Guarantees issued by the [parent company]"); see also IMCO
Realty Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,434, at 77,275-76 (Feb. 6, 1990) (debt securities of one wholly owned subsidiary of a part-
nership could be exchanged for debt securities of another wholly owned subsidiary of a part-
nership where the partnership guaranteed the securities of both subsidiaries, and both
subsidiaries were formed exclusively to act as financing entities and had no economic substance
or operations independent from the partnership); Saatchi & Saatchi, SEC No-Action Letter
(avail. May 18, 1989) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (special purpose subsidiary with no
assets); Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget SCA, SCA Capitol Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(avail. Dec. 15, 1988) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (limited purpose finance subsidiary
with some assets); Dynalectron Corp., DFC Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 10, 1986)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (special purpose subsidiary with no material tangible
assets).
174. See, e.g., Financial Corp. of Santa Barbara, supra note 153 (issuer's counsel noting the
Staff's different treatment of Target Securities that had been guaranteed by the Offeror vis a vis
Target Securities for which the Offeror had assumed joint and several liability).
175. Daisy Sys. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 79,314, at 79,153-57 (Apr. 10, 1989) (parent company transferred substantially
all of its operating assets to a merger subsidiary prior to guaranteeing obligations for the con-
vertible debentures of a previously unaffiliated corporation it acquired through a reverse trian-
gular merger with the merger subsidiary, and relied on Section 3(a)(9) to exchange the parent's
debentures for the new subsidiary's debentures upon conversion).
176. FHC-CompCare, Inc., supra note 152.
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however, the Staff took no-action positions on proposed Section 3(a)(9)
Exchanges in which parent corporations guaranteed the existing securi-
ties of an operating subsidiary that had been acquired through merger.17 7
The Staff now appears to equate the guarantee of an obligation with the
assumption of primary liability for an obligation, 17 8 and appears now to
permit a parent corporation to guarantee the debt of a subsidiary for the
purpose of satisfying the same issuer requirement. 79
177. Id.; Daisy Sys. Corp., supra note 175. Counsel for both FHC-Comp Care, Inc. and
Daisy Systems Corp. abandoned the "economic reality" rationale for satisfying the same issuer
requirement, and instead argued, apparently persuasively, that the parent "should be deemed
to be an issuer of the [subsidiary's] Debentures [the Target Securities] as well as the issuer of
the [parent's New Securities] '[b]ecause the [parent] will in fact be liable under the [subsidi-
ary's] Debentures." FHC-CompCare, Inc., supra note 152 (citing, among others, Daisy Sys.
Corp., supra note 175 (using the same "deemed issuer" rationale); Newell Co., supra note 155;
MeKesson Corp., supra note 155; Pacwest II, supra note 158). Cf National Can Corp., supra
note 170 (Staff's earlier and dramatically opposite analysis). As a result of the overall transac-
tion in Daisy Systems Corp., the parent-guarantor became a holding company and substan-
tially all of the operating assets of the overall corporate entity were owned by the surviving
acquired corporation that was the issuer of the convertible debentures. Daisy Sys. Corp.,
supra note 175, at 79,155. As a result, it is arguable that an "economic reality" rationale could
have been a basis for the Staff's no-action position in Daisy Systems Corp., although the no-
action request did not mention this rationale and put its faith exclusively in the "deemed is-
suer" rationale. In FHC-CompCare, Inc, however, there was no factual basis for any eco-
nomic reality rationale for the Staff's no-action position. First Hospital Corporation (FHC)
formed a holding company parent, which would hold all of the operating assets of FHC in one
subsidiary and all of the operating assets of Comprehensive Care Corporation (CompCare), the
company it was acquiring, in a second subsidiary, and would guarantee CompCare's converti-
ble debt after a proposed reverse triangular merger of CompCare with and into the second
subsidiary. FHC-CompCare, Inc., supra note 152. The Staff issued a no-action letter that
would have allowed the parent holding company, despite holding all of FHC's assets in a
separate subsidiary, to rely on Section 3(a)(9) to exchange the parent's common stock and
debentures for CompCare's debentures upon conversion. FHC-CompCare, Inc., supra note
152.
178. In the Daisy Systems Corp. no-action request, counsel stated:
For these purposes, there is no reason to view an assumption of joint and several
liability as different from [a guarantee]. Indeed, several no-action letters, and a con-
versation we had with [a member of the Staff] in late January of this year, indicate
that the Staff does not distinguish between assumptions and guarantees in such cases.
Daisy Sys. Corp., supra note 175, at 79,156 (citing Southwest Bancorp., SEC No-Action Let-
ter (avail. May 20, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); The Limited Stores, SEC No-
Action Letter (avail. May 12, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)).
179. But see supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text, discussing the bona fide exchange
requirement of Section 3(a)(9) set forth in Securities Act Release No. 646, supra note 130.
There was no apparent reason for Daisy Systems' guarantee of its new subsidiary's Target
Securities other than to satisfy the same issuer requirement. See Daisy Sys. Corp., supra note
175. In FHC-CompCare, Inc., however, the guarantee also provided the basis for the Staff's
taking a no-action position with regard to the acquired subsidiary's termination of filing peri-
odic reports with the SEC pursuant to sections 13 and 15(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m, 78o(d). FHC-CompCare, Inc., supra note 152. For a discussion of the basis for this
termination, see supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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As in the primary obligor context,"' ° if an Offeror seeks to satisfy
the same issuer requirement through its guarantee of Target Securities
issued by another issuer, that Offeror must guarantee the payment of
principal, premium, if any, and interest on those Target Securities."'8
The guarantee, however, may be made on a subordinated basis consistent
with the subordinated nature of the underlying securities.
18 2
The Staff has not addressed the situation in which the issuer of the
underlying Target Securities that are guaranteed offers to exchange New
Securities without a guarantee for such Target Securities pursuant to Sec-
tion 3(a)(9). Professor Hicks suggests that if the "guarantee is worthless
either because [the guarantor] is defunct or with substantially inadequate
assets to honor its obligations . . . , form should yield to substance, as
suggested by the language of National Can, and the [Section 3(a)(9)] ex-
emption should apply." 8 3 This logic smacks of the "economic reality"
rationale that the Staff clung to when it distinguished between guarantors
and primary obligors, and that was apparently abandoned in FHC-
CompCare, Inc. and Daisy Systems Corporation."4 As in the primary
obligor no-action letters, so long as the Offeror is "deemed to be an is-
suer" of at least some of the Target Securities, it does not seem relevant
that attached securities of another issuer, whether valuable or not, that
are inseparable from such Target Securities may be extinguished in the
exchange. 85
2. The "exclusively by exchange" requirement
Section 3(a)(9) provides that "any security exchanged by the issuer
with its existing security holders exclusively" is exempt from registra-
tion.' 86 As noted above, the SEC has interpreted the word "exclusively"
to modify the word "exchanged."' 187 If interpretated literally, such lan-
180. See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
181. See FHC-CompCare, Inc., supra note 152; Daisy Sys. Corp., supra note 175; The
Timken Co. and The Tenax Co., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Jan. 20, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file); American Motors Corp., supra note 173.
182. See, e.g., FHC-CompCare, Inc., supra note 152.
183. 7 J. HIcKS, supra note 129, § 2.04E5][b][iii] (citing National Can Corp., supra note
170); accord H. SOWARDS, The Federal Securities Act and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, in
11 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-SECURITIES REGULATION § 3. 10[], at 3-23, 3-24 (A.A. Som-
mer, Jr. ed. 1990) (analyzing same hypothetical fact scenario, and concluding that "one issuer"
is involved, and that the surrender of a second security (for example, the extinguishment of the
guarantee) "was immaterial" to the holder of the Target Securities).
184. See supra note 177.
185. For a discussion about the potential inter-relationship of the same issuer requirement
and exclusively by exchange requirement in this context, see infra at 188.
186. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (emphasis added).
187. See Rules 149 & 150, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.149, 230.150. For a discussion of Securities
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guage would preclude any holder of Target Securities from giving the
corporation any consideration other than Target Securities for the New
Securities, and also would prevent the corporation from offering any-
thing other than New Securities in return for Target Securities. 188 The
SEC liberalized this requirement, however, through the adoption of
Rules 149189 and 150190 under the Securities Act, and through related
no-action letters. 191
a. security holders paying consideration in addition to Target Securities
Rule 149 permits security holders to pay sucl cash to the corpora-
tion, along with Target Securities, in a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange "as may
be necessary to effect an equitable adjustment, in respect of dividends or
interest paid or payable on the securities involved in the exchange, as
between such security holder and other security holders of the same class
accepting the offer of exchange."1 92 The waiver of interest or dividends
accrued on the Target Security as part of the terms of an Exchange Offer
is itself an indirect payment by security holders to the issuer. 193 The Staff
has confirmed the availability of the Section 3(a)(9) exemption in such
exchanges by relying on Rule 149 and upon the argument that the waiver
of accrued interest or dividends is incidental to the primary purpose of
the exchange of New Securities for Target Securities. 194
Act Release No. 2029's analysis of the word "exclusively" in Section 3(a)(9) as the justification
for the need to conduct an integration analysis in connection with Section 3(a)(9) generally,
and for the exclusively by exchange requirement in particular, see supra notes 132-42 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of what some commentators call the "double duty" that
the word "exclusively" serves in Section 3(a)(9), see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
188. Of course, an out-of-court restructuring that is structured to entail an exchange of
securities is not sufficient to qualify for Section 3(a)(9) in and of itself. As a result of the same
issuer requirement, Section 3(a)(9) is also generally not available if the exchange involves New
Securities to be issued by an entity other than the issuer of the Target Securities. See supra
notes 143-85 and accompanying text. In this context, it is interesting that the Staff has not
questioned the availability of Section 3(a)(9) on account of the exclusively by exchange re-
quirement when an Offeror proposes to exchange its New Securities for securities that had
been issued by another corporation but which had been assumed on a joint and several basis or
guaranteed by the Offeror. In such a transaction, the holder of Target Securities is offered
New Securities of one corporation (the Offeror) in return for the holder surrendering existing
securities of, in effect, two corporations: (i) the Offeror (the assumption of joint and several
liability or the guarantee), and (ii) the Other Issuer (the underlying security). Rather than the
exclusively by exchange requirement, however, the Staff has focused on the same issuer re-
quirement in this factual scenario. See supra notes 156-85 and accompanying text.
189. 17 C.F.R. § 230.149.
190. Id. § 230.150.
191. See SEC No-Action Letters cited infra notes 194-200 & 202-03.
192. 17 C.F.R. § 230.149.
193. See 7 J. HICKs, supra note 129, § 2.05[2], at 2-78 to 2-83.
194. See, eg., Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 159, at 79,338; The Royale Group, SEC
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In addition, the Staff has taken no-action positions in connection
with proposed Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges in which the corporation of-
fered New Securities in exchange for Target Securities and the following
types of consideration other than cash for interest or dividends: (1) the
waiver of a cause of action or claims against the corporation with respect
to the Target Securities, 19 and (2) the consent of holders of Target Se-
curities to amend Target Securities in a concurrent Consent Solicitation
and Section 3(a)(9) Exchange,1 96 or an independent Consent Solicitation
that is deemed to create New Securities. 97
b. issuers paying consideration in addition to New Securities
Rule 150 makes it clear that an issuer, consistent with Section
3(a)(9), may make direct or indirect payments to its security holders
No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 4, 1988) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); ECL Indus. &
Norlin Corp., supra note 169; Shop Rite Foods, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Oct. 14,
1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Barnett Winston Inv. Trust, SEC No-Action Letter
(avail. Feb. 9, 1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); NJB Prime Investors, SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 80,556, at 86,431 (Apr.
14, 1976); Geoscience Tech. Servs. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Feb. 9, 1976) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file); Canrad Precision Indus., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Sept. 27,
1973) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Diversa-Graphics, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter
(avail. July 20, 1972) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); see also Four-Phase Sys., supra note
138 (in the solicitation of consents to an amendment that would extensively modify existing
preferred stock, counsel successfully argued-without reference to Rule 149-that issuance of
common stock for accrued cash dividends on preferred stock was "not a primary purpose of,
but is incidental to, the exchange offer [i.e., the solicitation]"); cf Rapid-Am. Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (avail. Oct. 30, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (no-action position
taken when the exercise price of debenture purchase warrants could consist of either cash or an
exchange of outstanding securities plus cash in the amount of accrued interest on the New
Securities to be issued upon the exercise of the warrants).
195. See, e.g., Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at 79,338; First Pennsylvania Mort-
gage Trust, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Mar. 4, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file);
Metagraphic Sys., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. May 1, 1975) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
fie). But cf. Snowshoe Co., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. June 23, 1975) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (Staff states it is "unable to express any view as to availability of Section
3(a)(9) for an exchange of notes for" unsecured creditor claims out of bankruptcy, because
there were not enough facts presented for Staff to determine whether such unsecured claims
were securities).
196. See, eg., Bayswater Realty & Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Apr. 30,
1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (cited on LEXIS as Baywater [sic] Realty & Capital
Corp.); Shop Rite Foods, supra note 194. For a discussion of Consent Solicitations conducted
in conjunction with Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges, see infra notes 304-12 and accompanying text.
197. See, eg., Four-Phase Sys., supra note 138; Daitch Crystal Dairies, SEC No-Action
Letter (avail. Nov. 13, 1972) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); see also infra note 201 and
accompanying text (discussing a consent to an asset sale from holders of convertible deben-
tures in exchange for a reduction of the conversion price of the debentures in the context of
Rule 150). For a discussion of Consent Solicitations not conducted in conjunction with Sec-
tion 3(a)(9) Exchanges that are deemed to create New Securities, see infra notes 360-81 and
accompanying text.
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"when such payments are part of the terms of the offer of exchange." '1 98
For example, t1e Staff has allowed corporations to pay cash to security
holders for accrued dividends on Target Securities199 and when security
holders otherwise would have been entitled to receive a fractional share
as part of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange.2 "° In addition, one federal district
court would not invalidate the availability of Section 3(a)(9) in a transac-
tion in which the corporation, as a part of an alleged exchange transac-
tion, reduced the conversion price on outstanding convertible debentures
as payment for consents from the holders of those debentures to the sale
of certain of the corporation's assets.2 °1
The Staff has also taken no-action positions when the amount of
cash consideration paid to holders of Target Securities was significant in
relation to the value of the New Security.20 2 Unlike Rule 149, under
which the additional consideration the holder of a Target Security can
surrender must "effect an equitable adjustment, '20 3 Rule 150 contains no
implication of any limitation on the amount of payments a corporation
can make to holders of Target Securities along with New Securities in a
Section 3(a)(9) Exchange. Thus, practitioners can structure Section
3(a)(9) Exchanges without any constraints on the form of consideration
offered by the corporation to the holders of the Target Securities.
198. 17 C.F.R. § 230.150.
199. See, e.g., Steiner Am. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. May 4, 1973) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file).
200. See, e.g., WestMarc Communications, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 20, 1989)
(LEXIS, Fedsee library, Noact file); University Patents, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Apr. 6,
1979) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
201. In re Browning Debenture Holders' Comm., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCII), T 95,071, at 97,753, 97,754 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (relying on Rule 150). See infra
notes 366 & 375 and accompanying text, discussing Browning in the context of amendments to
existing securities creating New Securities.
202. See, e.g., Shop Rite Foods, supra note 194 (no-action position taken in connection with
exchange of payment of $5 in cash plus issuance of $5 in convertible debt for each share of
existing preferred stock with a redemption price of $10 per share); Systemedics, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter (avail. Feb. 19, 1976) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (Staff took no-action
position in connection with issuance of debentures when the corporation was offering one dol-
lar in cash and one dollar principal amount of debentures for each share of common stock
tendered and accepted); Rapid-Am Corp., supra note 194 (upon payment of $35 in principal
amount of Target Securities, the corporation would issue $45 in principal amount of New
Securities and $3.25 in cash). The Section 3(a)(9) exemption also will not be destroyed if a
corporation offers holders of Target Securities the option of receiving exclusively cash or sub-
stantially exclusively New Securities, see, eg., WestMarc Communications, supra note 200, or
the option of different sets of New Securities, see, e.g.. Radyne Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(avail. Feb. 6, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
203. See supra note 188.
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3. The "no paid solicitation" requirement
The "no paid solicitation" requirement can be violated, and the use
of Section 3(a)(9) invalidated, at any time during the Section 3(a)(9) Ex-
change if any person who is paid by the corporation in connection with
the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange engages in any activity that is construed to
be a direct or indirect solicitation of the exchange.2" Such persons in-
clude specially compensated employees of the corporation, employees of
the corporation's financial advisor and employees of any other entity that
is paid by the corporation in connection with the Section 3(a)(9)
Exchange.
20 5
An analysis of whether a paid solicitation has occurred is, by its
nature, fact specific. Therefore, a corporation and its financial advisors
must know which activities are permissible and which are not. Further-
more, all parties must remain circumspect even when engaging in activi-
ties that are set forth below as permissible activities.
a. activities of the corporation's employees
As a general rule, a corporation, unlike a paid outside party, may
solicit holders of Target Securities in connection with a Section 3(a)(9)
Exchange without jeopardizing the use of the Section 3(a)(9) exemp-
tion.206 As noted above, however, the corporation cannot pay anyone
(including its affiliates), directly or indirectly, to make solicitations in
connection with the exchange.20 7 Consequently, a corporation should be
careful how it conducts its own solicitations to guard against a subse-
quent claim of an indirect paid solicitation. Based on no-action letters
published to date, a corporation soliciting holders of Target Securities
should adhere to the following guidelines to preserve the "no paid solici-
tation" element of the Section 3(a)(9) exemption:
* the personnel chosen to contact security holders should have
204. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (Section 3(a)(9) only exempts exchanges "where no commission
or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange").
205. These persons may include financial advisors, legal counsel and information and ex-
change agents. For purposes of this discussion on the no paid solicitation requirement, any
reference to "financial advisors" also applies to any other agent, or any employee of financial
advisors or any other agent, that a corporation may retain during the process of preparing,
commencing and carrying out a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, unless the context otherwise
requires.
206. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,052, at 82,279 (Sept. 8, 1972); No-Action letters cited infra notes
208-10.
207. Chris-Craft Indus., supra note 206, at 82,279 (officers, directors and employees re-
ceived no special compensation in connection with the exchange offer); see infra note 209 and
accompanying text.
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significant responsibilities with the corporation other than so-
licitation of the offer; such persons may include directors, of-
ficers and regular key employees (corporate solicitors);" 8
* no special bonus, commission, fee or any other type of remu-
neration should be paid to the corporate solicitors for their so-
licitation activities; they should be paid no more than their
regular salary;2 0 9 and
e the corporate solicitorsshould attend to their regular duties,
with their solicitation efforts only being additional assign-
ments.2 1 o
b. activities of the corporation's financial advisors and other agents
Although paid solicitation of holders of Target Securities is not per-
mitted under Section 3(a)(9), the Staff recognizes that all parties benefit
when a corporation hires advisors or other agents to assist in certain as-
pects of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange in addition to advising the corpora-
tion.211 The following general guidelines provide a framework for the
activities of a corporation's financial advisor in a Section 3(a)(9)
Exchange:
• the corporation's financial advisor may not make any recom-
mendation regarding a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange to any security
holder or to any advisor or any other representative of any
holder of the Target Securities;
e when communicating with security holders, the corpora-
208. See Shop Rite Foods, supra note 194; Mortgage Investors of Washington, SEC No-
Action Letter (avail. Oct. 8, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) [hereinafter MIW I];
URS Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. May 8, 1975) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
Corporate solicitors need not be registered as broker-dealers under section 15(b) of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(b) (1988). See Mortgage Investors of Washington, SEC No-
Action Letter (avail. Jan. 31, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Barnett Mortgage
Trust, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. June 9, 1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
209. See, eg., Boston Futures Fund (II) & Boston Futures Fund (IV), SEC No-Action
Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 78,467, at 77,544 (Aug. 12, 1987);
MIW I, supra note 208 (corporate solicitors may be reimbursed for expenses they incur in
connection with the solicitation); CIT Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Sept. 22,
1975) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); URS Corp., supra note 208 (corporate solicitors
may be reimbursed for expenses they incur in connection with the solicitation); Chris-Craft
Indus., supra note 206, at 82,279; El Paso Natural Gas. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (avail.
Mar. 11, 1971) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
210. See Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at 79,338; Chris-Craft Indus., supra note
206, at 82,278.
211. See, ag., Chris-Craft Indus., supra note 206, at 82,279 (a payment for ministerial
assistance is not "for soliciting the exchange but merely to facilitate the publication of the
Exchange Offer to [security holders] to whom it is addressed and to make sure that they will
not through inadvertence lose the opportunity to accept").
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tion's financial advisor may provide only that information
which is included in the various communications sent by the
corporation to the holders of the Target Securities, such as of-
fering circulars, letters of transmittal, cover letters and any
other related documents (the Exchange Materials);
* the corporation's financial advisor should limit its activities
to performing functionary services or administrative assistance
in the distribution of Exchange Materials and providing infor-
mation about the mechanics of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange; and
a the corporation's financial advisor may render advice on the
terms of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange only to the corporation.
i. impermissible activities
It is essential that the corporation's financial advisor not make any
recommendation to any holder of the Target Securities, or to any advisor
or other representative of any such holder, regarding the acceptance or
rejection of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange.2" 2 If any security holder or any
advisor or other representative to any security holder asks the corpora-
tion's financial advisor for his or her opinion on an investment-related
attribute of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, the corporation's financial advi-
sor should direct the holder of the Target Securities to contact the appro-
212. While all no-action requests that address the no paid solicitation requirement make
.this point in one form or another, the Staff specifically conditioned its no-action position on
this statement in Grolier, Inc., supra note 168; Western Pac. Indus., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 80,801, at 87,090 (Sept. 9, 1976);
Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Oct. 29, 1975) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file); Alpex Computer Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. July 1, 1974)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). Cf American Can Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail.
May 12, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (in a proposed Reclassification, which re-
quired the affirmative vote of specified percentages of the holders of existing common stock
and preferred stock, of existing preferred stock into a right to receive cash or new preferred
stock, the information agent may make recommendations to common stockholders who do not
hold existing preferred stock); Time, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,095, at 81,863 (Apr. 19, 1979) (in a proposed Reclassification of
existing series A preferred stock into new shares of series B preferred stock that required the
approval of holders of each of Time's outstanding series A preferred stock, series B preferred
stock and common stock, Time intended to rely on Section 3(a)(9) to avoid registering the new
shares of series B preferred stock to be issued in the Reclassification, but proposed to hire a
proxy solicitor to distribute proxy materials, and to solicit and make recommendations to hold-
ers of outstanding series B preferred stock and common stock if those holders did not also hold
series A preferred stock; the Staff specifically conditioned its no-action position on Time's
representation that the proxy solicitor would not make any recommendation about voting to
any holders of series A preferred stock). But see infra notes 245-54 and accompanying text
regarding permissible discussions between the corporation's advisors and advisors to
committees.
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priate officer or employee of the corporation.213 The financial advisor
may respond to questions from holders of Target Securities regarding
substantive elements of the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange that are answered
in the Exchange Materials by directing the holder to the pertinent por-
tion of the Exchange Materials.214 The financial advisor, however, can-
not convey management's views or recommendations on a Section
3(a)(9) Exchange, even if those views or recommendations or both are
contained in the Exchange Materials.21 In addition, when the corpora-
tion's financial advisor has rendered or may render a fairness opinion in
connection with a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, that financial advisor should
not have any contact with any holder of the Target Securities or any
advisor to or other representative of any such holder.2" 6
ii. permissible activities
The corporation's financial advisor and other agents in connection
with a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange may assist the corporation by con-
ducting activities that do not constitute paid solicitations. In other
words, a financial advisor may conduct activities that are merely
designed to effect, but not promote, the exchange.217 The permissible
activities of a financial advisor can be grouped into two broad categories:
(1) advice to the corporation with respect to the terms and mechanics of
a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange;218 and, (2) administrative or ministerial serv-
ices in furtherance of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange.219 In addition, the cor-
poration's financial advisor may render a fairness opinion in connection
with a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange if such financial advisor will not have
any contact with holders of the Target Securities or their advisors or
213. See Trans-Sterling, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. June 16, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file); Hamilton Bros. Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Aug. 14,
1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Valhi, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Feb. 17,
1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact fie) [hereinafter Vahi II].
214. See Trans-Sterling, Inc., supra note 213; MIW I, supra note 208; Barnett Winston Inv.
Trust, supra note 194; Barnett Mortgage Trust, supra note 208; Shareholder Communications
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. July 6, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact fie) (cited
on LEXIS as Shareholder Communication [sic] Corp.).
215. See Stokeley-Van Camp, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 77,404, at 78,466 (Mar. 31, 1983).
216. See National City Lines, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Apr. 11, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file); American Can Corp., supra note 212; Hamilton Bros. Petroleum Corp.,
supra note 213; Valhi, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 80,802, at 87,091 (Sept. 15, 1976) [hereinafter Vaihi I]; Dean Witter & Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Feb. 24, 1975) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (whether or
not the fairness opinion is made public).
217. Letter from the Chief of Securities Division, supra note 126, at 2588.
218. See infra notes 221-28 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 229-44 and accompanying text.
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other representatives.22 °
(a) advice to the corporation
The corporation's financial advisor may advise the corporation with
respect to virtually all aspects of developing and executing a Section
3(a)(9) Exchange. The Staff has taken a no-action position with respect
to each of the following advisory services:
" performance of financial analysis for the corporation;22
" formulation or assistance in the formulation of a restructur-
ing proposal for the corporation's approval;722
* advice on the corporation's capital structure following the
restructuring;
223
* advice on the timing and organization of the restructuring
proposal;
224
• advice on the proposed terms and mechanical procedures for
the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange;
225
" advice on proposed terms for the New Securities;
226
• assistance in the preparation of the various Exchange Materi-
als to be sent by the corporation to the holders of the Target
Securities; 227 and
* advice to employees of the corporation on the procedures to
be used in conversations with holders of the Target Securities
concerning the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange.223
(b) administrative services
In addition to rendering advice to the corporation, the corporation's
220. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
221. International Controls Corp., supra note 59; Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at
79,339.
222. Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at 79,338; MIW I, supra note 208; Hamilton
Bros. Petroleum Corp., supra note 213; Grolier, Inc., supra note 168.
223. Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at 79,338.
224. UniCapital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 4, 1974) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file).
225. International Controls Corp., supra note 59; Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at
79,338; MIW I, supra note 208; Barnett Winston Inv. Trust, supra note 194; Barnett Mortgage
Trust, supra note 208; URS Corp., supra note 208; Dean Witter & Co., supra note 216; Skin-
ner & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 11, 1974) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
226. International Controls Corp., supra note 59; MIW I, supra note 208; Dean Witter &
Co., supra note 216.
227. International Controls Corp., supra note 59; MIW I, supra note 208; Barnett Winston
Inv. Trust, supra note 194; Barnett Mortgage Trust, supra note 208; URS Corp., supra note
208; Dean Witter & Co., supra note 216; Skinner & Co., supra note 225.
228. MIW I, supra note 208.
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financial advisor may engage in administrative or ministerial services
designed to convey the information in the Exchange Materials to security
holders. These activities can be divided into two groups: (1) those in
which the financial advisor merely serves as a functionary in disseminat-
ing information, and (2) those in which the financial advisor communi-
cates directly with the holders of the Target Securities or their advisors
or other representatives. The first group of functionary services is
straightforward. The second group of services, however, should be con-
ducted with great care and with a clear understanding of the permissible
content of the relevant communications.
(1) functionary services in disseminating information
The Staff has acknowledged in no-action letters that a corporation's
financial advisor and other agents may provide each of the following
functionary services to its clients:
* obtain a list of the corporation's security holders from the
corporation and confirm the accuracy of the addresses of the
holders of the Target Securities;2 2 9
* mail or otherwise assist in the distribution of Exchange
Materials;
230
• maintain records on the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange;231
* be named as a financial advisor in the Exchange Materials;
232
" contact nominees holding Target Securities and ascertain the
number of the Exchange Materials needed by each brokerage
house for transmittal to beneficial holders;
233
9 deliver sufficient quantities of the Exchange Materials to bro-
kerage houses, trust officers, other banks and other nominees
229. Varco Int'l, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Mar. 24, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file); ECL Indus. & Norlin Corp., supra note 169; Hershey Foods Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (avail. Oct. 12, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Trans-Sterling, Inc.,
supra note 213; MIW I, supra note 208; Hamilton Bros. Petroleum Corp., supra note 213;
Barnett Winston Inv. Trust, supra note 194; Barnett Mortgage Trust, supra note 208; Share-
holder Communications Corp., supra note 214; Valhi II, supra note 213; Valhi I, supra note
216, at 87,092; Frier Indus., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 17, 1975) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file); Alpex Computer Corp., supra note 212; Georgeson & Co., SEC No-Action
Letter (avail. June 11, 1973) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact fie).
230. Hershey Foods Corp., supra note 229; Shop Rite Foods, supra note 194; Infotronics
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Apr. 3, 1972) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
231. Trans-Sterling, Inc., supra note 213; MIW I, supra note 208; Barnett Winston Inv.
Trust, supra note 194; Barnett Mortgage Trust, supra note 208; Shareholder Communications
Corp., supra note 214; Frier Indus., supra note 229; The Carter Org., SEC No-Action Letter
(avail. Apr. 7, 1975) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
232. MIW I, supra note 208.
233. Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust, supra note 212.
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for distribution to beneficial holders of the Target Securities;
234
and
* mail duplicate copies of Exchange Materials to holders of
Target Securities who appear to have lost or mislaid those origi-
nally sent to them.235
(2) communications with holders of Target Securities
Unless the corporation's financial advisor has rendered a fairness
opinion in connection with a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, the financial ad-
visor may contact holders of the Target Securities directly for the follow-
ing ministerial purposes, subject in all instances to the requirement that
no solicitation take place as a result of any such contacts:
9 to determine whether the holders of Target Securities re-
ceived the Exchange Materials;
2 36
9 to determine whether the holders of the Target Securities un-
derstand the procedures for participating in the Section 3(a)(9)
Exchange-for example, expiration dates and to whom to for-
ward documents;
237
0 to answer questions or resolve any confusion about the pro-
cedures for participating in the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange;
238
e to contact back-office personnel of nominees who hold secur-
ities for the benefit of others to make sure that they promptly
234. Varco Int'l, supra note 229; Hershey Foods Corp., supra note 229; American Can Co.,
supra note 212, Time, Inc., supra note 212, at 81,863; Instrument Sys. Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter (avail. Nov. 3, 1975) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact fie); Dominion Mortgage & Realty
Trust, supra note 212; CIT Fin. Corp., supra note 209; URS, supra note 208; Skinner & Co.,
supra note 225; UniCapital Corp., supra note 224; Georgeson & Co., supra note 229.
235. Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust, supra note 212.
236. Varco Int'l, supra note 229; ECL Indus. & Norlin Corp., supra note 169; Boston Fu-
tures Mgmt. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) % 77,847, at 79,246 (Oct. 22, 1984); Hershey Foods Corp., supra note 229; Trans-
Sterling, Inc., supra note 213; MIW I, supra note 208; Hamilton Bros. Petroleum Corp., supra
note 213; Barnett Winston Inv. Trust, supra note 194; Barnett Mortgage Trust, supra note
208; Shareholder Communications Corp., supra note 214; Valhi II, supra note 213; Valhi I,
supra note 216, at 87,092; Frier Indus., supra note 229; Instrument Sys. Corp., supra note 234;
The Carter Org., supra note 231; Skinner & Co., supra note 225; Alpex Computer Corp., supra
note 212.
237. ECL Indus. & Norlin Corp., supra note 169; Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust,
supra note 212.
238. Hershey Foods Corp., supra note 229; Trans-Sterling, Inc., supra note 213; MIW I,
supra note 208; Hamilton Bros. Petroleum Corp., supra note 213; Barnett Winston Inv. Trust,
supra note 194; Barnett Mortgage Trust, supra note 208; Shareholder Communications Corp.,
supra note 214; Valhi II, supra note 216; CIT Fin. Corp., supra note 209; The Carter Org.,
supra note 231; Skinner & Co., supra note 225; UniCapital Corp., supra note 224; Alpex Com-
puter Corp., supra note 212; Georgeson & Co., supra note 229.
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forward Exchange Materials to the nominees;
239
* to urge such back-office personnel to check with the benefi-
cial holders of the Target Securities about whether such holders
have received the Exchange Materials, understand procedurally
how to participate in the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, and are
generally aware of the relevant dates and deadlines;
2 4°
* to determine whether the holders of the Target Securities in-
tend to participate in the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange and to com-
municate the response to the corporation;
241
* to remind the holders of the Target Securities of all appropri-
ate deadlines;24 2 and
* to respond to the questions of holders of Target Securities
that do not concern the mechanical aspects of the Section
3(a)(9) Exchange by directing the security holders to the perti-
nent portion of the Exchange Materials.243
As noted above, when a corporation's financial advisor communi-
cates with holders of the Target Securities, under no circumstances may
the advisor discuss the merits of the exchange, make any direct or indi-
rect recommendation about whether to participate in the exchange or
communicate management's recommendation, even if that recommenda-
239. Varco Int'l, supra note 229; ECL Indus. & Norlin Corp., supra note 169; Hershey
Foods Corp., supra note 229; Trans-Sterling, Inc., supra note 213; MIW I, supra note 208;
Hamilton Bros. Petroleum Corp., supra note 213; Barnett Winston Inv. Trust, supra note 194;
Barnett Mortgage Trust, supra note 208; Valhi II, supra note 213; Valhi I, supra note 216, at
87,092; Frier Indus., supra note 229; The Carter Org., supra note 231; Alpex Computer Corp.,
supra note 212; Chris-Craft Indus., supra note 206, at 82,277-78.
240. Varco Int'l, supra note 229; ECL Indus. & Norlin Corp., supra note 169; Trans-Ster-
ling, Inc., supra note 213; MIW I, supra note 208; Hamilton Bros. Petroleum Corp., supra
note 213; Barnett Winston Inv. Trust, supra note 194; Barnett Mortgage Trust, supra note
208; Valhi I, supra note 216, at 87,092; Frier Indus., supra note 229; Valhi II, supra note 213;
The Carter Org., supra note 231; Alpex Computer Corp., supra note 212; Georgeson & Co.,
supra note 229.
241. Varco Int'l, supra note 229; ECL Indus. & Norlin Corp., supra note 169; Hershey
Foods Corp., supra note 229; Trans-Sterling, Inc., supra note 213; MIW I, supra note 208;
Barnett Winston Inv. Trust, supra note 194; Barnett Mortgage Trust, supra note 208; Share-
holder Communications Corp., supra note 214; Valhi I, supra note 216; Frier Indus., supra
note 229; The Carter Org., supra note 231; Alpex Computer Corp., supra note 212.
242. ECL Indus. & Norlin Corp., supra note 169; Hershey Foods Corp., supra note 229;
Trans-Sterling, Inc., supra note 213; MIW I, supra note 208; Hamilton Bros. Petroleum Corp.,
supra note 213; Barnett Winston Inv. Trust, supra note 194; Barnett Mortgage Trust, supra
note 208; Shareholder Communications Corp., supra note 214; Valhi II, supra note 213; Valhi
I, supra note 216, at 87,092; Frier Indus., supra note 229; CIT Fin. Corp., supra note 209;
URS Corp., supra note 208; The Carter Org., supra note 231; Skinner & Co., supra note 225;
Alpex Computer Corp., supra note 212.
243. Trans-Sterling, Inc., supra note 213; MIW I, supra note 208; Barnett Winston Inv.
Trust, supra note 194; Barnett Mortgage Trust, supra note 208; Shareholder Communications
Corp., supra note 214.
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tion is contained in the Exchange Materials.2'
In the final analysis, whether a paid solicitation occurs is necessarily
fact-specific. Consequently, any and all contact with any holders of Tar-
get Securities by a corporation's financial advisor should be closely super-
vised and undertaken with great care and attention.
c. discussions with advisors to holders of the Target Securities
The Staff has indicated in two no-action letters that it would not
recommend enforcement action to the SEC where a corporation's finan-
cial advisors were to participate or had participated in discussions with
the legal and financial advisors to certain institutional holders of Target
Securities that had formed committees in connection with Section 3(a)(9)
Exchanges.24 In the first such no-action request, financial advisors to
Seaman Furniture Company participated in meetings between the corpo-
ration and legal and financial advisors to the committee while the corpo-
ration was considering, but before it had commenced, several forms of
restructuring, including a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange.246 In the second
such no-action request, a committee of institutional holders of Target
Securities contacted International Controls Corporation after the corpo-
ration had commenced a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange. International Con-
trols sought the Staff's advice on whether its financial advisor could
discuss the transaction with the financial and legal advisors to the com-
mittee.247 In each of these cases, the Staff sanctioned the corporation's
financial advisor's participation in discussions with such committees' ad-
visors in which the corporation's financial advisor, among other things,
"presented the company's current proposals," "received and discussed
the counterproposals," if any, and "relayed such counterproposals to the
Company.)
248
Counsel to the corporation in Seaman Furniture represented that
the corporation's financial advisor (1) had not communicated to the
holders of the proposed Target Securities or their financial advisors its
views on (a) the fairness of the proposed debt restructuring or Section
3(a)(9) Exchange, or (b) the value of the New Securities to be issued in
connection with the proposed Section 3(a)(9) Exchange; (2) had not
made any recommendation to the legal and financial advisors to the hold-
244. See supra text accompanying notes 208-12.
245. International Controls Corp., supra note 59; Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at
79,340.
246. Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at 79,336.
247. International Controls Corp., supra note 59.
248. International Controls Corp., supra note 59; Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at
79,338.
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ers of the proposed Target Securities with respect to the restructuring or
the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange; (3) would not be named as a dealer man-
ager of the proposed Section 3(a)(9) Exchange; (4) would not deliver a
fairness opinion with respect to the proposed Section 3(a)(9) Exchange;
and (5) would not communicate directly with any holder of the proposed
Target Securities with respect to substantive matters relating to any pro-
posed restructuring or Section 3(a)(9) Exchange.24 9 Counsel to the cor-
poration in International Controls represented that its client's financial
advisors would also not conduct any of the activities noted in (1)(b), (3),
(4) and (5) above.2"' International Controls' counsel also represented
that the corporation's financial advisors would not make any recommen-
dations to holders of the Target Securities; however, it did not repre-
sent-as did counsel in Seaman Furniture-that it would not make
recommendations to the legal and financial advisors to the holders of the
Target Securities.2"' This is a distinction, however, that should not be
relied upon conclusively. The great weight of authority on the no paid
solicitation requirement clearly indicates that the corporation's paid
agents should not make recommendations to holders of Target Securities
or their advisors.
Additional facts that may have influenced the Staff's determination
in each of these two no-action requests include the following: (1) all the
holders of the Target Securities who comprised each committee and had
retained the advisors that would be involved in the above-described com-
munications were "institutional investors"; (2) the financial and legal ad-
visors to each committee did not solicit exchanges in connection with the
proposed Section 3(a)(9) Exchange; (3) the committees' financial and
legal advisors and the corporation's financial advisors were paid fixed
fees that were not contingent on the success of the Section 3(a)(9) Ex-
change; and, (4) the time savings afforded by a Section 3(a)(9) exemption
were critical to the financial condition of each corporation.2 52 The pri-
mary rationale in each of these requests was the need to "facilitate an
understanding by the legal and financial advisors to the committees of
the financial condition of the Company and the structure of the Ex-
249. Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at 79,338.
250. International Controls Corp., supra note 59.
251. Id. Counsel in International Controls did state that
[t]he primary purpose of these contacts [between the corporation's financial advisors
and their 'opposite numbers' advising the committee and the committee's lawyers]
would be to facilitate an understanding of the Company's financial condition and of
the structure of the Exchange Offers in relation to that financial condition, and not to
advocate participation in the Exchange Offers.
Id. (emphasis added).
252. Id. Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at 79,338-39.
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change Offers." '253 In other words, "the activities of the Company's fi-
nancial advisors constitute 'effecting' rather than 'promoting' an
exchange" and these services "if not mechanical, [are] by [their] nature
ancillary to the effective mechanical operation" of the restructuring.
254
Ultimately, these no-action positions may indicate the Staff's recognition
of the practical importance of involving paid financial advisors, at least
through advisors to committees, in complex restructuring and work-out
transactions.
d. suggested fee structures
Although there is nothing in Section 3(a)(9) that mandates that a
financial advisor receive a fixed fee for its services, most Section 3(a)(9)
no-action letters recite that the financial advisor was to receive a fixed
fee, plus reasonable expenses, that was not contingent upon the success of
the exchange.255 A fixed-fee arrangement eliminates one factor which
might otherwise support the inference that the financial advisor had an
incentive to engage in a solicitation of holders of the Target Securities.
Consequently, whenever paid advisors are contacting holders of Target
Securities within the guidelines of this section, and especially when there
will be substantive discussions between advisors to the corporation and
advisors to the holders of the Target Securities, it is advisable that the
financial advisor's fees be a fixed amount not tied to the success of the
Section 3(a)(9) Exchange.256 Ultimately, however, determining whether
a paid solicitation has occurred is a fact-specific analysis that will turn on
the mix of facts present in a particular transaction as measured against
the criteria set forth above. This determination is not necessarily based
upon the method of payment of fees to the financial advisor and
others.257
253. International Controls Corp., supra note 59.
254. Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at 79,339; accord Letter from the Chief of Secur-
ities Division, supra note 126, at 2588.
255. See, eg., International Controls Corp., supra note 59; Seaman Furniture Co., supra
note 59, at 79,338; Varco Int'l, supra note 229; MIW I, supra note 208.
256. See Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at 79,340 (counsel to Seaman wrote a fol-
low-up letter to its initial letter of inquiry, in which such counsel confirmed, most likely in
response to a Staff request, "that the Company has not and will not agree to pay any compen-
sation to the Committee's legal counsel or financial advisors which is contingent on the con-
summation of the proposed" Section 3(a)(9) Exchange).
257. Compare Seaman Furniture Co., supra note 59, at 79,338 (where the financial advisor
to the corporation communicated with the security holders' advisors on possible structures of a
recapitalization, and confirmed that no portion of the compensation to be paid to security
holders' advisors was to be contingent on the success of the proposed Section 3(a)(9) Ex-
change) with Hamilton Bros. Petroleum Corp., supra note 213 (where financial advisor to
corporation was engaged, among other things, to render fairness opinion to the corporation,
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C. Integration with Other Issuances
As noted above,2"' whenever a corporation is conducting a Section
3(a)(9) Exchange, all participants must be concerned about whether the
exchange could be "integrated" with another offering.2 59 The effect of
integration with another offering could be to destroy the availability of
the Section 3(a)(9) exemption for that restructuring. 2" The SEC has es-
tablished the following general criteria for determining whether offerings
for securities should be integrated: (1) whether the sales are part of a
single plan of financing; (2) whether the sales of securities involve the
issuance of the same class of securities; (3) whether the offerings are
made at or about the same time; (4) whether the same type of considera-
tion is received; and, (5) whether the offerings are made for the same
general purpose.26 1
Integration most often becomes an issue in the context of Section
3(a)(9) Exchanges when a corporation conducts an offering of securities
for cash substantially simultaneously with a proposed Section 3(a)(9) Ex-
change. If such an offering for cash were integrated with the exchange
transaction, the exclusively by exchange requirement would be vio-
lated262 and the Section 3(a)(9) exemption from registration would be
unavailable.2 63 For example, UST Corporation intended to conduct a
but was not planning to communicate with any security holders or any advisors or other repre-
sentatives of any security holders, and Staff took a no-action position although one-third of
corporation's financial advisor's fee was to be paid only upon consummation of transaction).
258. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text, discussing how other commentators on
Section 3(a)(9) characterize integration analysis in the context of Section 3(a)(9) as an "exclu-
sively with existing security holders" requirement.
259. Securities Act Release No. 2029, supra note 133, at 2584 (the Section 3(a)(9) exemp-
tion "is available only to securities constituting part of an issue which, as a whole, is exchanged
in conformity with the requirements of the section"). The "issue" referred to is the issuance of
securities at a particular point or points in time, not the entire class of such securities.
260. See supra note 131 (quoting R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 14, at 440 (describ-
ing integration generally)).
261. See Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2272 (Dec. 6, 1961).
These factors, with a comment that integration analysis depends upon the particular facts and
circumstances, have been included in notes to Rules 147 and 502 under the Securities Act for
guidance in determining whether offers and sales should be integrated for purposes of the
exemptions from the registration requirements of the Securities Act available under Section
3(a)(11) and Regulation D, respectively. See Rule 147 preliminary note 3, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.147 (1990); Rule 502(a) note, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1990) (citing Non-public Offering
Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2770
(Nov. 6, 1962)); Securities Act Release No. 2029, supra note 131, % 2140, at 2584 (analogizing
to integration analyses under Sections 3(b) and 3(a)(l 1) of the Securities Act in determining
whether or not a proposed Section 3(a)(9) Exchange should be integrated).
262. See supra notes 186-203 and accompanying text.
263. See, eg., Release 2029, supra note 133, 11 2140-2141, at 2583-17 to 2584 (SEC Gen-
eral Counsel opining that an issuance of new Series B bonds for existing Series A bonds pursu-
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simultaneous Section 3(a)(9) Exchange (of its floating rate notes for its
outstanding subordinated notes) and an intra-state offering of floating
rate notes for cash,2" which would be exempt from registration require-
ments of the Securities Act pursuant to section 3(a)(1 1) of the Securities
Act.265 The Staff took a no-action position "that the two offerings would
not be integrated for the purpose of determining the availability of the
section 3(a)(1 1) exemption" for the cash offering, although UST's coun-
sel conceded that two of the five integration standards existed.266 The
Staff also implicitly took a no-action position on the use of Section
3(a)(9); if the transactions were not integrated for the purpose of section
3(a)(1 1), the same conclusion should be reached for the purpose of Sec-
tion 3(a)(9).
The integration of otherwise separate offerings of securities
can also invalidate the use of Section 3(a)(9) by violating the "same
ant to a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, and an issuance of Series C bonds for cash pursuant to the
private placement exemption provided by section 4(1) (now section 4(2)) of the Securities Act
should not be integrated because "I do not believe that securities of different classes [the Series
B and Series C bonds were "substantially" different with "respect to maturity date, interest
rate, redemption prices and default provisions"] can fairly be deemed parts of a single 'is-
sue.' "); Bayswater Realty & Capital Corp., supra note 197 (based upon counsel's analysis of
the SEC's five integration factors, Section 3(a)(9) Exchange not integrated with simultaneous
Section 3(a)(10) Settlement Exchange pursuant to which some class members were required to
pay solely cash for New Securities; counsel notes that it "understands that should the two
offerings be 'integrated' the result might be the unavailability of the 3(a)(9) exemption");
Model Fin. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Dec. 27, 1973) (LEXIS, Fedsee library, Noact
file) (no-action position taken in connection with the integration of a debt-for-debt Section
3(a)(9) Exchange and an unregistered offering of debt for cash pursuant to Regulation A, 17
C.F.R. § 230.251-63 (1990)); Four-Phase Sys., supra note 138 (based upon counsel's analysis
of the SEC's five integration factors, no-action position taken when a corporation contem-
plated a substantially simultaneous Section 3(a)(9) Exchange and private placement of notes
for cash pursuant to Section 4(2)); Steiner Am. Corp., supra note 199 (no-action position taken
when a corporation intended to rely on Section 3(a)(9) in a Reclassification of its preferred
stock into common stock, and intended to conduct a registered public offering of its common
stock for cash substantially simultaneously).
264. UST Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Apr. 8, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file).
265. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(l1) (1988).
266. UST Corp., supra note 264. The Staff noted that UST's counsel conceded that the two
offerings were to be made at the same time and involved the same class of securities. Id. The
proposed offerings, however, were not part of a single plan of financing (because, among other
things, the two offerings were not cross-conditioned), were not being made for the same type of
consideration (because the consideration for the New Securities in the Section 3(a)(9) Ex-
change was to be existing debt securities, and the consideration for the New Securities in the
Section 3(a)(1 1) offering was to be cash), and were not being made for the same general pur-
pose (because the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange was intended to satisfy a condition to the restruc-
turing of UST's bank debt, and the Section 3(a)(l 1) offering was intended to generate working
capital). Id.
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issuer" requirement2 6  and the "no paid solicitation" require-
ment.268 In the latter context, for example, the Staff has taken a no-
action position where a corporation had hired an investment bank to act
as its placement agent in a section 4(2) private offering2 6 9 of notes for
cash, while at the same time the corporation intended to rely on Section
3(a)(9) in an exchange of securities.270 Counsel represented that the "in-
vestment banker will receive a fee in connection with the placement of
the Notes but will not solicit the exchange," and reasoned that "[a]s the
investment banker will not solicit the exchange, no part of its fee in con-
nection with the placement of the Notes is allocable thereto.
271
D. Restrictions on Resale of New Securities
One factor that could significantly influence the willingness of a
holder of Target Securities to participate in a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange is
whether the New Securities will be subject to resale restrictions. Re-
267. See, eg., Union Planters Corp., supra note 153 (determining that two separate presum-
ably Section 4(2) Private Exchanges of securities issued by different entities as part of a merger
transaction should not be integrated with a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, and therefore did violate
the same issuer requirement), clarified in Union Planters Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail.
Jan. 10, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (noting that no exemption existed for the
issuance of a parent guarantee); cf Lacy Sales Inst., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Aug. 13,
1979) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (Staff refused to take no-action position when the
corporation proposed to rely on Section 3(a)(9) to exchange one new share of its stock for
every 20 shares presently outstanding, and to exchange one new share of its stock for each
share of stock of a company with which it intended to merge), reconsidered in Lacy Sales Inst.,
SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Dec. 10, 1979) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (Staff took
no-action position regarding Section 3(a)(9) when the corporation proposed to rely on Section
3(a)(9) to conduct a reverse stock split, and Section 4(2) to conduct a concurrent exchange of
stock with stockholders of a corporation with which it intended to merge). For a discussion of
the "same issuer" requirement, see supra notes 143-85 and accompanying text.
268. For a discussion of the "no paid solicitation" requirement, see supra notes 204-57 and
accompanying text.
269. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988).
270. Four-Phase Sys., supra note 138. This "exchange" actually involved a solicitation of
consents to modify its preferred stock so significantly that the issuer's counsel considered the
solicitation to be an exchange of old preferred stock for new preferred stock. Id. See infra
notes 360-81 and accompanying text, describing when modifications to existing securities can
be deemed to create, for Federal securities law purposes, New Securities.
271. Four-Phase Sys., supra note 138. Practitioners should note that the Staff appears-to be
liberalizing its integration analysis in the context of multi-step out-of-court restructurings in-
volving sophisticated institutional investors. See Backman & Gervis, Integration Revisited:
The Black Box Restructuring, INSIGHiS, Feb. 1991, at 3 (citing and analyzing Black Box, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter (avail. June 26, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file), in which the
Staff took a no-action position in connection with a Section 4(2) Private Exchange that was
entered into pursuant to "Recapitalization Agreement" prior to a contemplated registered
public offering of New Securities for cash, but was conditioned upon the completion of the
public offering).
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stricted securities2 72 may be resold only in compliance with Rule 144,273
Rule 144A,274 through registration under the Securities Act or an appli-
cable exemption,275 such as Section 4(1) of the Securities Act.276
Although the exemptions contained in section 3 of the Securities
Act generally exempt certain securities from the Securities Act's registra-
tion requirements, 277 Section 3(a)(9) is considered to be a transaction ex-
emption; therefore, New Securities issued in a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange
are not, simply because of Section 3(a)(9), permanently exempt from the
registration requirements of the Securities* Act.278  This created some
confusion about the restrictions on the resale of New Securities issued in
a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange. In response to the 1984 no-action request of
Clevepak Corporation, however, the Staff clarified the issue when it
stated that it is "the view of [the SEC's Corporate Finance] Division that
resales of [securities] received in [a Section 3(a)(9) E]xchange would be
subject to the same restrictions, if any, applicable to the securities surren-
272. Restricted securities, as defined by Rule 144, are securities acquired in a "transaction
or chain of transactions not involving any public offering... or securities that are subject to
the resale limitations of Regulation D and are acquired in a transaction or chain of transac-
tions not involving any public offering." Rule 144(a)(3), 17 C.F.R § 230.144(a)(3) (1990).
273. Rule 144(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b) (1990). See generally Resale of Restricted and
Other Securities; Interpretations of Rules, Securities Act Release No. 6099, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) I 2705H (Aug. 2, 1979) (setting forth Staff views on various interpretive questions
relating to the resale of restricted and certain other securities); J. WILLIAM HIcKS, RESALE OF
RESTRICTED SECURrrIES (Clark Boardman Securities Law Series) (1989). Rule 144 generally
requires that affiliates and non-affiliates of the issuer hold restricted securities for two years
before they may begin to be resold. Rule 144(d)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1) (1990). Sales of
restricted securities held by non-affiliates generally are subject to volume limitations between
the second and third years after such non-affiliates acquire the restricted securities. Rules
144(e)(2), 144(k), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(2), .144(k) (1990). Sales of restricted and
nonrestricted securities by affiliates of the issuer are always subject to volume limitations. Rule
144(e)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1). For a brief discussion of how a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange
affects these time periods, see infra note 283. Rule 148, 17 C.F.R. § 230.148 (1990), is similar
to Rule 144 and "provides a safe harbor for the resale of securities issued under a plan in
bankruptcy proceedings, as well as securities held in the debtor's portfolio." Securities Act
Release No. 6099, supra, at 2819-27. "If all applicable conditions of the rule under which
[restricted securities] are sold are satisfied, the purchaser receives unrestricted securities." Id.
at 2819-25.
274. 55 Fed. Reg. 17,945 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A). Rule 144A permits
persons other than issuers to privately resell restricted securities to institutions. Id.
275. Rule 144(j), 17 C.F.R. § 230.1440) (1990); Rule 144A(e), 55 Fed. Reg. 17,945 (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(e)).
276. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1988) ("The provisions of Section 5 shall not apply to... transac-
tions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.").
277. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1988) ("[Tlhe provisions of this subehapter shall not apply to
any of the following classes of securities." (emphasis added)).
278. See Securities Act Release No. 646, supra note 130, at 2583-16 to -17 (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1934)); In re Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 11 (1940).
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dered."279 For example, if the Target Securities were originally issued in
a registered offering (as they were in the Clevepak Corporation no-action
request) and thereby are not subject to resale restrictions (other than
those Target Securities held by affiliates of the issuer),2 80 the New Securi-
ties exchanged for such Target Securities would be free of resale restric-
tions if held by non-affiliated persons.2 8 1 Conversely, if the Target
Securities are restricted securities,2" 2 the New Securities will be re-
stricted2 83 and may be resold only by meeting the requirements of Rule
279. Clevepak Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Mar. 23, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file) (shares of new common stock were to be issued in a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange for
existing shares of preferred stock registered under the Securities Act).
280. Unlike persons other than an issuer, affiliate, underwriter or dealer, who can freely
resell unrestricted securities (such as registered securities) pursuant to Section 4(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(l), affiliates may only resell unrestricted securities if they comply with the provisions of
Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1990), absent registration or another appropriate exemption.
See Securities Act Release No. 6099, supra note 273, at 2819-5. Rule 144 generally permits
affiliates to sell restricted securities in limited amounts. Rule 144(e)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144(e)(1). Moreover, Rule 144(k) does not apply to the resale of securities held by
affiliates. See Rule 144(k), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k) (three-year holding provision of Rule 144
expressly excludes affiliates); supra note 273. For a discussion of securities sales by affiliates,
see C. JOHNSON, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIEs LAWS 9-14 (1990); L. Loss,
supra note 126, at 350-76.
281. See, ag., Terminal Data Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 19, 1990) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file); Financial Corp. of Santa Barbara, supra note 153; Clevepak Corp.
supra note 279; Storage Equities, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Feb. 1, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file); Solid State Technology, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. July 11, 1975)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). Affiliates, however, may resell such New Securities only
in compliance with Rule 144 absent registration or another appropriate exemption. See supra
note 276.
282. For example, Target Securities would be restricted if they were originally issued pursu-
ant to the private placement exemption provided by section 4(2) of the Securities Act, see Rule
144(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3), and the securities had not become freely transferable
through the passage of time. See, eg., Rules 144(d)(1) & 144(k), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1),
230.144(k). Section 4(2) exempts "transactions... not involving any public offering." 15
U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988).
283. See, eg., Lehigh Valley Indus., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 18, 1985) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file); Dawson Well Servicing, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Aug. 8,
1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact fie); Intercontinental Energy Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,795, at 87,078 (Sept. 14,
1976); Wright Air Lines, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Sept. 24, 1973) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact fie).
If the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange qualifies as a "recapitalization" under Rule 144, the New
Securities are deemed to have been acquired at the same time as the Target Securities for
purposes of calculating the two-year holding period of Rule 144(d)(1) and the three-year pe-
riod of Rule 144(k). Rules 144(d)(4)(A) & 144(k), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(4)(A), 230.144(k).
Although the term "recapitalization" is not defined in Rule 144, the Staff has allowed tacking
the holding period of the Target Securities to the New Securities in Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges.
See, e.g., Radyne Corp., supra note 202 (exchange of convertible debentures for a choice of
new convertible debentures or different new convertible debentures and common stock); Dis-
covery Oil, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Feb. 7, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)
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144, Rule 144A, or through registration or an applicable exemption.28 4
E. Disclosure and Filing Requirements
There are no specific disclosure or filing requirements for offerings
of securities made pursuant to Section 3(a)(9). However, an exemption
from Section 5 of the Securities Act by virtue of Section 3(a)(9) does not
exempt the offering from the anti-fraud provisions of the Federal securi-
ties laws.285 In addition, the structure of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange may
trigger filing requirements under various other securities laws.'"
Although there are certainly limits to the extent of disclosure that the
corporation and timing constraints will permit when there are no statu-
tory requirements, liability concerns suggest that holders of Target Se-
curities should be provided approximately the same information in the
Exchange Materials for a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange as they would in a
Registered Exchange.2"7
Notwithstanding the exemption from section 5, the particular struc-
ture of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange might generate other filing and disclo-
sure requirements. For example, when a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange
involves a concurrent solicitation of consents or proxies from holders of
(exchange of common stock and common stock warrants for existing preferred stock); Lehigh
Valley Indus., supra (exchange of common stock for existing preferred stock); Newpark Re-
sources, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Aug. 15, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)
(exchange of preferred stock for existing preferred stock); Dawson Well Servicing, supra (ex-
change of common stock for debentures); Canrad Precision Indus., supra note 194 (exchange
or a stockholder vote involving new non-cumulative preferred stock and existing cumulative
preferred stock).
284. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
286. See supra note 37 & infra notes 288-301 & 382-464 and accompanying text.
287. This practice is advisable as a general rule, but is subject to a case-by-case materiality
analysis. Most Registered Exchanges are filed with the SEC on a registration statement on
Form S-4, 17 C.F.R. § 239.25(c) (1990). Form S-4 "may be used for registration under the
Securities Act... of securities to be issued... (3) in an exchange offer for securities of the
issuer or another entity." General Instruction A.1, Form S-4, reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCII) 7161, at 6261 (June 1, 1988). Form S-4 follows the Form "S-1-2-3 approach." Regis-
trants qualified to use Form S-3, see General Instruction 1, Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13
(1990), reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 7152, at 6251 (Aug. 15, 1990), may incorpo-
rate by reference into the prospectus certain company-specific information previously included
in Exchange Act reports. Registrants qualified to use Form S-2, see General Instruction 1,
Form S-2, 17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (1990), reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 7142, at 6231
(Aug. 8, 1990), may present certain information either by concurrently delivering an annual
report to security holders or reiterating that level of information in the prospectus. Registrants
who do not qualify to use Form S-2 or Form S-3 must include most information required by
Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11, reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 7122 (Aug. 8, 1990),
in the Form S-4. See generally Securities Act Release No. 6578, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
72,418, at 62,066 (Apr. 23, 1985) (the adopting release for Form S-4).
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Target Securities that is subject to Regulation 14A,288 the offering docu-
ment must be filed with the SEC for review at least ten days prior to
mailing the first solicitation document to such holders28 9 and is normally
in the form of a combined offering circular and proxy statement in com-
pliance with Schedule 14A.29 ° If the New Security is qualifying public
debt, the issuer must meet the disclosure and filing requirements of the
TIA.2 9 1 If the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange is a tender offer and the Target
Security is convertible debt or any other equity security,29 2 the issuer
must comply with Rule 13e-4293 and file a Schedule 13E-4 with the
SEC.294 If the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange is for any and all of a class of
equity securities, including convertible debt, or otherwise constitutes a
"going private" transaction, the issuer may need to comply with Rule
13e-32 9' and fie a Schedule 13E-3296 with the SEC.
If the New Security is capital stock that is not authorized by the
corporation's charter, state law will probably require a stockholder vote
to amend the charter.2 9 7 Moreover, if the New Security is common stock
or securities convertible into or exercisable for common stock that would
represent a substantial portion of the corporation's "voting power out-
standing" after the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, the national securities ex-
change on which the corporation's voting common stock is traded may
condition approval of the additional listing application for such New Se-
curities on the corporation's stockholders' approval of the Section 3(a)(9)
Exchange.2 98 Either of these events may again invoke the proxy rules.2 99
288. See infra notes 303-81 & 448-57 for a discussion of Consent Solicitations and the proxy
rules, respectively.
289. Rule 14a-6(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1990).
290. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1990). If the transaction were a Registered Exchange, Form
S-4 may be used instead of Schedule 14A to fulfill both the informational and filing require-
ments of the Securities Act and the proxy rules. Rule 14a-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a)
(1990); Rule 14c-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2(a) (for Regulation 14C); Instruction E, Form S-4,
reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7162, at 6263; see supra note 287.
291. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1988), as amended by Trust
Indenture Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550 (Nov. 15, 1990); see infra notes 458-64
and accompanying text.
292. See infra note 383 for the guidelines to the "definition" of a tender offer; see Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(1 1), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1 1) (1988) (definition of "equity secur-
ity" under the Exchange Act).
293. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1990).
294. Schedule 13E-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-101 (1990); see infra notes 399-417 and accom-
panying text.
295. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1990).
296. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1990); see infra notes 418-25 and accompanying text.
297. See, ag., CAL. CORP. CODE § 903 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1990);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §§ 6.01(a), 10.03(b) (1990).
298. See infra note 452.
299. See infra notes 448-57 and accompanying text.
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In the few cases where exemptions are not available, the proper state
filings must be made under the "blue-sky" laws of the states in which
holders of the Target Securities reside.3°° Finally, any financial advisor
that a corporation retains in connection with a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange
may be required to have their compensation arrangements, along with
other relationships with the corporation, reviewed and cleared by the
NASD.3 °1
The TIA, Rule 13e-4, Rule 13e-3, the proxy rules and applicable
rules of the different national securities exchanges are discussed in more
detail elsewhere in this Article. If some or all of these regulations are
invoked, more disclosure, filings and reviews of filings are required.
These processes could add to the time required to commence and, there-
fore, complete the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange.30 2
IV. CONSENT SOLICITATIONS
A. Background: The Need for Consents
A corporation may seek amendments of its existing securities for a
variety of reasons. The corporation may no longer be able to meet cove-
nants because of financial difficulties or may desire to pursue a course of
action prohibited by such covenants (for example, to incur additional in-
debtedness, pay dividends on equity securities or repurchase equity se-
curities, or conduct other transactions contemplated by an overall
financial restructuring).
Although Consent Solicitations are often conducted independent
from any other transaction,0 3 a corporation conducting a Consent Solic-
itation concurrently with an Exchange Offer may have an additional rea-
son for seeking amendments: to reduce the attractiveness of a holdout
position 31 in the Target Securities by eliminating or modifying certain
existing restrictions contained in the indenture, certificate of designation
300. See supra note 33.
301. Absent an exemption, the NASD must review the compensation paid to the financial
advisor that is a NASD member prior to the commencement of the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange,
If such financial advisor beneficially owns more than 10% of the voting securities of the issuer,
or owns more than 10% of the Target Securities, Schedule E may also need to be complied
with. See supra note 35.
302. For a discussion of the frequent importance of minimizing the time required to com-
plete a restructuring, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
303. See, eg., SCI HOLDINGS, INC., AMENDED CONSENT SOLICITATION STATEMENT
(Oct. 21, 1988); NORTHERN PACIFIC CORP., CONSENT SOLICITATION STATEMENT (Mar. 21,
1987); PAY 'N SAVE, INC., CONSENT SOLICITATION STATEMENT (Feb. 12, 1988).
304. For a discussion of the issue of "holdouts" in all voluntary exchanges of securities, see
supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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or other documents relating to those Target Securities,3 °5 thereby en-
couraging the holders of such securities to participate in the Exchange
Offer. The consents sought in these types of Consent Solicitations are
commonly called "exit consents."
A corporation can increase the effectiveness of the exit consents in
motivating holders of Target Securities to participate in the exchange by
conditioning the Exchange Offer on the corporation's receipt of the req-
uisite consents to effect the proposed amendments.3 °6 Most indentures
require the holders of at least two-thirds or a majority of the aggregate
principal amount of the outstanding indenture securities to consent to an
amendment, supplement or waiver of most indenture provisions. 3°7 Un-
like the Exchange Offer itself, which affects only those holders of Target
Securities who voluntarily exchange their Target Securities for New Se-
305. For example, a corporation pursuing a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange of New Securities
that are debt for Target Securities that are debt could seek to remove from the indenture
underlying the Target Securities certain covenants restricting the incurrence of indebtedness,
see, eg., Eaton Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Jan. 30, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file), or prohibiting the declaration or payment of dividends on capital stock, see, eg.,
Leasco Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Oct. 22, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file).
306. See, eg., SAVIN CORPORATION, PROSPECTUS AND CONSENT SOLICITATION (May 12,
1988); HOLIDAY INNS, INC., OFFERING CIRCULAR AND CONSENT SOLICITATION (Oct. 20,
1987); PAY 'N SAVE, INC., OFFERING CIRCULAR AND CONSENT SOLICITATION (Dec. 23,
1987). Exit Consent Solicitations have also been used in connection with offers to purchase
existing securities for cash. See, eg, MARY KAY CORPORATION, OFFER TO PURCHASE AND
CONSENT SOLICITATION (Sept. 28, 1990) (amended by three supplements, the last of which is
dated Nov. 20, 1990).
307. See AMERICAN BAR FOUND., CORP. DEBT FIN. PROJECT, COMMENTARIES ON
MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS, 1965 MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PRO-
VISIONS, ALL REGISTERED ISSUES 1967 AND CERTAIN NEGOTIABLE PROVISIONS 305-07
(1986) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES]; C. JOHNSON, supra note 280, at 747-
48. If a corporation would like to modify Target Securities that are capital stock, most juris-
dictions provide that such amendments must be approved by at least a majority of shares
entitled to vote thereon. See 3 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 10.03, at 1174 (Supp.
1990) (listing 37 jurisdictions that provide for majority votes, unless the articles require other-
wise, plus four other jurisdictions that allow majority votes in certain circumstances and 12
jurisdictions that require two-thirds votes); see, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 152, 902(a) (West
1990); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 242(b) (1983); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 802(b) (McKinney
1986). In additon, almost all classes of stock with limited voting rights (such as most preferred
stock) provide for separate class voting rights when the amendment generally would "affect
them adversely." See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. § 242(b) (requiring a class vote when a proposed
"amendment would increase or decrease the aggregate number of authorized shares of such
class, increase or decrease the par value of the shares of such class, or alter or change the
powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class as to affect them adversely."
(emphasis added)); see also 3 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 10.04, at 1176.1-1177,
1183 (Supps. 1989-1990) (enumerating nine kinds of modifications that trigger class votes in
place of the "adversely affects" language, and noting that all but 11 states follow the Model
Acts' approach).
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curities, an affirmative vote of the holders of the requisite principal
amount or number of the Target Securities will be binding on all holders
of the Target Securities, both those who consent and those who do not
consent to any proposed amendment.308
B. The Mechanics of Exit Consents
Practitioners should be particularly careful in following the amend-
ment procedures of an indenture governing Target Securities for which
exit consents are being sought in a combined Exchange Offer/Consent
Solicitation. All trust indentures following the Model Indenture and
many private trust indentures provide that bonds held by the issuer or its
affiliates will not be considered "outstanding" for purposes of voting in
favor of any amendment to, or waiver of, the terms of the indenture.30 9
Consequently, a corporation typically would allow the consents it re-
ceives to be withdrawn prior to the execution of the supplemental inden-
ture affecting the proposed amendments and would time such execution
so that it does not occur after the corporation accepts any Target Securi-
ties pursuant to the concurrent Exchange Offer.
While discussing the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
the court in Katz v. Oak Industries310 analyzed what it characterized as
an indenture provision prohibiting the corporation from voting "treasury
308. In the case of indentures governed by or following the TIA, the consent process can be
used to modify all indenture provisions except changes in interest rate, principal amount and
maturity that require the consent of all holders affected. Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
§ 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1988), as amended by Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-550 (Nov. 15, 1990) (providing that, with certain exceptions, "the right of any
holder of any indenture security to receive payment of the principal of and interest on such
indenture security, on or after the respective due dates expressed in such indenture security...
shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder."). But see Roe, The
Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232 (1987) (arguing that, in light of "a
future economic recession" and antiquated policies that generated its enactment in 1939, TIA
§ 316's prohibition on "majority action clauses" for such provisions should be repealed to
facilitate beneficial bond workouts).
309. See COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES, supra note 307, at 41-44 (noting that the defini-
tion of an "outstanding" security in the Model Indenture "expand[s] on TIA § 316(a) by not
permitting [securities owned by an issuer or any of its affiliates to be counted in any] vote with
respect to 'any request, demand, authorization, direction, notice, consent or waiver'" (empha-
sis added)). Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 316(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a) (1988), as amended
by Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550 (Nov. 15, 1990), only provides
that such "treasury securities" cannot be voted in a referendum
(A) to direct the time, method, and place of conducting any proceeding for any rem-
edy available to such trustee, or exercising any trust or power conferred upon such
trustee, under such indenture, or (B) on behalf of the holders of all such indenture
securities, to consent to the waiver of any past default and its consequences.
310. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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securities" in the context of exit consents. 3 11 The Oak Industries court
reasoned that the prohibition was intended to prevent the issuer from
voting the bonds itself for its own benefit, and that as long as only "those
with a financial interest to maximize their return in their investment" are
able to grant or withhold consents, and that "the incentive to consent is
equally available to all members of each class of bondholders," providing
bondholders an incentive to give their consent does not subvert the pur-
poses of "treasury voting" prohibition.3 12
C. Legality of Exit Consents
Practitioners should be prepared to analyze whether exit consents
constitute a breach of either a fiduciary duty owed to holders of the Tar-
get Securities or an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
While the court in Oak Industries is the only court we are aware of that
has addressed these issues explicitly in the context of exit consents, 313 the
otherwise extensive general law on fiduciary duties owed to non-common
stockholders and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
should apply equally to this narrow area.
1. Fiduciary duty of corporations, their directors and their
controlling stockholders to non-common stockholders
a. the general Delaware law
Oak Industries is part of an extensive line of Delaware jurisprudence
that holds that a corporation, its directors and its controlling stockhold-
311. Id. at 881.
312. Id. (the "incentive to consent" referred to is the New Securities offered in the Section
3(a)(9) Exchange); see Kass v. Eastern Air Lines, Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op. (Del. Ch.
Nov. 14, 1986) (in a Consent Solicitation not conducted in conjunction with any other transac-
tion, the Delaware Chancery Court, in dictum, stated that a payment for consents may have
been considered to breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and to be "vote
buying" and voidable as against public policy, if the consideration for the consents was not
offered to all holders of the Target Securities); Weingarten, supra note 55, at 168. See infra
notes 343-45 & 353-59 and accompanying text, for a discussion of Eastern Air Lines in the
context of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and vote buying, respectively.
313. Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). See infra notes 324-30 & 339-
42 and accompanying text for a discussion of Oak Industries. We are aware of only two other
courts that have confronted claims of a breach of the implied convenant of good faith and fair
dealing and of the public policy against "vote buying" in connection with Consent Solicitations
not in conjunction with any other transaction, therefore not involving exit consents. See Kass
v. Eastern Air Lines, Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op. (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986); Pisik v. BCI
Holdings Corp., No. 14593/87, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 1987) (concurring and relying
on Oak Industries and Eastern Air Lines, but applying New York law); cf. Eastern Air Lines,
Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op. at 10 n.4 (in dictum, noting that debtholders are not owed
fiduciary duties, as are stockholders).
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ers do not owe an independent fiduciary duty to holders of the corpora-
tion's debt securities,314 even if the debt securities are convertible into
common equity.315 The Delaware Chancery Court recently put it very
314. See Oak Indus., 508 A.2d at 879. "It has now become firmly fixed in our law that
among the duties owed by directors of a Delaware corporation to holders of that corporation's
debt instruments there is no duty of the broad and exacting nature characterized as fiduciary
duty." Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 786 & n.1 (Del. Ch. 1987) [hereinafter Simons I]
(citing Oak Industries among an extensive list of cases), aff'd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988). The
Delaware Chancery Court, in Simons I, stated that "courts of this state have consistently
recognized that neither an issuer of debentures nor a controlling shareholder owes to holders
of the company's debt securities duties of the special sort characterized as fiduciary in charac-
ter." Id. at 788; accord Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., No. 9032, slip op. at
10 n.2 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1988); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunt Int'l Re-
sources Corp., No. 7888, slip op. at 9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 1987) ("the relationship between a
corporation and its directors and debenture holders is contractual, not 'fiduciary,' in nature is
well settled in this state"); Eastern Air Lines, Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op.; Norte & Co. v.
Manor Healthcare Corp., Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 10-11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1985) [herein-
after Norte I]; see also MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (in dicta); Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056, 1063 (Del. 1986) (by
implication); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974) (by implication), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975).
315. Plaintiffs in several cases involving convertible debt securities have argued that their
contingent equity ownership interest in the corporation created a fiduciary interest at least to
the extent that corporate action impacts on that interest. See, e.g., Oak Indus., 508 A.2d at
880; Norte I, Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 10-11; Harff, 324 A.2d at 221. In each of these cases,
Delaware courts dismissed the fiduciary duty claim on the theory that "[u]ntil the debenture is
converted into stock the convertible debenture holder acquires no equitable interest, and re-
mains a creditor of the corporation whose interests are protected by the contractual terms of
the indenture." Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) [hereinafter Simons II];
accord Note, Fiduciary Obligations to Holders of Convertible Debentures: Simons v. Cogan, 58
U. CIN. L. REv. 751 (1989); see also Norman v. Paco Pharmaceutical Servs., [1989-1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,739, at 93,998 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 1989) (rely-
ing on the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Simons II in dismissing a convertible deben-
tureholder's claim of breach of fiduciary duty); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying New York law, which it found "less
than dispositive," but found the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling in Simons I1 "persuasive,
and believes that a New York court would agree with that conclusion"). This analysis dates
back at least to an 1899 opinion by Justice (then Judge) Holmes. Parkinson v. West End Street
Ry., 53 N.E. 891, 892 (Mass. 1899) (A conversion right "is simply an option to take stock as it
may turn out to be when the time for choice arrives. The bondholder does not become a
stockholder, by his contract, in equity any more than at law." (citation omitted)). But see
Glinert v. Wickes Cos., No. 10487, slip op. at 21-25 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 1990) (in dicta, as-
sumes, "without deciding," that a warrantholder maybe owed a fiduciary duty if the subject
warrant is convertible automatically into common stock, without action or investment by the
holder of the warrant). Cf In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,689, at 98,239 & n.6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1990) (in determining whether
convertible debtholders could sue corporate insiders for allegedly selling stock with knowledge
of material non-public information in violation of Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990),
district court found that "[d]ebenture purchasers as well as stock purchasers have the fiduciary
relationship to corporate insiders and their tippees that the Supreme Court has required ... for
standing under Rule lob-5.") (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 680 F.2d
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simply: "(i) a debentureholder has no independent right to maintain a
claim for a breach of fiduciary duty in this context, and (ii) in the absence
of fraud, insolvency or statutory violation, a debentureholder's rights are
defined by the indenture.
316
The primary rationale for the absence of a fiduciary duty in this
context is that "[u]nlike shareholders, to whom such [fiduciary] duties
are owed, holders of debt may turn to documents that exhaustively detail
the rights and obligations of the issuer, the trustee under the indenture,
and the holders of the securities., 3 17 Consequently, "'[c]ourts tradition-
ally have directed bondholders to protect themselves against ... self-
interested issuer action with explicit contractual provisions. Holders of
senior securities, such as bonds, are outside the legal model of the firm
for protective purposes: a heavy black-letter line bars the extension of
corporate fiduciary protections to them.' "318
Delaware courts have also held that a corporation does not owe an
independent fiduciary duty to holders of their preferred stock with re-
spect to the "preferential" rights of preferred stock specifically desig-
nated in the corporation's charter.319 The preferential rights of preferred
933, 941 (3d Cir. 1982)); see infra note 323, presenting an argument for why Rule lOb-5 stand-
ing cases should not be relevant to state fiduciary duty claims.
316. Continental IlL Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. 7888, slip op. at 9.
317. Simons I, 542 A.2d at 786.
318. Id. at 789 (quoting Bratton I, supra note 66, at 668 (footnote omitted); and citing
AMERICAN BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS
527 (1971)). Chancellor Allen in Simons I concluded that "[t]o introduce the powerful ab-
straction of 'fidicuary duty' into the highly negotiated and exhaustively documented commer-
cial relationship between an issuer of convertible securities and the holders of such securities
would, or so it now appears to me, risk greater insecurity and uncertainty than could be justi-
fied by the occasional increment of fairness that might be hoped for." Id. at 791 (citing Brat-
ton I, supra note 66, at 730-39).
319. Rosan v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., No. 10,526, slip op. at 14-17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6,
1990); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986). In Jedwab,
the plaintiff, a preferred stockholder, was to receive $4.00 per share less than common stock-
holders in the sale/merger of MGM Grand to Bally's. Id. at 590. The defendants claimed
that all rights of preferred stockholders were contractual in nature; therefore, analogizing to
the rights of bondholders, they claimed that no fiduciary duty was owed to preferred stock-
holders. Id. at 593. The Jedwab court agreed only to a point, noting that preferred stock
could essentially be broken into two sets of rights: (i) "'preferential' rights (and special limita-
tions)" and (ii) "rights associated with all stock." Id. at 593. All classes of stock of a corpora-
tion are equal except as specified in the certificate of incorporation. Id. (citing Shanghai Power
Co. v. Delaware Trust Co., 316 A.2d 589 (Del. Ch. 1974)). Thus, the Jedwab court split the
attributes of, and duties triggered by, preferred stock into two categories: (1) all aspects of
preferred stock addressed in the certificate of incorporation are contractual in nature and
therefore imply no fiduciary duty, while (2) all aspects of preferred stock not specifically men-
tioned in the certificate would share those rights with common stock, imposing a fiduciary
duty on the corporation as to those rights. Id. at 594. In Jedwab, the court found that (a) the
fair allocation of the proceeds in a merger, (b) the exercise of appropriate care in negotiating
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stockholders, like the rights of debtholders, are based on contract law.32°
In contrast, the rights of common stockholders are based on the trust
relationship between the board of directors of the corporation and the
common stockholders as the ultimate owners of the corporation.32
It should be noted that isolated federal district courts or federal
judges construing state law have attempted to expand fiduciary duties to
debtholders in certain limited circumstances.322 Most of these rulings
have been actually or effectively overruled by higher courts.323
the merger and (c) the alleged overreaching by the controlling stockholder of MGM Grand (as
to timing) were not addressed in the charter, and therefore "fairly implicate fiduciary duties."
Id. Conversely, the Jedwab court found that the plaintiff's claim that the merger was a wrong-
ful attempt to circumvent the preferred stock's $20 per share redemption provision did "relate
to a negotiated preference and must be evaluated strictly as a contract right." Id. at 594 n.6;
accord Kirschner Bros. Oil v. Natomas Co., 185 Cal. App. 3d 784, 795, 229 Cal. Rptr. 899,
908 (1986) (applying a similar contractual analysis and reaching a similar conclusion under
California law regarding fiduciary duties owed to preferred stockholders).
320. It is well established in Delaware law that "the provisions of the certificate of incorpo-
ration govern the rights of preferred shareholders, the certificate of incorporation being inter-
preted in accordance with the law of contracts, with only those rights which are embodied in
the certificate granted to preferred shareholders." Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624,
628 (Del. 1977) (citing Ellingwood v. Wolf's Head Oil Refining Co., 38 A.2d 743 (Del. 1944));
accord Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984)
("[p]referential rights are contractual in nature and therefore are governed by the express pro-
vision of a company's certificate of incorporation"); Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401
A.2d 932, 937 (Del. 1979) ("as to the conversion privilege, it has been said that the rights of a
preferred shareholder are 'least affected by rules of law and most dependent on the share con-
tract,"' Le., the certificate of designation) (quoting Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and
Draftsmanship, 42 CAL. L. Rav. 243, 279 (1954)).
321. See Norte I, Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 10-11 (directors, managing the business and
affairs of the corporation, act as fiduciaries for the corporation and its stockholders who are
the equitable owners of the assets; by contrast, debentureholders are creditors of the
corporation).
322. See, eg., Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., No. 76-5433, slip op. at 17 (S.D.N.Y. July 14,
1981). In Green, a Federal court, sitting in New York and applying Delaware law, found that
any corporate act that "impinged upon the equity aspects" of a convertible debt security (i.e.,
the conversion feature and any act that would depress the market for the common stock of the
corporation and thereby make a conversion uneconomic) would implicate a fiduciary duty to
the holders of the convertible debt. Id. But see infra note 323 (Delaware Supreme Court
effectively overruling Green). Some debtholders also have unsuccessfully attempted to "boot-
strap" allegations of fraud into establishing a fiduciary duty. See cases cited infra note 348.
323. The Supreme Court of Delaware expressly disavowed the ruling in Green, stating that
"a mere expectancy interest does not create a fiduciary relationship." Simons II, 549 A.2d at
304 (citing Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988)).
"In relying on an expectancy interest created by the conversion feature of the debenture the
Green court misperceives the type of interest required for the imposition of fiduciary duties,
under Delaware law." Id. While acknowledging that there is some Federal judicial sentiment
to extend fiduciary duties at least to holders of convertible debt securities, the Delaware Chan-
cery Court in Simons I noted that "[tihese seeds ... have fallen upon stones. None of the
appellate opinions actually represent a holding so extending that concept [of fiduciary duty]
and, indeed, each of those cases evidence the fact that prevailing judicial opinion remains to
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b. Consent Solicitations and exit consents
Particularly relevant to Exchange Offers conducted in conjunction
with Consent Solicitations is Katz v. Oak Industries,324 the seminal case
that specifically addressed the issue of whether a corporation owes any
fiduciary duty to the holders of its debt securities in the context of a
solicitation of exit consents.32 In this case, Oak Industries commenced
the contrary." Simons I, 542 A.2d at 790; see, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d
929 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (vacating lower court's ruling on other
grounds with dicta indicating disapproval of lower court's extension of fiduciary duty to hold-
ers of convertible debt securities under New York law); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d
812 (2d Cir. 1977) (disavowing analysis from earlier proceeding that holders of convertible
debt were owed a fiduciary duty under New York law); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying New York law and finding that
the Supreme Court of Delaware's ruling in Simons II on the fiduciary duties owed to bond-
holders "persuasive and believes a New York court would agree with that conclusion"). One
federal appellate court has held to the contrary, however, and stated that it "would be very
much surprised if Maryland or any other state would today hold that no such [fiduciary]
obligations were owed by an issuer of such [convertible] securities and its directors." Pitts-
burgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933, 941 (3d Cir. 1982). Dela-
ware and other states clearly would surprise the author of the Pittsburgh Terminal opinion;
moreover, two other members of the panel in Pittsburgh Terminal expressly disavowed any
such conclusion. Id. at 943 (Garth, J., concurring); id. at 954 (Adams, J., dissenting). See also
In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 95,689, at
98,239 & n.6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1990) (lower Federal court decision, discussed more fully
supra note 315); see generally McDaniel II, supra note 66, at 265-308 (analyzing certain of
these and other cases to expound the view that there are, or should be, fiduciary duties owed to
bondholders); Mitchell, supra note 67, at 1169 n. 11 (stating that "McDaniel... overstates the
extent to which courts have provided fiduciary rights for bondholders"; but, otherwise presents
a case for extending fiduciary rights to bondholders) (citations omitted); Bratton II, supra note
66, at 119 (noting that "the decisions set out this fiduciary duty very tentatively. Discussion of
the source and nature of the duty tends to be fragmentary, and the duty's precise relationship
to contract terms unclear .... In most cases... the duty remains subject to the contract
terms; it takes a breach of contract to breach the duty." (footnote omitted)).
It has been argued that Entel v. Guilden, 223 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (perpetual
warrantholders allowed standing in a derivative suit pleading a private right of action under
Section 17(e) of the Investment Company Act of 1940), and Hoff v. Sprayregan, 52 F.R.D. 243
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (convertible debtholders allowed standing in a Rule lob-5 case), are examples
of Federal law applying the expansive Federal view of fiduciary duties owed to non-stockhold-
ers. See, e.g., Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531, 540, 155 Cal. Rptr. 94, 100
(1979). Entel and Hoff, however, interpreted the word "shareholder" in the federal standing
statute to include holders of convertible securities based on the principle that courts "should
strive to construe the federal rules [of civil procedure] so as to harmonize them with substan-
tive Federal statutes ...." Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Be-
cause federal securities law defines convertible debt securities, warrants and preferred stock as
equity securities, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(l1), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l1) (1988),
this line of cases should not be applicable to state law. See Kessler, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 545, 155
Cal. Rptr. at 103 (discussing each of those Federal cases and dismissing their relevance to state
fiduciary claims).
324. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
325. Eastern Air Lines, which did not involve exit consents, is the only other Delaware case
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tender offers to exchange New Securities for its six classes of outstanding
debt securities and concurrently sought bondholders' consents to amend-
ments to the underlying indentures.326 The exchange offers were condi-
tioned on certain minimum amounts of each class of existing debt
securities being tendered. In order to tender their securities, bondholders
were required to consent to the amendments to the relevant indenture.3 "
The amendments to the indentures would have had adverse conse-
quences to bondholders who did not tender pursuant to the offers. 328
The Delaware Chancery Court pointed out that the relationship be-
tween a corporation and its bondholders is contractual in nature, that
neither the corporation nor its directors are in a fiduciary relationship
with the bondholders, and that the "high standard of fidelity required of
fiduciaries when they act with respect to the interests of the beneficiaries
of their trust" was not involved in this case.329 To the contrary, "ftjhe
terms of the contractual relationship agreed to ... define the corpora-
tion's obligation to its bondholders."330 This analysis is wholly consis-
tent with the jurisprudence described above concerning whether and
when a corporation, its directors and its controlling stockholders owe
of which we are aware that has addressed whether fiduciary duties are owed to debtholders in a
Consent Solicitation; however, it dismissed such liability only in dictum in a footnote. Eastern
Air Lines, Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op. at 10 n.4.
326. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d at 876.
327. Id. at 877.
328. The "amendments would, if implemented, have the effect of removing significant nego-
tiated protections to holders of [Oak Industries'] long-term debt including the deletion of all
financial covenants." Id. The plaintiff complained that bondholders who did not consent and
tender in the exchange offers would be left holding securities that were stripped of financial
covenant protections and for which there would be no ready market. Id. at 878.
329. Id. at 879. The court noted that the relationship is contractual even when the debt
securities are convertible. Id.
330. Id. The court noted that:
Arrangements among a corporation, underwriters of its debt, trustees under its in-
dentures and sometimes ultimate investors are typically thoroughly negotiated and
massively documented. The rights and obligations of the various parties are or
should be spelled out in that documentation. The terms of the contractual relation-
ship agreed to and not broad concepts such as fairness define the corporation's obli-
gation to its bondholders.
Id. at 879. "[C]entral to plaintiff's own articulation of his theory of recovery" in Oak Indus-
tries was the characterization of the combined Section 3(a)(9) Exchange and Consent Solicita-
tion as "coercive." Id The court in Oak Industries, however, determined that "for purposes
of legal analysis, the term 'coercion' itself--covering a multitude of situations-is not very
meaningful." Oak Indus., 508 A.2d at 880. The real analysis is whether the transaction is
"'inappropriately coercive' or 'wrongfully coercive,'" and that the standard by which the
"adverb modifying" the term is determined is based on contract law and the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Id. But see Coffee, Coercive Debt Tender Offers, N.Y.L. J., July
19, 1990, at 5 (analyzing and criticizing the use of exit consents). For a discussion of how the
court in Oak Industries ruled on the contractual claim of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, see infra notes 339-42.
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fiduciary duties to non-common stockholders. Consequently, all of that
jurisprudence, not just Oak Industries, should apply equally to other
challenges of exit consents.
c. "special circumstances"
Courts look outside the four corners of the contract instruments to
determine the rights of the debtholders and preferred stockholders in the
same "special circumstances" common in general contract and debtor/
creditor law. Such instances are limited to: (1) violation of statute; (2)
fraud in the inducement; and, (3) breach of fiduciary duty owed to credi-
tors in insolvency or bankruptcy.331 The first two of these "special cir-
cumstances" arise in quite particular factual situations. Financially
troubled corporations, however, are often exposed to the very real risk of
being deemed insolvent. It has been held that when a corporation be-
comes insolvent, "the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the
stockholders to the creditors. '332 While there is a bright line for deter-
mining when a bankruptcy occurs, 33 3 there are a number of methods for
determining when a corporation is insolvent.334 Directors of a troubled
331. See Simons II, 549 A.2d at 303; Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. 7888, slip
op. at 9; Note I, Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 11; Harff, 324 A.2d at 222.
332. FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
928 (1983); accord Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945) (citing Arnold v. Knapp,
75 W. Va. 804, 810, 84 S.E. 895, 899 (1915)); Xonics Medical Sys. v. Haverty, 99 Bankr. 870,
872 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying Delaware law); Wieboldt Stores v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488,
507-10 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Official Secured Creditors' Comm. of Amfesco Indus. v. Greenblatt,
215 A.D.2d 215, 217, 548 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (App. Div. 1989) (creditors' committee, author-
ized by bankruptcy court to maintain the action, did not lack standing to bring an action
against directors for breach of duty owed to the creditors). This "shift" is only the "majority
rule," with several states maintaining a "minority rule" that "precludes suits by injured credi-
tors of an insolvent corporation." In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d 901, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1985)
(citing 3 A.W. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 1181, at 417 (perm. ed.
1986)). Compare Davis, 147 F.2d at 633 (following the "law by the great weight of authority")
with Conway v. Bonner, 100 F.2d 786, 787 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 307 U.S. 632 (1939) (citing
Texas law for the proposition that "a corporation is not held to be insolvent so long as it
continues to be a going concern ... without some positive act of insolvency"); see also New
York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau v. Weiss, 305 N.Y. 1, 110 N.E.2d 397 (1953) ("shift"
in fiduciary duty may occur shortly before insolvency).
333. In contrast to the divided law on insolvency, it has been clearly established that the
fiduciary duties of directors of a corporation in bankruptcy no longer run solely to stockhold-
ers and the cor5ration. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939).
334. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A) (1988) ("sum of [corporation's]
debts is greater than all such entity's property, at a fair valuation"); MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT ANN. § 6.40 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1990) (inability of a corporation to pay its debts
as they mature; or total assets less than sum of total liabilities); CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (West
1988) (inability to meet liabilities as they mature); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 102(8) (McKinney
1988) (inability to pay debts as they mature); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 291 (1983)
(receivers for insolvent corporations; appointment and powers). Insolvency under section 291
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company, therefore, face an extremely difficult situation if their company
has drifted into insolvency, but not yet into bankruptcy: to whom does
their fiduciary duty lie in a context in which they often must negotiate
between debtholders and stockholders?335
2. Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and other
contractual remedies
Absent special circumstances, holders of debt securities are limited
to contractual remedies. Therefore, they have attacked corporations as
having violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an
alternative claim to an allegation of a breach of fiduciary duties.336 This
remedy has been generally recognized in modern contract law.337 In the
context of debt securities, Delaware courts have held that "the contrac-
tual documents creating the debenture[s] and the duties of the issuer
may, in narrow circumstances, be held to imply obligations arising from
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
' 33
The Oak Industries court set out the general test of this "implied"
covenant in Delaware: "[I]s it clear from what was expressly agreed
upon that the parties who negotiated the express terms of the contract
would have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of as a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith-had they thought to negotiate with
respect to that matter? ' 339
of the Delaware General Corporation Law may arise "where liabilities exceed assets, or where
the corporation is unable to meet its current obligations arising in the ordinary course of busi-
ness." 2 E. FOLK, R. WARD & E. WELCH, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORA-
TION LAW § 291.2 (2d ed. 1988) (citation omitted). Insolvency under section 291 is a question
of fact "that 'must be free from doubt' and proof thereof should be 'clear and convincing.'"
Id. (citation omitted).
335. See Mlmoe, supra note 69, at 200-09 (discussing this dilemma and directors' business
judgment).
336. See, eg., Van Gemert, 553 F.2d 812 (applying New York law); Simons II, 549 A.2d
300; Oak Indus, 508 A.2d 873; Waverly Prods. v. RKO Gen., 217 Cal. App. 2d 721, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 73 (1963).
337. See REATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); 3 CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 540 (Kaufman ed. 1984).
338. Simons I, 542 A.2d at 787 (emphasis added).
339. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d at 880. In California, the elements of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing are as follows:
"(1) the implication must arise from the language used or it must be indispensable to
effectuate the intention of the parties; (2) it must appear from the language used that
it was so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unneces-
sary to express it; (3) implied covenants can only be justified on the grounds of legal
necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only where it can be rightfully assumed that it
would have been made if attention had been called to it; and (5) there can be no
implied covenant where the subject is completely covered by the contract."
Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531, 541, 155 Cal. Rptr. 94, 101 (1979)
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In Oak Industries, the bondholder, who sought to enjoin the concur-
rent Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges and Consent Solicitation on fiduciary
duty grounds also claimed that the allegedly coercive nature of the exit
consents breached the corporation's implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."4 The court determined that (1) indenture provisions
granting bondholders the power to veto modifications did not prevent the
issuer from offering inducements to consent on the same terms to all
bondholders; 341 and, (2) indenture provisions prohibiting the issuer from
voting debt securities it held did not prevent the issuer from inducing
bondholders to concurrently consent to modifications and transfer their
bonds to the issuer. 42
Citing the test set forth in Oak Industries, the Delaware Chancery
Court in Kass v. Eastern Air Lines 34 3 ruled that Eastern's Consent Solici-
tation, in which it offered to pay bondholders for their consents, was not
a breach of the implied contractual obligation of good faith and fair deal-
ing. An apparently important factor in the Court's analysis was that the
(quoting Hinckley v. Bechtel Corp., 41 Cal. App. 3d 206, 211, 116 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (1974)).
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 976, 919 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (in dismissing plaintiffs' claim that Campeau Corporation's leveraged buy-out of Feder-
ated "prejudiced the security underlying" plaintiffs' debt securities and thereby violated the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the District Court noted that under New York
law the "'implied covenant... derives its substance directly from the language of the Inden-
ture, and "cannot give the holders... any rights inconsistent with those set out in the Inden-
ture,"' " and that a court cannot "imply a covenant to supply additional terms for which the
parties did not bargain") (quoting Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire, Inc.,
589 F. Supp. 669, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929,
957 (5th Cir.), cert denied., 454 U.S. 965 (1981)), vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
754 F.2d 478, 479 (2d Cir. 1985)) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. lR Nabisco, 716 F.
Supp. 1504, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (dismissing an existing debt security holders' claim of a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because of the leveraged buy-out
of RJR Nabisco)).
340. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d at 881. The court examined the specific provisions of the inden-
tures to determine whether the parties "would have expressly agreed to prohibit contractually
the linking of the giving of consent with the purchase and sale of the security." Id. at 880-8 1.
See supra note 330 for a discussion of the court's view in Oak Industries that the word "coer-
cive" was analytically meaningless.
341. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d at 881.
342. Id. The court found that the purpose of the restriction on Oak Industries voting the
debt securities it held was to protect bondholders "against the issuer voting as a bondholder in
favor of modifications that would benefit it as issuer, even though such changes would be
detrimental to bondholders." Id. The court reasoned that this financial conflict of interest was
not present even when the bondholders' consents were to be given "concurrently with the
transfer of the bond to the issuer." Id. "Not only will the proposed consents be granted or
withheld only by those with a financial interest to maximize the return on their investment in'
Oak's bonds, but the incentive to consent is equally available to all members of each class of
bondholders." Id.
343. Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op. (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986). See infra notes 347-54 and
accompanying text for a more complete discussion of the facts and allegations in this case.
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offer was made to all bondholders on the same terms.3 4 However, the
court noted in dicta that a private consent payment made only to a suffi-
cient number of bondholders to carry the election would probably be a
breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
345
Although not mentioned in the opinions in Oak Industries and East-
ern Air Lines,346 fraud in the inducement has often been alleged as a
second contractual cause of action accompanying alleged breaches of fi-
duciary duties owed to non-common stockholders in contexts other than
consent solicitations. 347 Although plaintiffs frequently have attempted to
bootstrap allegations of fraud into establishing a foundation for a fiduci-
ary duty owed to non-common stockholders, 348 Delaware courts have
clearly held that a claim of fraud is wholly independent from, and does
not create any sort of fiduciary duty.349 "In Delaware, '[t]he elements of
"actionable fraud" consist of a false representation of a material fact
knowingly made with intent to be believed to one who, ignorant of its
falsity, relies thereon and is thereby deceived.' ,,350
3. Vote buying
The anti-democratic implications of providing consideration for
344. Eastern Airlines, Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op. at 11. Eastern Air Line's Consent
Solicitation was not conducted in conjunction with a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, and therefore
did not involve exit consents.
345. Id.; see Pisik v. BCI Holdings Corp., No. 14593/87, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June
21, 1987) (reaching the same conclusion under New York law on essentially the same facts as
Eastern Air Lines).
346. Oak Indu&, 508 A.2d 873; Eastern Air Lines, Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op.; see also
Pisik, No. 14593/87, slip op. (also no claim of fraud in the inducement).
347. See, eg., Simons II, 549 A.2d at 301-03; Harff, 347 A.2d at 134; Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., No.7888, slip op. at 2; Norte I, Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 11; Green, No.
76-5433, slip op. at 2.
348. A few plaintiffs have attempted to utilize the reversal of the Harff lower court decision
(on grounds that fraud had been sufficiently pled to give rise to a triable issue of fact as to that
issue) to construct an argument that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty owed to non-common
stockholders may exist when pled in conjunction with a claim of fraud. See Simons II, 549
A.2d at 301-02; Continental IlL Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. 7888, slip op. at 2; Simons I, 542
A.2d at 788; Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 2 (May 30,
1986) [hereinafter Norte 1]; Norte I, Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 7-8. This is also one of the
foundations of the Green decision in New York. Green, slip op. at 16.
349. The courts in Norte II, Continental IlL. Nat'l Bank & Trust and, finally and emphati-
cally, in the Simons I and Simons II cases repudiated this argument, making clear that fraud is
an independent claim that in no way relates to or creates any fiduciary duty. Simons II, 549
A.2d at 302-04; Simons I, 542 A.2d at 790-92; Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust, slip op. at
8-10; Norte II, slip op. at 2-3; Norte I, slip op. at 13-14.
350. Continental IlL Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., slip op. at 14 (quoting Harman v. Masoneilan
Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 499 (Del. 1986)); see Harff, 347 A.2d at 134.
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votes has long been against public policy in certain contexts. 351 Consent
Solicitations that involve payments for the consents have been attacked
on these grounds. For example, in Eastern Air Lines, the airline offered a
choice of cash or airline ticket vouchers to the holders of its five classes of
debt securities who consented to the removal of certain financial condi-
tions from the underlying indentures.3 2 Bondholders who did not con-
sent would receive no consideration even if the corporation received the
requisite consents, and the amendments became effective.
35 3
Certain bondholders sought to enjoin the implementation of the
amendments to the indentures.354 They asserted two theories: (1) that
the consent payments constituted vote buying that, as a matter of public
policy, was void per se; and (2) that the payment of consideration only to
consenting bondholders was a breach of Eastern Air Line's implied con-
tractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing.355 Under Delaware
law, vote buying in the corporate stockholder setting35 6 may be "void or
against public policy" if the purpose of the arrangement is fraud or the
disenfranchisement of other stockholders. 3 7 The court passed over the
fraud element of this test 358 and found that there was no disenfranchise-
ment purpose in Eastern Air Line's offer, and in so doing noted that "the
offer [was] made publicly to all voters on the same terms" and "each
bondholder [was] free to accept or reject it."
'359
351. See, eg., N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 3; N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-142 (Consol. 1990); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 609(e) (Consol. 1990); DEL. CONST., art. V, § 3; Chew v. Inverness Man-
agement Corp., 352 A.2d 426 (Del. Ch. 1976) (public policy prohibits stockholder from selling
vote for consideration personal to that stockholder).
352. Eastern Air Lines, Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op. at 3.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1.
355. Id. at 6; see Pisik, No. 14593/87, slip op. at 2-3 (plaintiff asserted identical two theories
based on New York law). See supra notes 343-45 for a discussion of the implied contractual
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in Eastern Air Lines.
356. The court noted that Eastern Air Lines involved bondholders, not stockholders, and
that the duty owed to bondholders is not fiduciary in nature as is the duty owed to stockhold-
ers. Eastern Air Lines, Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 10 n.4. Nonetheless, the court applied the
law as developed in the stockholder setting. Id. at 10.
357. Id. at 9-10 (citing Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 25 (Del. Ch. 1982)).
358. "The gist of the complaint is not that Eastern is not being candid but that it is being
wrongfully coercive and unfair." Id. at 9. For a description of the view of the court in Oak
Industries that the term "coercive" has little legal utility, see supra note 330.
359. Eastern Air Lines, Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op. at 11. The court suggested that the
outcome might be different if the consent payment had not been made to all bondholders on
the same terms. Id; see also Pisik, No. 14593/87, slip op. at 3 (reaching same conclusion,
based on New York law, where corporation offered only cash, not cash or ticket vouchers, only
to security holders who consented to proposed amendments to a debt agreement).
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D. Amendments Creating New Securities-Availability
of Section 3(a)(9)
Generally, a Consent Solicitation by itself does not involve the offer
or sale of a security, and therefore does not require registration under the
Securities Act. If, however, the amendments sought in a Consent Solici-
tation substantially affect the rights of holders of Target Securities, the
amendments of the Target Securities may be deemed to constitute the
issuance of New Securities3" requiring registration under the Securities
Act361 and possibly qualification under the TIA,362 unless an exemption
from each such statute is available.
Traditionally, the "substantially affects" standard has been met, and
a New Security deemed created, when modifications would alter the "ba-
360. L. Loss, supra note 128, at 248 ("There is always the question ... whether the rights
of security holders have been so substantially affected by the particular change in the terms of
the outstanding security that it becomes a new security."); H. SOWARDS, supra note 183,
§ 2.02[4], at 2-130 ("A modification in the terms of a security that makes a fundamental
change in the nature of the investment it represents is a disposition of the modified security for
value, and a resultant 'sale' of that security."); McGuigan & Aiken, supra note 118, at 935 ("In
determining whether the amendment of a security constitutes the sale ... of a new security, the
generally accepted test is whether the alteration has substantially affected the legal rights and
obligations of the holders of the outstanding securities.").
361. "[I]f an alteration of a security effectively creates a new security, the transaction is in
essence an exchange of an old for a new security, and hence a sale, even though no actual
exchange of one security for another may have occurred." McGuigan & Aiken, supra note
118, at 935. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. See also Rule 145(a)(1), 17
C.F.R. § 240.145(a)(1) (1990) ("A reclassification of securities of [a] corporation ... which
involves the substitution of a security for another security" that has been consummated after a
plan for such a reclassification has been "submitted for the vote or consent of [the corpora-
tion's] security holders" shall be deemed to involve an "offer," "offer to sell," "offer for sale"
or "sale" within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Securities Act); L. Loss, supra note 128, at
292-95 (discussing Rule 145, its history and its relationship to the "perceived presence of a
'sale' in exchanges of securities and significant alterations of their terms" (footnote omitted)).
362. The TIA does not specifically define the term "security," and section 303(1) of the
TIA incorporates all definitions set forth in section 2 of the Securities Act if the term is not
otherwise defined in the TIA. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 303(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77ccc(l)
(1988), amended by Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550 (Nov. 15,
1990), including the definition of the term "security" in Securities Act of 1933, § 2(a)(16), 15
U.S.C. § 79b(a)(16) (1988). Therefore, the outcome of the analysis of whether the amend-
ments to debt securities result in the creation of New Securities under the Securities Act is
dispositive under the TIA. See Lockheed Aircraft, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Feb. 14,
1975) (LEXIS, Fedsee library, Noact file) (no-action position taken in response to a request
asserting that qualification of the supplemental indenture under the TIA should not be re-
quired because the qualification provisions of the TIA relate only to "securities" that are de-
fined in the TIA by reference to the Securities Act). See infra notes 380-81 and accompanying
text, noting that a supplemental indenture must be qualified under the TIA even if Section
3(a)(9) is available to exempt the issuance of the New Security deemed to be created by the
amendment from the registration requirements under the Securities Act.
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sic financial terms" of existing debt securities363 or the "basic nature" of
existing equity securities. 3 6 In the leading case of SEC v. Associated Gas
& Electric,36 5 for example, a corporation submitted to holders of its in-
vestment certificates a proposal to pay twenty percent of the principal
coming due and extend the maturity date of the remaining principal
either for one year or for five years at each holder's option. 66 As an
inducement to extend the maturity date for five years, the corporation
offered an additional "interest advance" of two percent to the holders.367
The court held the extension of the maturity date of investment certifi-
cates, evidenced by a legend stamped on the outstanding certificates, to
involve the sale of a new "security" within the meaning of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (the HCA).368
Since the Associated Gas & Electric Co. decision, published SEC pro-
nouncements and Staff no-action letters that address this issue have em-
ployed a fact-intensive analysis of whether the proposed modifications
alter the "basic financial terms" or "basic nature" of the securities, or
363. The American Bar Foundation describes the "basic financial terms" of a debt security
as "the payment of the principal amount, the interest rate, the redemption premium, the ma-
turity, the place of payment, the currency in which payable and the right to institute suit for
any default in such payment." COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES, supra note 307, at 307. It
describes the "essence" of an issue of debt securities as "the promise to pay a sum of money on
a future date together with interest on such sum, payable semi-annually at a specified rate at a
specified place." Id. at 111. These "intrinsic rights" under the security, id. at 125, are essen-
tially equivalent to the "basic financial terms." See Leasco Corp., supra note 305 (no-action
position taken in response to a request noting that the proposed amendments would not affect
the provisions of the indenture relating to payment of principal and interest, interest rate,
interest payment date, maturity date, redeemability or the sinking fund provisions). But see
infra notes 371-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of limited exceptions to this rule.
364. Alteration of voting rights, dividend rights or liquidation rights constitutes a change to
the "basic nature" of equity securities. See Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., 21 S.E.C. 633, 634-36
(1945) (alteration of the priorities, preferences, voting power and other rights of preferred and
common stockholders, including reduction of the dividend rate and establishment of cumula-
tive dividend rights, resulted in a substantial alteration of the rights of the preferred and com-
mon stockholders); L. Loss, supra note 128, at 248; H. SOWARDS, supra note 183, § 2.0214], at
2-132 (alteration of voting rights).
365. 99 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1938).
366. Id. at 796.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 797. Because the definition of "security" under the HCA, § 2(a)(16), 15 U.S.C.
§ 79b(a)(16) (1988), is coextensive with that under the Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(l) (1988), the rationale of Associated Gas & Electric applies equally to the Securities Act.
Cf. L. Loss, supra note 128, at 247 n.3 (noting that the HCA defines the term "sale" more
broadly than does the Securities Act, but concluding that the rationale of Associated Gas &
Electric applies equally to the Securities Act). The Staff has also taken the view that an "offer
to extend the maturity date of... outstanding debentures at a higher interest rate would
constitute an 'offer to sell' and 'sale' of a new security." Allied-Carson Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,434, at 86,146 (Feb.12,
1976).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:527
whether the amendments constitute mere adjustments of the contractual
rights embodied by the underlying indenture or certificate of designa-
tion.369 For example, and particularly relevant to exit consents, to date
the Staff consistently has issued no-action letters in connection with pro-
posed amendments that would alter or eliminate covenants or definitions
in an indenture.3 70 Moreover, not all changes to basic financial terms
have been deemed to create a New Security. Certain changes that are
favorable to the security holder, and therefore do not increase the
holder's investment risk, have not been characterized as a sale of a New
Security. 1  For example, while some commentators appear to regard
369. See, eg., Leasco Corp., supra note 305 (no-action position taken); Susquehanna Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter (avail. June 27, 1979) (LEXIS, Fedsee library, Noact file) (modification
to debt securities "relaxing" stock payment limitation covenants and increasing the interest
rate "constitute merely a modification of contractual provisions contained in the Indentures,
made in accordance with the procedures provided in the Indentures"); cf. Minneapolis Gen.
Elec. Co., 2 S.E.C. 57 (1937) (SEC found that a new security was created under the HCA as a
result of the extensive changes to the existing mortgage indenture, including minor changes in
collateral).
370. See, e.g., Leasco Corp., supra note 305 (proposed amendments would eliminate cove-
nant that, among other things, prohibited the issuer from declaring or paying dividends on
capital stock); Susquehanna Corp., supra note 369 (proposed amendments would relax cove-
nants restricting the issuer's ability to make so-called 'stock payments,' including the payment
of dividends); Sheraton Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 24, 1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (no-action position taken in response to a request that asserted that pro-
posed amendments to indentures that would "permit the return [to the parent corporation of
$170 million in] capitalized advances and [would] increase the rate of interest payable on the
Debentures." merely modified certain contractual provisions of the indenture pursuant to
which debt securities previously registered under the Securities Act were issued); see also Ten-
nessee Forging Steel Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Jan. 21, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file) (Staff takes no-action position, without necessarily agreeing with counsel's
legal conclusion that a New Security would not be created, when corporation sought bond-
holder consent to a waiver of a default in a net worth covenant, among other things); McGui-
gan & Aiken, supra note 118, at 938 (it is "reasonable to conclude that when a company
amends indenture provisions to change definitions and remove financing restrictions,... no
sale of a new security will have occurred."). But see infra note 377 for a description of the
Staffs' yet unpublished and informal lowering of the standards that determine when a New
Security is created when covenants are modified or eliminated in a Consent Solicitation.
371. See Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 95,071, at 97,753 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Browning, the court
stated that "the plaintiffs' assertion that a reduction in the conversion price of the debentures
resulted in the issuance and sale of a new security is without merit." Id. at 97,754. Plaintiffs'
authorities, including Associated Gas & Electric Co., were "no support for this position since
they involve amendments to the disadvantage of the indenture [sic] holder," unlike the changes
in Browning, which were beneficial to the holder. Id. at 97,754 n.*; see also Adee, Creating a
New Security, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1989, at 23 (interprets New Security analyses as, generally, those
modifications that are adverse to a holder will create a New Security and those modifications
that are beneficial to a holder do not create a New Security); McCoy & McGlynn, Current
Interpretations of §§ 3(a)(9) and 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Other Significant
No-Action and Interpretive Positions 7-8 (Oct. 12, 1990) (presented at the 23rd Annual Rocky
Mountain State-Federal-Provincial Securities Conference) (courts review whether or not the
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any change in interest rate of a debt security as a change in the "basic
financial terms" of a debt security,372 the Staff has taken no-action posi-
tions in several instances where a corporation increased the interest rate
of existing debt securities without registration under the Securities Act or
qualification under the TIA.3 73 The Staff has also taken a no-action posi-
tion when a series of proposed modifications to a series of debt securities
would, among other things, accelerate the maturity date.37 A United
States District Court also has found that an amendment to a convertible
debt security that reduces the conversion price did not create a New
Security. 7 5
The foregoing analysis is unaffected by the fact that holders of Tar-
get Securities may receive cash or other consideration in return for their
consent to the amendments.376 Indeed, "the provisions of the security
proposed changes "are adverse to the holder," citing Ingenito v, Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp.
1154, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Associated Gas & Electric Co., 99 F.2d 795, and "[S]taff review
focuses less upon whether the changes are simply adverse to security holders and more upon
whether the changes are made pursuant to the terms of the original indenture.").
372. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES REGULATIONS § 2.26[4], at 2-234 (rev. ed. 1985)
(change in interest rate of debt security would most likely involve sale of a New Security); L.
Loss, supra note 126, at 248 (change in interest or dividend rate or liquidation preference
would seem quite clearly to result in New Security); H. SOWARDS, supra note 183, § 2.02[4], at
2-130 (modification of interest rate on debenture results in "sale" of debenture); McGuigan &
Aiken, supra note 118, at 938. Bloomenthal, Loss and Sowards cite no direct authority for
their positions. McGuigan and Aiken base their view on several no-action letters that, in fact,
stated that the proposed transactions were exempt from registration requirements under Sec-
tion 3(a)(9). McGuigan & Aiken, supra note 117, at 938.
373. See PLM Companies, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Sept. 14, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file); Time, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Dec. 9, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsee
library, Noact file); Eaton Corp., supra note 305; J. Ray McDermott & Co., SEC No-Action
Letter (avail. Sept. 10, 1979) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Susquehanna Corp., supra
note 369; Sheraton Corp., supra note 370; cf. Rochester Gas & Elec., 21 S.E.C. at 634-36
(reduction in preferred stock dividend rate, among other changes, held to be a sale of a New
Security); In re American Util. Serv., 6 S.E.C. 825 (1940) (reduction in interest rate held to be
an issuance of a New Security under the HCA).
374. Wilson Foods Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Aug. 6, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsee
library, Noact file) (Counsel's "no new security" analysis was one of two arguments for its
opinion that the modified debt securities did not have to be registered pursuant to the Securi-
ties Act or qualified under the TIA, and the Staff did not specify which it relied upon in taking
its no-action position).
375. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCII), at 97,754 (also relying on Section 3(a)(9)); see infra note 379.
376. See Kass v. Eastern Air Lines, Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, slip op. (Del. Ch. Nov. 14,
1986), discussed supra notes 343-45 & 353-59 and accompanying text; PLM Companies, supra
note 373 (increase in interest rate in return for waiver of restrictive covenant prohibiting the
transfer of assets); Eaton Corp., supra note 301 (increase in interest rate in return for elimina-
tion of certain financing restrictions); Time, Inc., supra note 373 (increase in interest rate in
return for modification of restrictions on financing and dispositions of assets); J. Ray McDer-
mott & Co., supra note 373 (increase in interest rates in return for amendments to financing
restrictions); Susquehanna Corp., supra note 369 (increase in interest rate in return for amend-
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instrument itself may give some indication as to what changes should be
considered 'substantial.' Changes that require unanimous consent of se-
curity holders are generally most important, whereas changes requiring
only a majority or two-thirds vote may be relatively 'insubstantial.' ""
Although neither the SEC nor the Staff has published any pro-
nouncements on changes of the foregoing New Security analysis, the au-
thors understand that the Staff is considering expanding the
circumstances under which it would deem an amendment to an existing
debt security to constitute the issuance of a New Security." 8 The Staff
position under consideration would represent a clear reversal of long-
held judicial, SEC and Staff positions, and would contradict the solid
reasoning for these well-established positions.
Nonetheless, when a Consent Solicitation is conducted in conjunc-
tion with an Exchange Offer, Section 3(a)(9) is likely to exempt the al-
leged New Securities created by a successful Consent Solicitation from
the registration requiements of the Securities Act. In fact, the Staff has
often relied on Section 3(a)(9) to grant no-action requests when it was
asked to determine whether a New Security would be created by a pro-
posed amendment.379
ments to restrictions on dividend payments to common stockholders); Sheraton Corp., supra
note 370 (increase in interest ratd in return for amendment permitting return of capital ad-
vances to obligor's parent).
377. McGuigan & Aiken, supra note 118, at 937. Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act
of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1988), amended by Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-550 (Nov. 15, 1990), provides that the right of any holder of an indenture security
to receive payment of the principal of and interest on such indenture security on or after the
respective due dates shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder. Id.
This section protects holders against amendment of the "basic financial terms" of the security.
See COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES, supra note 307, at 307. However,
the provisions of Section 316(b) were not designed to prevent a majority of bondhold-
ers from binding dissenters to changes in the indenture that do not relate to principal
or interest payments, nor to prevent a majority from waiving defaults other than non-
payment, even if the waivers indirectly affect the assets available for payment.
H. SOWARDS, supra note 183, § 8.18[3], at 8-120. Therefore, changes to these other terms may
be viewed as relatively insubstantial.
378. See Adee, Update: Creating a New Security, INSIGHTS, Nov. 1990, 23, 29 (Staff re-
cently has been informing counsel representing various parties involved in combined Consent
Solicitation/tender offers that proposed amendments that eliminate or change covenants in
existing debt securities so materially alter the "bundle of rights" of the debtholders that the
Staff now deems such modifications to covenants as creating a New Security; notes that "the
exact test the staff is now using to determine whether a new security exists is unclear... [and
that it is unclear] whether the change must be fundamental or merely material to result in a
new security; states that this new analysis has, "in effect, overruled the prior line of no-action
letters," although its new "position has not been publically announced in any release, no-
action letter or otherwise"); McCoy & McGlynn, supra note 371, at 9.
379. See, e.g., Eaton Corp., supra note 305; Barber-Coleman Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,400, at 76,653 (Apr. 3, 1980); J. Ray
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Practitioners should also note the registration exemption provided
by Section 3(a)(9) is one of the few section 3(a) exemptions that the TIA
has not incorporated.380 Consequently, if it is determined that a New
Security is created by the amendment of an outstanding public debt se-
curity, the supplemental indenture affecting that amendment would have
to be filed with the SEC and qualified under the TIA even if no filing is
required pursuant to the Securities Act because of Section 3(a)(9).
381
V. CERTAIN ADDITIONAL APPLICABLE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
A. The Tender Offer Rules
If an Exchange Offer is characterized as a tender offer, the tender
offer rules under the Exchange Act are triggered.382 Consequently, prac-
titioners should analyze the proposed restructuring against the eight-fac-
tor Wellman test to determine whether the Section 3(a)(9) Exchange
constitutes a tender offer.383 All tender offers are subject to Regulation
Dermott & Co., supra note 373; Liberty Loan Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Oct. 7,
1974) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Daitch Crystal Dairies, supra note 197; Magic
Marker Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. July 30, 1971) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file); see also Browning Debenture Holders' Comm., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. at 97,754 (United States District Court reaching the same conclusion).
380. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 304(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(4)(A) (1988),
amended by Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550 (Nov. 15, 1990). See
McGuigan & Aiken, supra note 118, at 941 ("If registration is not required under the Securi-
ties Act, the provisions of the [TIA] do not apply, except when the Securities Act exemption is
derived from Section 3(a)(9) or 3(a)(10) .... ").
'381. See Allied-Carson Corp., supra note 368, at 86,147; Magic Marker Corp., supra note
379 (Section 3(a)(9) available to exempt New Securities deemed to be created by modifications
from registration under Securities Act, but supplemental indenture still must be qualified
under TIA).
382. Regulation 14E, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 to -3 (1990) (governing all tender offers); Reg-
ulation 14D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 to -10 (1990) (governing tender offers for an issuer's equity
securities by affiliates and non-affiliates of the issuer); Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1990)
(governing tender offers by an issuer or its affiliate for the issuer's own equity securities).
383. Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). The term "tender
offer" is not defined in either the Exchange Act or the rules adopted thereunder. Courts,
however, have generally analyzed whether a transaction constitutes a tender offer by compar-
ing the transaction to the eight-factor test set forth in Wellman (commonly referred to as the
Wellman test). These eight factors are as follows:
(1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an
issuer;
(2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock;
(3) offer to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price;
(4) terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable;
(5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, often subject to a fixed
maximum number to be purchased;
(6) offer open for only a limited period of time;
(7) offeree subject to pressure to sell his or her stock; and
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14E.38 4 Additionally, Rule 13e-4385 governs tender offers by an issuer
(and certain affiliates of that issuer) for that issuer's equity securities,
386
and Regulation 14D 3 7 governs most tender offers for equity securities by
affiliates and nonaffiliates of the issuer.388
1. Regulation 14E
The procedural and antifraud provisions of Section 14(e) of the Ex-
change Act and Regulation 14E,319 adopted thereunder, are applicable to
all tender offers,39 ° including any Exchange Offer that constitutes a
(8) publicity preceding or accompanying the rapid accumulation of stock.
Id. at 823-24. "Not all factors need be present to find a tender offer; rather, they provide some
guidance as to the traditional indicia of a tender offer." SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores,
760 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Alternative approaches to the definition
of tender offer have been employed by some courts. See S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466
F. Supp. 1114, 1126-1127 (D. Mass. 1978) (a tender offer involves "(1) a publicly announced
intention by the purchaser to acquire a substantial block of the stock of the target company for
purposes of acquiring control thereof; and (2) a subsequent rapid acquisition by the purchaser
of large blocks of stock through open market and privately negotiated purchases."); Hanson
Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) ("the question of whether a solicita-
tion constitutes a 'tender offer' ... turns on whether.., there appears to be a likelihood that
unless the [tender offer rules] are followed there will be a substantial risk that solicitees will
lack information needed to make a carefully considered appraisal of the proposal"); see also R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 14, at 658-76; L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at
2198-2208.
The SEC has taken the position that a definition of tender offer is neither appropriate nor
necessary in view of "the dynamic nature of these transactions and the need ... to remain
flexible." Exchange Act Release No. 12,676, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,659, at 86,696 (Aug. 2, 1976); see 5 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 117, at
2198; see also Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCII) % 97,107, at 96,145, 96,148 & n.3 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1979) (discussing the eight
factors enumerated in Wellman and claiming, without citation, that they were initially formu-
lated by the SEC); Securities Act Release No. 6159, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCII) % 82,374, at 82,600, 82,601 & n.4 (Nov. 29, 1979) (proposing amendments-still
not adopted or withdrawn-to the tender offer rules to adopt a definition for "tender offer,"
and commenting that the SEC "has been continually involved in the development of the mean-
ing of the term but has not adopted a definition").
384. Rule 14d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(a).
385. Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4.
386. "The term 'equity security' means any stock or similar security; or any security con-
vertible... into such a security.... ." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(l 1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(1 1) (1988). For a discussion of Rule 13e-4, see infra notes 399-417 and accompanying
text.
387. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 through .14d-101.
388. Rule 14d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(a). See infra note 405, discussing whether Regu-
lation 14D or Rule 13e-4 would apply to a tender offer for an affiliate's equity securities.
389. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988); Regulation 14E,
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14e-1 to .14e-3.
390. Section 14(e) provides, in pertinent part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
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tender offer. Regulation 14E is the only tender offer rule that is applica-
ble to an Exchange Offer that constitutes a tender offer if the Target Se-
curities are not equity securities. 9 1
Rule 14e-1 requires the following:
(a) tender offers must remain open for at least twenty business
days3 92 from the date the offer is first published or sent to
security holders;
39 3
(b) tender offers must remain open for at least ten business
days after the date of publishing or sending notice to secur-
ity holders of an increase or decrease in (i) the percentage of
the class of securities being sought,3 9 4 (ii) the consideration
offered, or (iii) the dealer's soliciting fee;
395
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage
in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with
any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security
holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (emphasis added). Rule 14e-1
applies to a "person who makes a tender offer." Rule 14e-3 applies if "any person has taken a
substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced a tender offer." Rule 14e-1, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-1; Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (emphasis added); see also Rule 14d-
1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(a) (scope and definitions of Regulations 14D and 14E).
391. See Rule 13e-4(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(a)(2) (1990); Rule 13e-4(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-4(b) (1990); Rule 14d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(a) (referring to Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988)).
392. Rule 14d-l(b)(6) defines the term "business day" for both Regulation 14D and 14E as:
any day, other than Saturday, Sunday or a federal holiday, and shall consist of the
time period from 12:01 a.m. through 12:00 midnight Eastern time. In computing
any time period under ... Regulation 14E, the date of the event which begins the
running of such time period shall be included except that if such event occurs on
other than a business day such period shall begin to run on and shall include the first
business day thereafter.
Rule 14d-l(b)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(b)(6) (emphasis in original). The term "business
day" has essentially the identical definition in Rule 13e-4(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(a)(3).
393. Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a).
394. An exception applies when there is an increase in the maximum amount of securities
sought in the tender offer that is equal to or less than two percent of the class of outstanding
Target Securities, as calculated pursuant to section 14(d)(3) of the Exchange Act. Rule 14e-
l(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(b).
395. Id. In addition, the SEC prohibits the expiration of a tender offer for at least five
business days following the dissemination of a "material" amendment of the terms of the
tender offer. Interpretative Release Relating to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release
No. 24,296, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) % 24,285J (Apr. 3, 1987) (noting that waiver of a
minimum tender condition was a material change). For a discussion of the purpose of mini-
mum tender conditions, see supra note 47 and accompanying text. Ultimately, the minimum
period a tender offer must remain open will depend upon the facts and circumstances, includ-
ing the importance of any changes during the pendency of the tender offer and the manner of
dissemination of the Exchange Materials disclosing the changes.
If material changes are made with respect to information that approaches the signifi-
cance of price and share levels [I e., changes of the type specified by the ten-day-
notice rule], a minimum of ten business days may be required to allow for adequate
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(c) the person making the tender offer must pay for or return
Target Securities tendered promptly after the termination
or withdrawal of the tender offer;396 and,
(d) the party making the tender offer must give public notice of
any extension of the length of the tender offer.39 7
Section 14(e) and Regulation 14E do not require any filings with the
SEC.398
2. Rule 13e-4: issuer tender offers
The SEC adopted Rule 13e-43 99 and Schedule 13E-4 4  to regulate
issuer tender offers." 1 The Rule applies to tender offers for Target Se-
curities that are equity securities 40 2 by issuers that (1) have a class of
equity securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act40 3
or are required to file periodic reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the
Exchange Act,' or, (2) are closed-end investment companies registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940. 5
dissemination and investor response. Moreover, the five-business-day period may not
be sufficient when revised or additional materials are required because disclosure dis-
seminated to security holders is found to be materially deficient.
Id.
396. Rule 14e-l(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(c).
397. Rule 14e-l(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(d) (The notice must include the number of se-
curities deposited to date, and must be made "no later than the earlier of: (i) 9:00 a.m. Eastern
time, on the next business day after the scheduled expiration date of the offer, or (ii) if the
[Target Securities are] registered on one or more national securities exchanges the first opening
of any one of such exchanges on the next business day after the scheduled expiration date of
the offer.").
398. Other aspects of an exchange transaction may trigger separate filing, disclosure and
dissemination requirements under, for example, the TIA, the Securities Act, the proxy rules or
the NASD rules.
399. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4.
400. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-101.
401. Tender Offers by Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,112, [1979 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 82,182 (Aug. 16, 1979).
402. See supra note 386 for the definition of "equity securities" for purposes of the Ex-
change Act, including Rule 13e-4.
403. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988).
404. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1988).
405. Rule 13e-4(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(a)(1), Rule 13e-4(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
4(a)(2). Although unlikely to be relevant to Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges because of the same
issuer requirement, see supra notes 143-85 and accompanying text, Rule 13e-4 also applies to
tender offers by affiliates of issuers when such issuers have a class of equity securities registered
pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act or are required to file periodic reports pursuant to
section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. See Rule 13e-4(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(a)(2). Rule
13e-4(g)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(g)(4), exempts from Rule 13e-4 tender offers that are sub-
ject to section 14(d) of the Exchange Act. A corporation that makes a tender offer for its
affiliates' equity securities that are registered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act is
subject to section 14(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1), and therefore is exempt
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Rule 13e-4 and Schedule 13E-4, which were modeled after the third-
party tender offer requirements of Regulation 14D 41 6 and Schedule
14D-1, 407 contain antifraud, filing, disclosure and dissemination require-
ments. °8 In addition to the antifraud measures of Regulation 14E set
forth above," 9 Rule 13e-4 subjects applicable tender offers to the follow-
ing general requirements:
(a) a holder of Target Securities who has tendered any such
securities to the offeror pursuant to the tender offer may
withdraw such tenders at any time while the tender offer is
open;
4 10
(b) a holder of Target Securities who has tendered any such
securities to the offeror pursuant to the tender offer may
also withdraw such tenders at any time after forty business
days after the commencement of the tender offer if that
holder's Target Securities have not previously been ac-
cepted for payment;4 1'
(c) if the tender offer is for less than all of the outstanding Tar-
get Securities, and the number of shares of stock or princi-
pal amount of debt tendered pursuant to the tender offer
exceeds the maximum number or amount specified in the
tender offer, the issuer must acquire Target Securities from
each tendering holder, pro rata, based on the number or
principal amount each holder actually tendered while the
tender offer was open;
412
from most provisions of Rule 13e-4. Thus, the vast majority of Rule 13e-4 applies to an affili-
ate of an issuer only when such affiliate makes a tender offer for Target Securities that are not
registered pursuant to section 12, but the issuer has other equity securities registered pursuant
to section 12, or must report under section 15(d), and not section 13. In Rule 13e4's adopting
release, the SEC noted that most issuer affiliates are exempt from Rule 13e-4 because they are
subject to Regulation 14D. Tender Offers by Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,112, supra
note 401, at 1. Nonetheless, issuers and all of their affiliates must comply with Rule 13e-
4(f)(6), which prohibits purchases otherwise than pursuant to the tender offer for at least 10
business days after the date of termination of the tender offer. Id. at 82,207 n.21, 82,210-11.
See infra notes 415 and accompanying text for a description of Rule 13e-4(f)(6).
406. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-I to -10.
407. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1990).
408. Exchange Act Release No. 16,112, supra note 401, at 82,204.
409. See supra notes 389-97 and accompanying text. These Regulation 14E provisions,
other than the Extension Notice Rule, are duplicated in Rule 13e-4 in the following provisions:
Rule 13e-4(f)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(1)(i) (the twenty-business-day rule); Rule 13e-
4(f)(l)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(1)(ii) (the ten-day-notice rule); and Rule 13e-4(f)(5), 17
C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(5) (the prompt return rule).
410. Rule 13e-4(f)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(2)(i).
411. Rule 13e-4(f)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(2)(ii).
412. Rule 13e-4(f)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(3) (providing exceptions for rounding and
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(d) the issuer must pay all holders of Target Securities the
highest amount of "consideration" paid pursuant to the
tender offer, regardless of the consideration offered when a
particular holder tenders his or her Target Securities;413
(e) the tender offer must be made to all holders of the Target
Securities;4 4 and
(f) for ten full business days after the termination date of the
tender offer, neither the issuer, nor any affiliate of the is-
suer, can purchase (other than pursuant to the tender offer)
either the Target Securities or any New Securities, "or any
security of the same class and series" of either of the Target
Securities or New Securities, or any right to purchase any
such security.415
The issuer making the tender offer must file copies of Schedule
13E-4 and all exhibits thereto "prior to or as soon as practicable on the
odd lots, and allowing the offeror to provide each holder of Target Securities the option of
receiving no New Securities unless all of the holder's tendered Target Securities are accepted,
Le., unless no more than the maximum amount sought in the tender offer is validly tendered).
413. Rule 13e-4(8)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(8)(ii). The adopting release for this rule states
that the "issuer ... could reduce the consideration offered to security holders during the tender
offer." Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,016, at 88,186, 88,193 (July 11, 1986). But see Rule 13e-4(f)(4), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-4(f)(4) ("In the event the issuer or affiliate making the issuer tender offer increases
the consideration offered after the tender offer has commenced, such issuer or affiliate shall pay
such increased consideration to all security holders whose tendered securities are accepted for
payment by such issuer or affiliate." (emphasis added)); cf. Rule 13e-4(f)(1)(ii), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-4(f)(1)(ii) (ten-day-notice rule triggered by increases and decreases in the considera-
tion offered). In addition, a corporation may offer alternative types of consideration for the
Target Securities. Rule 13e-4(f)(10), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(10).
414. Rule 13e-4(f)(8)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(8)(i). The tender offer may, however,
exclude security holders in a particular state if the corporation making the tender offer has
made a good faith effort to comply, but cannot comply, with that state's laws and therefore
cannot make the offer in that state. The person making the tender offer may offer alternative
consideration in such a state in order to comply with that state's laws. Rule 13e-4(f)(9)(ii),
13e-4(f)(11), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(9)(ii), .13e-4(f)(11). See infra note 33 briefly discussing
the applicability of state blue sky laws.
415. Rule 13e-4(f)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(6); see also Rule lOb-6, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-6 (1990) (prohibiting persons "interested in a distribution," during such persons'
participation in the distribution, from trading in any securities (a) which are being distributed,
such as New Securities, (b) which are the same class or series as such New Securities, or (c)
which constitute any right to purchase any such New Security, such as the Target Securities
because of the tender offer); Rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1990) (prohibiting persons
making tender offers or exchange offers, i.e., tender offers in which the consideration is some-
thing other than "all cash," from purchasing the Target Securities that are equity securities
other than pursuant to the tender offer or exchange offer from the time of its public announce-
ment to the "expiration of the period ... securities tendered ... may by the terms of such offer
be accepted or rejected.").
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date of commencement" of the tender offer."g 6 In addition, a corporation
filing a Schedulel3E-4 must also report any material changes in the in-
formation contained in Schedule 13E-4 by "promptly" filing an amend-
ment to the Schedule.4 17
B. Rule 13e-3: Going Private Rules
1. Definition of a "going private" transaction
Rule 13e-3 was adopted in response to Congress' and the SEC's per-
ception that "going private" -transactions could be detrimental to inves-
tors.4 18 A Rule 13e-3 transaction consists of any transaction or series of
transactions4 9 involving at least one of the transactions specified in Rule
13e-3(a)(3)(i) that has either the purpose or reasonable likelihood of (A)
reducing the number of holders of the equity Target Securities below
300; or (B) causing the equity Target Securities to no longer be listed on a
national securities exchange nor authorized for quotation on an inter-
dealer quotation system.4 z0
The transactions specified in paragraph (a)(3)(i) of Rule 13e-3 are:
(A) the purchase of an equity security"' of the issuer; (B) a tender offer
for an equity security of the issuer; and (C) a solicitation subject to Regu-
lations 14A or 14C in connection with "a merger, consolidation, reclas-
sification, recapitalization, reorganization or similar corporate
416. Rule 13e-4(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(c)(1).
417. Rule 13e-4(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(c)(2).
418. Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1990), and Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
100 (1990), were adopted pursuant to sections 17(a) and 19 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77p(a), 77s (1988), and sections 3(b), 10(b), 13(e), 14(a), 14(c), 14(e) and 23(a) of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b), 78j(b), 78m(e), 78n(a), (c), (e), 78w(a) (1988). See HOUSE
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY
OWNERSHIP, H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2811. For an explanation of the purposes of Rule 13e-3, see Exchange Act
Release No. 17,719, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,709, at 17,304 (Apr. 13, 1981); Exchange
Act Release No. 16,075, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,166 (Aug. 2,
1979) (adopting release for Rule 13e-3); Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or
Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release No. 14,185, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 81,336, at 88,736-39 (Nov. 17, 1977).
419. See Exchange Act Release No. 17,719, supra note 418, at 17,307; M. BORDEN, GOING
PRIVATE 10-13 (1989).
420. Rule 13e-3(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(3). A corporation must comply with Rule
13e-3 even if the issuer continues to have other classes of section 12 or section 15(d) securities
held by more than 300 persons. See Exchange Act Release No. 17,719, supra note 418, at
17,306-07. However, "delisting of a class of equity securities from an exchange would not
trigger the application of Rule 13e-3 if the securities were nevertheless authorized to be quoted
on an inter-dealer quotation system of a registered national securities association." Exchange
Act Release No. 16,075, supra note 418, at 82,125.
421. See supra note 386, for the definition of "equity security" under the Exchange Act.
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transaction,"422 or a sale of substantially all assets to an affiliate, or cer-
tain reverse stock splits.423 As this list indicates, practitioners should
note that Rule 13e-3 is not limited to tender offers, as are Rule 13e-4 and
Regulation 14E.424
The "reasonable likelihood" phrase of Rule 13e-3 has been con-
strued quite liberally.425 Consequently, in determining whether a trans-
action has a reasonable likelihood of causing one of the specified
"effects," the contemplated transaction should be given its full effect-it
should be assumed that the issuer will acquire all of the securities or
consents it seeks. Practitioners are well advised to regard an Exchange
Offer for "any or all" Target Securities as having a "reasonable likeli-
hood" of producing the described effects and as evidence of a "purpose"
of producing such effects.
2. Exception to Rule 13e-3
A commonly relied-upon Rule 13e-3 exemption in many out-of-
court restructurings, including Exchange Offers, is found in paragraph
(g)(2) of Rule 13e-3.426 This exemption applies when holders of Target
Securities are "offered or receive only an equity security" either (i) with
"substantially the same rights" as the Target Securities or (ii) that is
common stock of the issuer.4 27 It is often unclear whether a New Secur-
ity has "substantially the same rights" as the Target Security.42 The
422. Rule 13e-3(a)(3)(i)(C), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(i)(C). "Rule 13e-3 is intended to ap-
ply to a merger, consolidation or similar multi-party reorganization transaction of an issuer
only if an affiliate of the issuer is also a party to the transaction." Exchange Act Release No.
17,719, supra note 418, at 17,306 (footnote omitted).
423. Rule 13e-3(a)(3)(i)(A)-(C), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(3)(i)(A)-(C).
424. In fact, Rule 13e-3 can be triggered by, among other things, Exchange Offers, Section
3(a)(10) Settlement Exchanges, Reclassifications, Consent Solicitations, recapitalizations and
most other restructuring transactions.
425. See, eg., Shamrock Assoc. v. Horizon Corp., 632 F. Supp. 566, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(holding that "conclusionary allegations of a reasonable likelihood would probably suffice to
withstand a motion to dismiss a claim under Rule 13e-3").
426. Rule 13e-3(g)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g)(2).
427. Rule 13e-3(g)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g)(2)(i). In addition, the (g)(2) exception
requires that holders of the Target Securities continue to be entitled to Exchange Act reporting
information from the issuer and that the New Securities continue to be listed on an exchange
or authorized for quotation on an inter-dealer system. Rule 13e-3(g)(2)(ii)-(iii), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-3(g)(2)(ii)-(iii). The New Security need not be listed or quoted on the same ex-
change or system as the Target Security to satisfy this requirement. See id.; cf. First Fidelity
Savings & Loan Ass'n, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Aug. 28, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file) (Staff declined to take a no-action position because the New Security itself would
neither be registered pursuant to section 12 nor subject to the reporting requirements of section
15, although counsel had represented that the issuer was a section 12(g) reporting company
that made the requisite information available to the public in its periodic filings).
428. The exception itself states that the rights contemplated include, but are "not limited to,
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SEC has stated, however, that the protection of Rule 13e-3 is not needed
when the security holders "are on an equal footing and are permitted to
maintain an equivalent or enhanced equity interest."42 9
In a Registered Exchange proposed by Savin Corporation, the Staff
took a no-action position in connection with the proposed use of the
(g)(2) exception for Savin's exchange of new convertible preferred stock
for existing convertible debt securities and existing convertible preferred
stock.4 30 The new convertible preferred stock had an enhanced conver-
sion rate over the Target Securities, voting rights equal or superior to the
Target Securities and liquidation rights only slightly lower than to the
Target Securities. 431  The dividend rate of the new preferred stock was
lower than that of the target preferred stock and was payable in addi-
tional shares of new preferred stock.432 The corporation, however, had
been unable to pay any cash dividends on the target preferred stock or
interest on the debt securities. 433 The redemption price of the new pre-
ferred stock was also lower than that of the target preferred stock, re-
flecting the "distressed financial condition of the [c]orporation."
434
In another no-action letter concerning the (g)(2) exception, Trans
World Airlines proposed to exchange any or all outstanding
subordinated convertible debentures for a new issue of subordinated con-
vertible debt with a different interest rate, maturity date, conversion ra-
tio, and sinking fund and optional redemption terms.4 35 The Staff took a
no-action position, noting that the new debt securities would be similar
to the old securities in that both would "be entitled to an annual interest
payment, convertible into Trans World Common Stock, subject to sink-
ing fund requirements, subordinated to Senior Debt, listed on the New
voting, dividends, redemption and liquidation rights." Rule 13e-3(g)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13(g)(2)(i) (1990).
429. Exchange Act Release No. 16,075, supra note 418, at 82,127 (emphasis added). A
number of no-action letters issued by the Staff support this statement-even when the New
Securities differ greatly from the Target Securities. See, eg., Snyder Oil Partners L.P., SEC
No-Action Letter (avail. Sept. 18, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsee library, Noact file) (exemption for
exchange of new common stock of a new corporation for old common units of predecessor
limited partnership); First Pennsylvania Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. July 12, 1984)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (exemption for exchange of new convertible depository
preferred stock for old convertible debentures).






435. Trans World Airlines, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Nov. 2, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file).
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York Stock Exchange and subject to an indenture qualified under the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939. "1436 The Staff apparently accepted the rep-
resentations that the variations in the particular terms of these rights
were designed to give the New Securities a slight premium over the mar-
ket value of the Target Securities.437
In contrast, the Staff refused to take a no-action position regarding
an exchange proposed by Damson Oil Corp.438 In a proposed Section
3(a)(9) Exchange, Damson proposed to offer new convertible preferred
stock for outstanding convertible preferred stock.4 39 The conversion fea-
tures of both the Target Securities and the New Securities did not acti-
vate for a period of time after the initial issuance of each series of
securities; however, the Target Securities had become convertible by the
time the Staff responded to Damson's no-action request." 0 The conver-
sion of the New Securities could have been delayed by Damson up to
eighteen months from the time the Target Securities became convertible.
In its response to Damson's no-action request, the Staff noted that the
Target Securities were then presently convertible, and that the New Se-
curities would not be convertible when issued. 44 1
3. Disclosure and filing requirements
Corporations must fie a Schedule 13E-3 with the SEC concurrently
with the commencement of an Exchange Offer whenever Rule 13e-3 ap-
plies, and no exemption is available under the Rule.' 2 Many of the dis-
closure items of Schedule 13E-3 are similar or identical to those of
Schedule 13E-4 and Schedule 141D-1. Unlike the other self-tender offer
disclosure rules, however, Item 8 to Schedule 13E-3 requires the issuer
(of its affiliate, if applicable) to state whether it "reasonably believes that
436. Id.; see also American Midland Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Sept. 21, 1986)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (no-action position granted for use of the Rule 13e-3(g)(2)
exemption in an exchange of new convertible subordinated debentures for old convertible
subordinated debentures).
437. Trans World Airlines, supra note 435. For a brief discussion of some of the features of
New Securities that can create this premium, see supra text accompanying notes 39-41.





442. Schedule 13E-3, General Instruction A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1990). When the
transaction is also subject to, for example, requirements under Regulation 14E or Rule 13e-4,
the Schedule 13E-3 need only contain a cover sheet, a cross-reference sheet indicating where
the information required by Schedule 13E-3 may be found in the other material, a copy of such
other material, and a signature page. Schedule 13E-3, General Instruction F, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-100; Exchange Act Release No. 16,075, supra note 418, at 82,128.
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the Rule 13e-3 transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security hold-
ers" 44 3 and to discuss "in reasonable detail the material factors upon
which the belief... is based."' 4 Item 9 requires a summary of any
"report, opinion (other than an opinion of counsel) or appraisal from an
outside party which is materially related to the Rule 13e-3 transaction"
including any report relating to the fairness of the transaction or the fair-
ness of the consideration."' Additionally, the person filing the Schedule
must state whether a majority of outside directors retained an unaffiliated
representative to report on the fairness, or negotiate the terms, of the
transaction on behalf of the unaffiliated security holders." 6 All of these
items must be prominently set forth in a "special factors section ... in
the forepart of the disclosure document furnished to security holders. 1
41 7
C. The Proxy Rules
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act448 and the rules and regulations
enacted thereunder 449 govern the solicitation of proxies for votes and
consents of holders of securities that are registered under section 12 of
the Exchange Act.45 ' The proxy rules apply to Exchange Offers primar-
ily in the following situations: (1) a corporation conducts a Consent So-
licitation to modify terms of Target Securities registered under section 12
of the Exchange Act;45 1 (2) the securities exchange on which the corpo-
ration's common stock is listed conditions approval of an additional list-
443. Schedule 13E-3, Item 8(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100.
444. Id. Item 8(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100.
445. Id. Item 9(a), (b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100. Such report, opinion or appraisal must be
made available to holders of the Target Securities for inspection and copying. Id. Item 9(c), 17
C.F.R. § 240.13e-100.
446. Id. Item 8(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100.
447. Exchange Act Release No. 16,075, supra note 418, at 82,129. The information called
for in Item 7, regarding the purpose(s), alternatives, reasons and effects of the transaction must
also be set forth in the "special factors" section. Schedule 13E-3, Item 7(a)-(d), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-100.
448. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). The proxy rules
define the term "proxy" as including "every proxy, consent or authorization." Rule 14a-l(f),
17 C.F.R. § 14a-l(f) (1988).
449. Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to .14a-102, 240.14b-1, .14b-2 (1990). Regu-
lation 14C governs transactions in which every holder of a class of securities registered pursu-
ant to section 12 of the Exchange Act is entitled to vote or consent to a given transaction but
from whom proxies or consents are not solicited. Rule 14c-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2 (1990).
Regulation 14C basically parallels Regulation 14A. See supra note 25.
450. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988). Section 12 securities are equity securities, including debt se-
curities convertible into equity securities, held by more than 500 holders, and equity and debt
securities (including non-convertible debt securities) listed on a national securities exchange.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(b)(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b), (g). See supra note 386 for
the definition of "equity securities" under the Exchange Act, including the proxy rules.
451. Modifications may be sought to permit a contemplated restructuring or other transac-
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:527
ing application for any common stock that may be offered as New
Securities in an Exchange Offer (or common stock issuable upon conver-
sion of such New Securities) on stockholder approval if that new com-
mon stock would represent a significant percentage of the outstanding
voting power of the corporation;45 or (3) the New Securities that would
be issued in the Exchange Offer are shares of stock that require an
amendment to the corporation's current charter to be properly
authorized. 3
A corporation conducting an Exchange Offer and Consent Solicita-
tion that is subject to the proxy rules will have to present information to
security holders in the form of a proxy statement that complies with
Schedule 14A under the Exchange Act and that must be filed with the
SEC.454 Rule 14a-6 of the Exchange Act requires that a corporation fur-
nish preliminary proxy materials to the SEC at least ten calendar days
tion, or to create an inducement for holders of Target Securities to participate in a Section
3(a)(9) Exchange. See supra notes 44 & 303-08 and accompanying text.
452. The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (the NYSE) requires such stockholder approval
as a "prerequisite to listing when":
[c]ommon stock or securities convertible into or exercisable for common stock are to
be issued in any transaction or series of related transactions, other than a public
offering for cash, (i) if the common stock has or will have upon issuance voting power
equal to or in excess of 20% of the voting power outstanding* before the issuance of
such stock or securities convertible into or exercisable for common stock, or (ii) the
number of shares of common stock to be issued is or will be equal to or in excess of
20% of the number of shares of common stock outstanding before the issuance of the
stock.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03(c) (2d ed. 1990)
(" 'Voting power outstanding' refers to the aggregate number of votes which may be cast by
holders of those securities outstanding which entitle the holders thereof to vote generally on all
matters submitted to the company's security holders for a vote.' "). The NYSE rules allow for
exemption from this rule when the delay caused by a stockholder vote "would seriously jeop-
ardize the financial viability of the enterprise," and the company audit committee endorses
that conclusion. Id. (omitting other requirements).
The American Stock Exchange also requires stockholder approval for the sale or issuance
by the issuer of common stock (or securities convertible into common stock) equal to 20% or
more of presently outstanding stock for less than the greater of book or market value of the
stock. AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE § 713 (1988); cf. Schedule D to the
By-Laws, Part III § 5(i), NASD Manual (CCH) S 1812, at 1573-1 (1990) (requiring stock-
holder approval of issuances of common stock or securities convertible into common stock by
NASDAQ traded corporations if the issuance will result in a change of control of the issuer; if
the issuance is in connection with the acquisition of another corporation and represents 20%
or more of the common stock or voting power outstanding; or if the issuance is in connection
with a non-public offering transaction and represents 20% or more of the common stock or
voting power outstanding).
453. The most obvious examples of this would occur when the class or series of new securi-
ties which would be capital stock are not currently authorized, or there is not sufficient remain-
ing authorized but not issued shares of an authorized class or series of capital stock should the
maximum number of shares be issued in the Exchange Offer.
454. Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1990).
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before definitive copies are sent to security holders.455 This filing is in-
tended to give the SEC time to review and comment on the proxy state-
ment prior to initial mailing; however, the SEC usually takes significantly
longer to review proxy material relating to restructurings. Consequently,
this review process may delay the mailing of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange
if the corporation wants to disseminate an integrated Offering Circular/
Consent Solicitation Statement. If the SEC requires revision of the pre-
liminary proxy materials or if a new proposal is added, the ten-day pe-
riod does not recommence unless the revisions or new proposals are
considered a fundamental change in the proxy disclosure. 56 All defini-
tive proxy materials should be sent to the SEC and to each exchange
upon which any securities of the corporation are listed no later than the
date such materials are first sent or given to security holders. 57
D. Trust Indenture Act
The TIA applies to restructurings that include the issuance of New
Securities that are secured or unsecured publicly issued debt securities in
an aggregate principal amount greater than ten million dollars.45 8
Although the TIA incorporates most of the Section 3(a) exemptions of
the Securities Act, it does not incorporate Section 3(a)(9) 59 Therefore,
in every Section 3(a)(9) Exchange, the indenture relating to the New Se-
curity must be filed with and qualified by the SEC.4 °
The issuer of debt securities subject to the TIA, but exempt from
registration under the Securities Act, is required to fie an application to
qualify the indenture underlying such debt securities on a Form T-3
461
with the SEC.4 62 The Form T-3 need only be filed with the SEC prior to
455. Rule 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1990).
456. Id.
457. Rule 14a-6(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(c) (1990).
458. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, §§ 303-05, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77ccc-eee (1988), as amended by
Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550 (Nov. 15, 1990).
459. Id. § 304(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(4)(A).
460. Id. §§ 305-06, 309, 15 U.S.C. §§ 777eee-fff, iii (1988). This includes a supplemental
indenture that effects an amendment of existing debt securities that is so substantial that it is
deemed to effect the issuance of a "New Security," but such an issuance is exempted from
Securities Act registration because of Section 3(a)(9). See supra notes 360-81 and accompany-
ing text describing how the amendment of existing securities can be deemed to create a "New
Security."
461. Form T-3, 17 C.F.R. § 269.3 (1990).
462. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 307(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77ggg(a) (1988); Rule 7a-1, 17
C.F.R. § 260.7a-1 (1990); Rule 7a-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 260.7a-3(a) (1990). In addition, the
trustee that will serve under the indenture must file a Form T-1, 17 C.F.R. § 269.1 (1990), or a
Form T-2, 17 C.F.R. § 269.2 (1990) with the SEC. Rule 5a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 260.5a-1 (1990);
Rule 5a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 260.5a-2 (1990).
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the commencement of a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange;463 however, the quali-
fication must become effective prior to the consummation of the Section
3(a)(9) Exchange and the issuance of the New Securities that are debt.4"4
VI. CONCLUSION
In these tumultuous economic times, both healthy and troubled cor-
porations will continue to search for efficient and cost effective methods
of restructuring outside of bankruptcy. Out-of-court restructurings,
whether Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges, Consent Solicitations, Registered Ex-
changes, Section 4(2) Private Exchanges, Section 3(a)(10) Settlement Ex-
changes, Reclassifications, Prepackaged Bankruptcies, or hybrids and
combinations of these transactions, all can offer distinct advantages over
the sometimes lengthy, costly and uncertain process of traditional bank-
ruptcy proceedings. In particular, Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges and Con-
sent Solicitations, in combination or separately, provide especially
attractive methods of avoiding the problems associated with a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. As a result, these transactions remain important al-
ternatives for a corporation considering a restructuring.
While Section 3(a)(9) Exchanges and Consent Solicitations can be
commenced quickly and completed cost effectively, these transactions are
not necessarily simple, at least from a legal or logistical analysis perspec-
tive, and require a working understanding of many legal specialties. This
Article has attempted to highlight and analyze the multitude of securities
law issues that arise in these transactions, hopefully giving practition-
ers-and indirectly their clients-an opportunity to take full advantage
of the benefits of these transactions.
463. Letter to Neal S. McCoy, Esq., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, from SEC
(June 23, 1989) (cited as Mississippi Chem. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (avail. June 23,
1989) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (Staff stating that "a solicitation relating to an offer
of debt securities exempt from registration pursuant to Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act
may commence when an application for qualification of an indenture has been filed under the
[TIA].") (clarifying Mississippi Chem. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 25, 1988) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file) (intimating a different conclusion))). See Trust Indenture Act of
1939, § 306(c), 15 U.S.C. 7fff(c) (1988) ("It shall be unlawful to offer to sell any [debt] security
-which is not registered under the Securities Act .... unless such security ... is to be issued
under an indenture and an application for qualification has beenfiled as to such indenture."
(emphasis added)).
464. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 306, 15 U.S.C. § 77fff. The Staff, however, has taken a
no-action position that persons other than issuers or underwriters can enter into when-issued
contracts for the purchase or sale of debt securities to be issued pursuant to a Section 3(a)(9)
Exchange after a Form T-3 has been filed but before qualification becomes effective. Jerome L.
Coben, Esq., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, SEC No-Action Letter (avail. Mar. 12,
1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). "This no-action position ... reversed the SEC's
prior position that when-issued trading was prohibited prior to the qualification of an inden-
ture." C. JOHNSON, supra note 280, at 755-56 n.71.
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